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Community Development Journal. 1983; 18(2):104-19.A review of demographic trends and health and social problems in the fast growing urban areas of the world indicates that, in the future, increasing numbers of people will be living in precarious socioeconomic conditions which impede the achievement of health. It is estimated that from 4.4 billion in 1980 the world's population will increase to 6.2 billion by the year 2000. The urban population will increase from 1.8 to 3.2 billion during the same period, over 2 billion of which will be in developing countries. The rapid and often uncontrollable demographic growth of cities, especially in the developing world, stimulates the demand for resources, intensifies their utilization and creates an intolerable pressure on the urban infrastructure and physical environment. A number of action oriented projects to combat disease and contamination have been successful. Projects in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Colombo, Sri Lanka, Hyderabad, India, Guayaquil, Ecuador, Lima, Peru, and Rio de Janeiro have been implemented under a partnership among WHO, UNICEF, the Netherlands Aid Agency, the World Bank, and other international organizationals and governments. These projects all emphasize the fundamental role of community organizations, especially that of women; low-cost technology and the need to mobilize and efficiently use locally available resources; an ecological multisectoral concept of health whereby action concerning the environment, education, income generation and the availability of food, all with a powerful disease preventive potential, carry equal if not greater weight than the efforts to provide the population with health centers or implement curative practices. All these projects are focused on marginal groups; many were initiated by imaginative individuals or groups with a considerable amount of social orientation and motivation, and often, at least in the beginning, without the support of governments, nongovernmental or international organizations. It is important to study these projects in their accomplishments and failures; to help describe them and disseminate related information when appropriate; and to promote political and technical support for those which are successful so that they can rapidly come out of the experimental/demonstration phase and be expanded to become part of routine programs.
Revue Tiers Monde. 1983 Apr-Jun; 24(94):305-24.This article discusses methodologies for arriving at population projections and predictions and their limitations, and presents short-term predictions for 1980-2000, longterm projections for 2000-2025, and very longterm projections for 2025-2100, which are highly speculative. The UN population projections for 210 countries and territories are provided by age and sex and by rural or urban status. The UN projections are prepared in 3 phases: 1) analysis of the quality of the basic data in different regions; 2) development of hypotheses concerning the evolution of fertility, mortality, and migration; and 3) separate projection of each component of growth. 4 variants, the medium, high, low, and constant fertility versions are usually prepared, of which the medium projection is considered most likely and that of constant fertility is included only for comparisons. The world crude reproduction rate fell from 2.41 in 1950 to 1.96 in 1975-80, and is expected to fall to 1.34 during 2000-2010 and to almost unity in the mid 21st century. Only Africa and Latin America are expected to have crude reproduction rates above replacement level in 2025. According to the medium projection, the world population will each 6.2 billion in 2000 and 10.4 billion in 2075, when it will be nearly stationary. Future growth in already developed countries will be minimal, but Third World countries, which had a population of 1.7 billion in 1950 and 3.3 billion in 1980, will have nearly 5 billion by 2000 and will stabilize at about 9.1 billion, representing 87% of total world population. About 40% will live in South Asia. The population in 2075 will be 1.2 billion in Latin America, 2.2 billion in Africa, and 1.7 billion in East Asia. The age structure of the future population will undergo considerable aging and the trend toward urbanization will accelerate.
Intercom. 1983 Mar-Apr; 11(3-4):10.Despite news reports of the end of the world population explosion and a consequent lessening of public concern with the issue, the seriousness of the threat of population growth has not diminished, and world population continues to increase at a rate anticipated by demographers. The source of the articles heralding a nonexistent end to the explosion was a 1982 UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) report that noted that if all countries' birthrates had remained at the high level of the 1950s, world population in the year 2000 would be about 7.5 billion, while the most recently published UN projection is 6.1 billion for that year. Misinterpretation of UN population projections was largely responsible for the misleading news reports: UN projections are based on educated guesses about future fertility behavior in different countries and are issued in high, medium, and low variants to indicate possible ranges of error. The most recent range for the year 2000 is 5.8-6.3 billion compared to the 4.6 billion presently living. The UN medium projection for 2000 has always hovered in the 6.1-6.5 billion range. The illustrative projection of 7.5 billion published by the UN in 1963 to show what world population would be if all countries' birthrates remained at the level of the late 1950s was never intended as a baseline against which actual trends were to be measured, despite its use as such in recent reports. UN projections appear to have been quite accurate overall: in 1963, the UN projected a 1980 population of 4.3 billion and in 1980 its population estimate was 4.4 billion.
