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  1. 1
    Peer Reviewed

    Population futures for the next three hundred years: Soft landing or surprises to come?

    Demeny P

    Population and Development Review. 2004 Sep; 30(3):507-517.

    World Population in 2300 (United Nations 2003b), reporting on the proceedings of a December 2003 expert group meeting on long-range population projections and presenting the results of a new set of United Nations population projections, bears out Hajnal's argument. Among his three propositions, the validity of the second is the most obvious. There has been a veritable outpouring of demographic projections during the last 50 years, prepared by various international organizations and national agencies, as well as by independent analysts. Among these, the United Nations Population Division's now biennially revised projections are by far the most detailed, best known, and most widely used. This well-deserved prominence reflects the Division's unparalleled access to national data, its in-house analytic experience and resources, and its willingness to draw on outside expertise whenever that might usefully complement its own. The most recent of the biennial projections, the 2002 Revision (United Nations 2003a), is the immediate predecessor of World Population in 2300, and indeed the former provides the year 2000 to 2050 component for the new set of long-term projections covering the next 300 years. This new set is not just one among the many. It is distinguished from the routine by an exceptionally brave ambition: to draw a picture of plausible demographic futures up to the year 2300 and to do so in extraordinary detail: country-by-country according to the political map of the early twenty-first century. (excerpt)
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  2. 2

    [A model of world population growth as an experiment in systematic research] Model' rosta naseleniya zemli kak opyt sistemnogo issledovaniya.

    Kapitsa S

    VOPROSY STATISTIKI. 1997; (8):46-57.

    A mathematical model was developed for the estimation of global population growth, and the estimates were compared with those of the UN and covered the stretch of 4.4 million years B.C. to the years 2175 and 2500 A.D. The estimates were also broken down into human, geological, and technological historical periods. The model showed that human population would stabilize at the level of 14 billion around 2500 A.D. and 13 billion around 2200 A.D., in accordance with UN projections. It also revealed the history of human population growth through the following stages (UN figures are listed in parentheses): 100,000, about 1.6 million years ago; 5 (1-5) million, 35,000 B.C.; 21 (10-15) million, 7000 B.C.; 46 (47) million, 2000 B.C.; 93 (100-230) million, at the time of Christ; 185 (275-345) million, 1000 A.D.; 366 (450-540) million, 1500 A.D.; 887 (907) million, 1800 A.D.; 1158 (1170) million, 1850 A.D.; 1656 (1650-1710) million, 1900 A.D.; 2812 (2515) million, 1950 A.D.; 5253 (5328) million, 1990 A.D.; 6265 (6261) million, 2000 A.D.; 10,487 (10,019) million, 2050 A.D.; 12,034 (11,186) million, 2100 A.D.; 12,648 (11,543) million, 2150 A.D.; 12,946 (11,600) million, 2200 A.D.; and 13,536 million, 2500 A.D. The model advanced the investigation of phenomena by studying the interactions between economical, technological, social, cultural, and biological processes. The analysis showed that humanity has reached a critical phase in its growth and that development in each period depended on external, not internal, factors. This permits the formulation of the principle of demographic imperative (distinct from the Malthusian principle), which states that resources determine the speed and extent of the growth of population.
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  3. 3

    Population in the Arab world: problems and prospects.

    Omran AR

    New York, United Nations Fund for Population Activities; London, England, Croom Helm, 1980. 215 p.

    The Arab population, consisting of 20 states and the people of Palestine, was almost 153 million in 1978 and is expected to reach 300 million by the year 2000. Most Arab countries have a high population growth rate of 3%, a young population structure with about 50% under age 15, a high rate of marriage, early age of marriage, large family size norm, and an agrarian rural community life, along with a high rate of urban expansion. Health patterns are also similar with epidemic diseases leading as causes of mortality and morbidity. But there is uneven distribution of wealth in the region with per capita annual income ranging from US$100 in Somalia to US$12,050 in Kuwait; health care is also more elaborate in the wealthier countries. Fertility rates are high in most countries, with crude birthrates about 45/1000 compared with 32/1000 in the world as a whole and 17/1000 in most developed countries. In many Arab countries up to 30-50% of total investment is involved in population-related activities compared to 15% in European countries. There is also increasing pressure in the educational and health systems with the same amount of professionals dealing with an increasing amount of people. Unplanned and excessive fertility also contributes to health problems for mothers and children with higher morbidity, mortality, and nutrition problems. Physical isolation of communities contributes to difficulties in spreading health care availability. Urban population is growing rapidly, 6%/year in most Arab cities, and at a rate of 10-15% in the cities of Kuwait and Qatar; this rate is not accompanied by sufficient urban planning policies or modernization. A unique population problem in this area is that of the over 2 million Palestinians living in and outside the Middle East who put demographic pressures on the Arab countries. 2 major constraints inhibit efforts to solve the Arab population problem: 1) the difficulty of actually reallocating the people to achieve more even distribution, and 2) cultural and political sensitivities. Since in the Arab countries fertility does not correlate well with social and economic indicators, it is possible that development alone will not reduce the fertility of the Arab countries unless rigorous and effective family planning policies are put into action.
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