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Implementing GIPA: how USAID missions and their implementing partners in five Asian countries are fostering greater involvement of people living with HIV / AIDS.
Washington, D.C., Futures Group International, POLICY Project, 2004 Jan.  p. (USAID Contract No. HRN-C-00-00-00006-00)On behalf of the Asia/Near East Bureau (ANE) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the POLICY Project undertook an assessment of how the Greater Involvement of People Living with HIV/AIDS (GIPA) Principle is being implemented in the ANE region. Five USAID Missions and 12 implementing agencies (IAs) in the region participated in the assessment, which was undertaken in May and June 2003 in Cambodia, India, Nepal, Philippines, and Viet Nam. The purpose of the assessment was to ascertain how Missions, IAs, and NGOs are incorporating GIPA principles into their organizations and into the programmatic work they support and implement. A self-administered questionnaire was completed by 23 respondents from Missions, IAs, and NGOs. The assessment found a high level of awareness of GIPA and a commitment by most organizations to foster and promote GIPA principles, within their organizations and in the work they carry out. Ninety-one percent of respondents from the three types of organizations believe that their organizations’ planning, programs, and policymaking activities are or would be enhanced by GIPA. (excerpt)
The level of effort in the national response to HIV / AIDS: the AIDS Program Effort Index (API), 2003 round.
Washington, D.C., USAID, 2003 Dec.  p.The success of HIV/AIDS programs can be affected by many factors, including political commitment, program effort, socio-cultural context, political systems, economic development, extent and duration of the epidemic , and resources available. Many programs track low-level inputs (e.g., training workshops conducted, condoms distributed) or outcomes (e.g., percentage of acts protected by condom use). Measures of program effort are generally confined to the existence or lack of major program elements (e.g., condom social marketing, counseling and testing). To assist countries in such evaluation efforts, several guides have been developed by the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other organizations (see, for example, “Meeting the Behavioural Data Collection Needs of National HIV/AIDS and STD Programmes” and “National AIDS Programs: A Guide to Monitoring and Evaluation of HIV/AIDS Programs”). However, information about the policy environment, level of political support, and other contextual issues affecting the success and failure of national AIDS programs has not been addressed previously. (excerpt)
Proceedings of the Caribbean Regional Conference "Operations Research: Key to Management and Policy", Dover Convention Centre, St. Lawrence, Barbados, May 31 - June 2, 1989.
[New York, New York], Population Council, 1989. 19,  p.Objectives, proceedings, and conclusions of a Caribbean regional conference on operations research (OR) in maternal-child health and family planning programs (FP/MCH) are summarized. Sponsored by the Population Council, USAID, and UNICEF, participants included policy makers, program managers, service providers, and representatives from international agencies in health and family planning from Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the U.S. The conference was held with hopes of contributing to the legitimization of OR as a management tool, and helping to develop a network of program directors and researchers interested in using OR for program improvement. Specifically, participants were called upon to review the progress and results of recent regional OR projects, analyze the utilization of these projects by policy makers and program managers, highlight regional quality of care, and establish directions for future projects in the region. Overall, the conference contributed to the dissemination and documentation of OR, and provided a forum in which to identify important service, research, and policy issues for the future. OR can improve FP/MCH services, and make positive contributions to the social impact of these programs. The unmet need of teenagers and men and structural adjustment were identified as issues of concern. Strategies will need to be developed to maintain currently high levels of contraceptive prevalence, while responding to the needs of special groups, with OR expected to focus on the quality of care especially in education and counseling, and screening and user follow-up. The technical competence of service providers and follow-up mechanisms are both in need of improvement, while stronger institutional and management capabilities should be developed through training and human resource development.
Population growth problem in developing countries: coordinated assistance essential, Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General.