Intercom. 1983 May-Jun; 11(5-6):8-9.The eventual accuracy of population projections depends on many variables, and for this reason the demographer must remain wary of placing too much faith in the results. Projections are simply scenarios of what a population's size might be and its age-sex composition could look like under a given set of conditions. Before a demographer proceeds with a projection, it is necessary to answer a few questions: what will the future course of the birthrate be; what will the future trend of life expectancy be; and how will migration affect a country or area's future. Nearly all that can be ascertained about the future size of any population depends on how well foresight can approximate answers to these questions. Of course, the pattern of future birthrates and death rates is unknown. Consequently, the attempt is to make educated guesses, which demographers prefer to term assumptions. Focus is directed to how this process might work when trying to make an assumption on future birthrates, a crucial component of any projection. For example, suppose one wants to project the future birthrate of a country with high fertility and an essentially agrarian economy, the classic preindustrial condition. In practical terms, the issue revolves around the question of when a country with high or moderately high fertility will reach replacement level, i.e., an average of about 2 children per couple. A demographer must assume something about future birthrates in order to make projections, but debates continue on just what effects further social and economic development will have on fertility in different countries. Other factors further complicate the assumption process. There is no certainty that all countries' life expectancies will gradually increase along with health conditions. Migration streams often react to economic conditions or political pressures without warning. And, projections rarely try to incorporate large scale disasters into their assumptions. Mortality caused by calamities such as floods and wars and epidemics find no place in projections due to their unpredictable nature. To illustrate the point, the example of Africa is used, as projected by the UN Population Division. It shows the effect of different assumptions on the pace of fertility decline. UN projections assume, based on Africa's social and economic development, that the continent's fertility will drop to replacement level anywhere from 2030-2070. If it does, the question is what then. What year between 2030-2070 Africa reaches replacement level fertility is of enormous importance as far as its eventual population is concerned, illustrating that projections simply serve as powerful analytical tools and not as forecasts of future population.
In: United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP]. Modelling economic and demographic development. New York, United Nations, 1983. 117-223. (Asian Population Studies Series No. 54)This study uses a longterm demographic-economic model to analyze the effects of the rapid aging of the Japanese population on various aspects of the economy and government programs. It is assumed that the quantitative analysis of the interrelationships between age-structural changes and the socioeconomic system provides a useful basis for Japanese government planners to formulate policy measures to cope with problems arising in connection with an aging population. The study draws on population, economic, and social security submodels in a series of simulation experiments. In the Standard Case, the total fertility rate falls due to economic progress and the rising age at 1st marriage, mortality improves as a result of increased per capita medical expenditures, and population grows at a diminishing rate after peaking at 131.3 million in 2007. The model further projects an increase in the percentage of the population age 65 years and over from 9.1% in 1980 to 23.9% in 2021 and a corresponding decrease in the population ages 15-64 years from 67.4% to 61.8%, Per capita real GNP is projected to continue to rise in the 1980-2025 period. However, the decreasing growth rate of the labor force, increasing financial resources for social security programs, and decline in the average hours worked by those in the labor force are expected to produce an economic slow-down, particularly in the early part of the 21st century. 5 policy measures are proposed to cope with this lowered rate of economic growth: 1) acceleration of the speed of technological progress to compensate for the shortage of young workers; 2) extension of retirement age to ease financial pressures on public pension schemes and retain the economic contributions of aged workers; 3) updating of the skills of aged workers through government vocational retraining programs; 4) the modification of public pension schemes to make benefit provision more selective, and adjustment of the amount of benefits paid out by extending the pensionable age for each scheme; and 5) review of the effectiveness and efficiency of various public medical plans, with attention to unnecessary use of medical services and improvement of preventive interventions.
In: United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP]. Modelling economic and demographic development. New York, United Nations, 1983. 7-51. (Asian Population Studies Series No. 54)An economic-demographic model for Indonesia was constructed to explore the effects of population changes on economic growth. 3 simulations were computed for the 1980-2010 period on the basis of different assumptions regarding growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) and fertility trends. Projection 1 was based on high growth and high fertility (HGHF), projection 2 on low growth and high fertility (LGHF), and projection 3 on low growth and low fertility (LGLF). The HGHF simulation projects an increase in the rate of growth of the GDP from 8% in 1980 to 14% by 2010, whereas the 2 other simulations project increases reaching a peak of around 11% by 1995-2000 and then declining slightly due to slower growth in the manufacturing sector. Population growth will accelerate in 1980-90 due to a faster decline in mortality caused by the growth of GDP, but will then decline from 2.48% in 1990 to 2.05% in 2010. The overall growth under HGHF conditions is slower. The HGHF, LGHF, and LGLF simulations project a total population by 2010 of 289 million, 300 million, and 245 million, respectively. Under high growth, employment in agriculture will rapidly decline from 63% to 22% during 1980-2010, whereas the decline under low growth conditions is only to 34%. A lower growth of GDP will slow down fertility decline, increase population growth, and consequently speed up entry into the labor force. If fertility measures are taken and fertility declines by 50% in 1970-2000, per government projections, labor force conditions will be more favorable. Under HGHF foreign funds are required by the economy until the year 2000, whereas under low growth they are required only until 1995. It is assumed that these projections on the interrelationship between demographic and socioeconomic factors have utility as a basis for formulating a conceptual framework for population policy.
[Brief review of population politics and actions which have been taken to influence population growth and distribution in Colombia (1962-1982)] Breve revision de lo que han sido las politicas y acciones que han requerido influir en el crecimiento y distribution de la poblacion en Colombia (1962-1982).
