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Designing contracts for the Global Fund: Lessons from the theory of incentives.

Author: 
Wren-Lewis L
Source: 
Washington, D.C., Center for Global Development, 2016 Feb. 38 p. (Center for Global Development Working Paper 425)
Abstract: 

This paper uses contract theory to suggest simple contract designs that could be used by the Global Fund. Using a basic model of procurement, we lay out five alternative options and consider when each is likely to be most appropriate. The rest of the paper then discusses how one can build a real-world contract from these theoretical foundations, and how these contracts should be adapted to different contexts when the basic assumptions do not hold. Finally, we provide a synthesis of these various results with the aim of guiding policy makers as to when and how ‘results-based’ incentive contracts can be used in practice.

Language: 
Year: 
Region / Country: 
Document Number: 
375674
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