Wash., D.C., GAO, 1978 Dec. 91 p.This document argues that a formal coordinating mechanism should be established to oversee the increasing bilateral and multilateral assistance funds being channeled into population activities in developing countries. Effective coordination is needed, according to the General Accounting Office, to ensure that funds are applied to the highest priorities, to maximize efficiency of country programs, and to take advantage of opportunities of cost reduction. The report is based on visits to 6 countries including Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Thailand, and interviews with U.S. ambassadors, AID mission directors, officials of donor organizations and host governments, and visits to headquarters of voluntary organizations and the 3 principal donors of population assistance. Viewpoints of the officials and agencies contacted and provisions for coordination within country programs are described. In-country coordination was found to consist largely of informal discussion among field representatives, officials of several voluntary organizations warned that overdeveloped coordination would be counterproductive, and officials of AID, the World Bank, and UNFPA, the main donors, felt that obstacles in the way of greater coordination were many. The GAO was unable to identify instances of unproductive duplication.
In: To cure all hunger. Food policy and food security in Sudan, edited by Simon Maxwell. London, England, Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991. 191-206.Targeting on grounds of equity, cost, or minimizing interference fails to consider whether targeting is politically possible. In the case of the USAID-sponsored famine-relief and emergency food aid operation in Darfur, western Sudan, in 1985, the expressed intention of target this relief was not fulfilled. The target group received inadequate amounts of relief grain owing to the lack of targeting by area councils within Darfur, and the lack of targeting within area councils. After severe rainfall failures in 1982, 1983 and 1984, large numbers of people in western Sudan faced severe food shortage, abnormal migrations, and increased risk of destitution. USAID, the principal donor for relief operations to western Sudan in 1984-85, approved 82,000 metric tons (mt) of relief grain for western Sudan in September 1984, and then a further 250,000 mt in late 1984 and early 1985. The target population for the first 41,000 mt of relief sorghum was the neediest one-fourth later, the neediest one-third. A USAID document provided estimates of people and the way the area councils conceived sheltering throngs of the target group. There was 153,141 seriously affected in Kutum area council, 102,907 in Mellit, and 507,348 in Geneina representing around 25% of Darfur's population, the size of the target group envisaged for the first 41,000 mt of relief grain. USAID made concessions to the Darfur regional government allowing South Darfur a higher proportion of early allocations than need dictated. Save the Children Fund experienced serious difficulties with the local contractor to distribute food from area-council level. Aid agencies and donors need to consider how targeting is to be accomplished and how to confront influential local players with interests contrary to such targeting. Allocations of relief grain could be made on the assumption that targeting will be only partially achieved; and through alternative forms of relief.
Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1991. vii, 266 p. (Order No. 9116069)The effectiveness of official development assistance in responding to health problems in recipient countries may be examined in terms of 1) the results of specific aid-supported projects, 2) the degree to which the activities have contributed to recipients' institutional capacity, and 3) the impact of aid on national policy and the broader development process. A review of the literature indicates a number of conceptual and practical constraints to assessing health aid effectiveness. Numerous health projects have been evaluated and issues of sustainability have been studied, but relatively little is known about the systemic effects of health aid. The experience of Nigeria is analyzed between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s. In the 1970s, Nigeria's income rose substantially from oil revenues, and a national program was undertaken to increase the provision of basic health services. The program did not achieve its immediate objectives, and health sector problems were exacerbated by the decline of national income during the 1980s. Since 1987, a progressive national primary healthcare policy has been in place. Aid has been given to Nigeria in comparatively small amounts per capita. Among the major donors, WHO, UNICEF, and, most recently, the World Bank, have assisted the development of general health services, while USAID, UNFPA, and the Ford Foundation have aided the health sector with the principal objective of promoting family planning. 3 projects are examined as case studies. They are: a model of family health clinics for maternal and child care; a largescale research project for health and family planning services; and a national immunization program. The effectiveness of each was constrained initially by limited coordination among donors and by the lack of a supportive policy framework. The 1st 2 of these projects developed service delivery models that have been reflected in the national health strategy. The immunization program has reached nationwide coverage, although with uncertain systemic impact. Overall, aid is seen as having made a marginal but significant contribution to health development in Nigeria,a primarily through the demonstration of new service delivery approaches and the improvement of management capacity. (author's)