In: Universidad Central del Ecuador. Instituto de Investiqaciones Economicas. Analisis de politicas poblacionales en America Latina [Seminario Internacional, Quito, Ecuador, 1982] Quito, Ecuador, Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas, 1983. 161-89.Colombia is one of the countries that has most radically modified its pattern of demographic development. In 1978 the fertility rate for the 1st time declined to levels of less than 30/1000. In 1980, for the 1st time in the demographic history of Colombia, an urban zone--the Pacific Region--reached fertility levels inferior to those of the capital. In recent years, the country has undergone a reduction of interdepartmental migration. It is estimated that from 1978 to 2003 the urban population will change from 16 to 28 million and that it will represent 63 to 75% of the total population. The rate of urban growth will be reduced from 3 to 1.7% in the period 1998-2003. Rural population will be stable with a volume of 9.3 million and a growth rate near 0. It is thought that during the next 25 years Colombia's population will concentrate in urban conglomerates of 500,000 at the same time that concentration in intermediate cities of less than 100,000 will be reduced. The number of such cities will increase to at least 20. These predictions are based on recent trends. A historical survey of population politics in Colombia is given as a context in which these changes have occurred. Special attention is given to actions taken during the governments of Carlos Lleras Restrepo and Misael Pastrara Borrero. The 1st encouraged migration from rural areas to intermediate cities and the 2nd fostered migration to large cities. The role of AID in financing Restrepo's politics is examined. It is suggested that Restrepo's plans functioned essentially as descriptive mechanisms which justified political and economic purposes and that their effect on Colombia's demographic changes was insignificant.
[Unpublished] 1983. Presented at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Pittsburgh, April 14-16. 35 p.In 1950 fertility levels in the developing countries were high. The crude birthrates (CBRs) were about 47 in Africa, 42 in the Americas, and 41 in Asia and the Pacific. In Asia and the Pacific, several countries are thought to have had fertility rates between 35-40/1000. In Latin America, Argentina, Cuba, and Uruguay the birthrates were less than 30/1000 and between 30-35/1000 in Chile and Jamaica. No country in Africa was reported to have had a rate below 40 with the sole exception of Gabon which is reported to have had a crude birthrate between 30-35/1000, not only in 1950 but this remained unchanged up to 1980. By 1965 there had been a little change in several countries but virtually no change at all in Africa. During the next 15 years the situation changed markedly in Asia and the Pacific with the crude birthrate decreasing by almost 1/4, from a little more than 39 to 30. There was a similar but slightly smaller decrease in Latin America, a decrease from 40-32, or about 20%. In Africa there was virtually no change. Many scholars and laypersons concerned about the rapid rate of population growth have expressed the view that population policies have been slow to develop. By 1980, 39 countries with a population of 2.6 billion or 78% of the population of all developing countries had adopted official policies to reduce the population growth rate. Many of these policies are without substance but a fairly large number of the countries have developed substantial population programs, as well as policies to reduce rates of population growth. There were an additional 33 countries with a total population of 554 million that had no demographic policy to reduce rates of population growth but nonetheless gave officcial support to family planning activities. Prior to 1960 only India had a population policy to reduce rates of population growth but during the 1960-64 period 4 additional countries in Asia and the Pacific adopted such policies, namely China, Korea, Pakistan, and Fiji. It was not until 1965 and after that African and Latin American countries adopted such policies. The annual number of family planning acceptors in large scale programs increased from a few tens of thousands around 1960 to about 2 1/2 million in 1965 and to approximately 25 million in 1980, excluding China, for which quantitative data are less readily available. In some countries contraceptive prevalence rates remain low after many years of a national family planning program, e.g., Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, and Bangladesh. Various macroeconomic studies, using countries as units, have found that both socioeconomic and population programs have important effects on fertility decline. UN projections (medium variant) to 2000-2005 assume a continuation of fertility decline in less developed countries (LDCs), including the start of decline in black Africa and Arab countries. Even if the UN projections are consistent with the realities of the years ahead, there is enormous population growth ahead.
New York, New York, United Nations, 1983. iv, 29 p. (ST/ESA/SER.E/32.)As part of its technical co-operation in the analysis of population and related demographic data, the UN Department of Technical Co-operation for Development (DTCD) explores innovative methods for increasing the capacity of developing countries to analyze demographic data and prepare population projections speedily and accurately, to meet urgent development needs. The development and increasing availability of computer software programs for demographic analysis will greatly facilitate detailed analysis of demographic and socioeconomic data derived from censuses, surveys, and vital statistics, and aid in the preparation of population projections. DTCD conducted a study of available aoftware packages for demographic analysis and their capabilities and limitations in adapting them to specific minicomputers or microcomputers. The present paper examines 3 major software packages covering the widest range of technics for demographic analysis and population projections. These include "Computer programs for demographic analysis", developed by the US Bureau of the Census: "Computer programs for demographic estimation", developed at the US National Academy of Sciences, and the "Population projection computer program", developed by the UN Population Division. The software packages are evaluated in respect of their function, required computing configuration, transportability, and readability of source code to assist users in determining the adaptability of the programs to their computer configurations. To enhance these programs' utility, DTCD is planning to test, edit, and adapt them to suit specific computer configurations in developing countries. (author's modified)