FRONT LINES. 1989 Dec; 6, 13.Projects supported by the Directorate for Population (S&T/POP) of the U.S. Agency for International Development and aimed at increasing for-profit private sector involvement in providing family planning services and products are described. Making products commercially available through social-marketing partnerships with the commercial sector, USAID has saved $1.1 million in commodity costs from Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Peru. Active private sector involvement benefits companies, consumers, and donors through increased corporate profits, healthier employees, improved consumer access at lower cost, and the possibility of sustained family planning programs. Moreover, private, for-profit companies will be able to meet service demands over the next 20 years where traditional government and donor agency sources would fail. Using employee surveys and cost-benefit analyses to demonstrate expected financial and health benefits for businesses and work forces, S&T/POP's Technical Information on Population for the Private Sector (TIPPS) project encourages private companies in developing countries to invest in family planning and maternal/child health care for their employees. 36 companies in 9 countries have responded thus far, which examples provided from Peru and Zimbabwe. The Enterprise program's objectives are also to increase the involvement of for-profit companies in delivering family planning services, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of private volunteer organizations in providing services. Projects have been started with mines, factories, banks, insurance companies, and parastatals in 27 countries, with examples cited from Ghana and Indonesia. Finally, the Social Marketing for Change project (SOMARC) builds demand and distributes low-cost contraceptives through commercial channels especially to low-income audiences. Partnerships have been initiated with the private sector in 17 developing countries, with examples provided from the Dominican Republic, Liberia and Ecuador. These projects have increased private sector involvement in family planning, thereby promoting service expansion at lower public sector cost.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY. 1987 Jul 11; 22(28):1099.India's family planning program has been restructured from a massive effort, using multimedia promotion and 2 million volunteers and designed to convey the "small family message" directly to the families concerned, to a smaller scale program emphasizing child survival, delayed marriage, village infrastructure, and birth spacing. The change is due to 2 factors: 1) The terminal approach failed to achieve lower birth rates because people will not accept the small family unless they can rely on the survival of the children; and 2) The terminal approach contained an element of coercion which caused the US to reduce support to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). The new scaled-down approach should be more effective, since more couples are now practicing family planning and birth spacing, oral contraceptives, IUDs, and longterm hormonal contraceptives are more appropriate than terminal methods to the present demographic picture.
[Unpublished] 1986 Aug. 71,  p. (AID Contract No. DPE-3024-C-00-4063-00)The evaluation of the Resources for Awareness of Population in Development (RAPID II) Project was initiated on June 18, 1985, 25 months into the project operation, to determine if the results of actions undertaken thus far have been adequate to justify the time and money spent on them and to find ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the program efforts. The objective of the 5-year RAPIDS II project is to assist those involved in development planning to better understand the relationship between population growth and socioeconomic development and thereby increase the less developed country (LDC) commitment to efforts designed to reduce rapid rates of population increase. This evaluation report discusses the development assistance context and then focuses on the following: RAPID II operations over the 1984-85 period; policy analyses and LDC subcontracting; the RAPID model and its presentation; visits by the evaluation team to the countries of the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Cameroon, and Liberia; what works in terms of population policy development; some major problems and potential resolutions; and RAPID II activities over the 1985-88 period. US Agency for International Development (USAID) officials in Washington as well as in the field described RAPID II as being of continuing utility in helping to create a climate favorable to more effective population policies. The review of RAPID II activities was generally positive. The project was identified as useful in several countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Due to the evidence of satisfactory performance in the field, the evaluation focused on differences between plan and midterm results with a view toward suggesting course corrections that can improve project performance. As population policy development is an inherently ambiguous field of activity, it has not been possible to draw clear lines between specific policy development activities and policy change in particular countries. Yet, there has been an improvement in the environment for population programs in LDCs. There were significant differences between planned and actual expenditures under the several subcategories of project expenditure. RAPID II total expenditures in the first 2 years of the project equalled budgeted expenditures when the contract was signed, but the distribution of expenditures by category was substantially different from what had been anticipated. It is recommended that emphasis in the project must shift predominantly to policy analyses (80% of remaining funds) and that that RAPID-style presentation resources (20%) be used carefully for only the highest priority requests. In regard to development of LDC subcontracts for policy analysis, efficiency has been low.