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New York, New York, UNFPA, 2006.  p.Today, women constitute almost half of all international migrants worldwide - 95 million. Yet, despite contributions to poverty reduction and struggling economies, it is only recently that the international community has begun to grasp the significance of what migrant women have to offer. And it is only recently that policymakers are acknowledging the particular challenges and risks women confront when venturing into new lands. Every year millions of women working millions of jobs overseas send hundreds of millions of dollars in remittance funds back to their homes and communities. These funds go to fill hungry bellies, clothe and educate children, provide health care and generally improve living standards for loved ones left behind. For host countries, the labour of migrant women is so embedded into the very fabric of society that it goes virtually unnoticed. Migrant women toil in the households of working families, soothe the sick and comfort the elderly. They contribute their technical and professional expertise, pay taxes and quietly support a quality of life that many take for granted. (excerpt)
New York, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2007 Sep. 108 p. (Human Rights Watch Vol 19, No. 14(A))Since mid-2005, hundreds of civilians have been killed, more than 10 thousand houses burned, and approximately 212,000 persons have fled their homes in terror to live in desperate conditions deep in the bush in northern Central African Republic (CAR). Bordering eastern Chad and war-ravaged Darfur in Sudan, this area has been destabilized by at least two major rebellions against the government of President Francois Bozize. The vast majority of summary executions and unlawful killings, and almost all village burnings, have been carried out by government forces, often in reprisal for rebel attacks. While both main rebel groups have been responsible for widespread looting and the forced taxation of the civilian population in areas they control - and rebels in the northeast have committed killings, beatings, and rape - their abuses pale in comparison to those of the Central African Armed Forces (Forces armees Centrafricaines, FACA) and the elite Presidential Guard (Garde presidentielle, GP). As the International Criminal Court (ICC) begins investigations into atrocities committed during the 2002-2003 rebellion against former President Patasse, it should also investigate possible war crimes under its jurisdiction committed in the current round of fighting. (excerpt)
[Unpublished] 1988. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 21-23, 1988. 18 p.The implications for Canada of the migration recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are discussed. OECD has 24 member countries in Europe, as well as Japan, U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. OECD organized a set of recommendations on migration and foreign manpower in the 1960s, which was updated in 1979 under the title "Migration, growth and development," commonly known as the "Kindleberger report," and focusing on migration of workers from less-developed to developed European OECD member countries. The OECD Kindleberger report deals with subjects such as social implications of migration, trend of South-to-North flows of illegal foreign workers, challenges to sovereignty of nations, macro-economic effects of migration, long-term demographic role of migration, increasing pluralism of societies, responsibility of the sending countries to solve their development problems. The OECD subsequently held a Working Party on Migration Conference on the Future of Migration in May 1986. The Canadian responses to the Conference are listed in a 7-point policy framework. Topics included policy convergence, sovereignty, economic role of migration, demographic impact, and control of immigration as regards tourism, illegal migrants, economic refugees, organized networks for border crossing, penalties on employers, and the effect of regularizing illegal migrants on future flows.
[Democracy, migration and return: Argentinians, Chileans and Uruguayans in Venezuela] Democracia, migracion y retorno: los Argentinos, Chilenos y Uruguayos en Venezuela.
Caracas, Venezuela, Universidad Catolica Andres Bello, Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales, 1986 Jul. 36 p. (Documento de Trabajo No. 29)Data from national censuses, migration registers, and the migration survey of 1981 were used to estimate the volume of migration from Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay to Venezuela in the past 35 years as well as the number returning to their countries of origin through programs established by international agencies. Immigrants from the 3 countries to Venezuela have in the past been a tiny minority. In 1950, they numbered just 1277 persons and represented .59% of persons born abroad. They were enumerated at 5531 in the 1961 census, at 8086 in the 1971 census, and at 43,748 in the 1981 census. In 1981, they accounted for 4.1% of the foreign born population. Between 1971-84, 13,074 Argentinians, 23,907 Chileans, and 6947 Uruguayans entered Venezuela. From 1971-79, 45,848 immigrants from the 3 countries entered Venezuela, with 13,000 more entering than exiting in 1978 alone. 1973-78 were years of economic prosperity and progress in Venezuela. From 1980-84, as economic conditions deteriorated, almost a quarter of a million persons left Venezuela, including 129,834 foreigners and 107,321 Venezuelans. About 2000 persons from Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay left Venezuela in the 5-year period. To determine whether the reemergence of democracy in Argentina and Uruguay in the 1980s had prompted the return of migrants from these countries, the subpopulation returning with the aid of 2 international organizations was studied. The records were examined of all individuals returning to the 3 countries between January 1983-June 1986 with the assistance of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration or the UN High Commission for Refugees. 462 women and 395 men were repatriated during the study period. 46.4% of those repatriated were 20-49 years old and 39.7% were under 20. About 60% of the Uruguayans but only about 25% of the Argentinians and Chileans were assisted by the UN High Commission for Refugees. The crude activity rate was 52.2% for repatriated men and 34.2% for repatriated women. Activity rates were 58.4% for Uruguayans, 48.7% for Argentinians, and 48.0% for Chileans. The repatriation was highly selective; 79.5% of Chileans, 74.3% of Argentinians, and 67.4% of Uruguayans declared themselves to be professionals, technicians, or related workers. Of the 857 persons repatriated from Venezuela, 550 went to Argentina, 196 to Uruguay, and 107 to Chile. An additional 4 Chileans went to Sweden. The Argentinian colony in Venezuela has shrunk and will probably continue to do so, the Chilean colony has not declined and may actually grow because of economic and political conditions in Chile, and the Uruguayan colony has hardly declined, suggesting that immigration is continuing.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW. 1986 Summer; 20(2):299-312.The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) commissioned researchers from the University of Zambia to conduct a socioeconomic survey and census of "spontaneously settled" Zairean and Angolan refugees in the Northwestern Province of Zambia in 1982. The sample consisted of 188 Angolans, 201 Zaireans, and 2 South Africans. The difficulties experienced by refugees in Northwestern Province in achieving integration were related to a combination of factors including the lack of a clear national policy on refugees and refugee status, a national concern for maintaining security, the popular belief that aliens are responsible for an increasing crime rate, the desire by immigration officials for stricter laws to control alien infiltration, conflict between traditional and modern leaders, and Zambia's deteriorating economic situation. In spite of the problems described, the integration of refugees into existing communities is a desirable goal and should be encouraged. One should not assume that self-settling refugees are able to live with ethnic kin, receive assistance and hospitality, and thus are better off than those in camps. The Zambian case provides ample evidence that integration is not easy even with kin support, shared ethnicity, language, and historical connections. Moreover, given the fact that Zambia will continue to receive refugees it is vital that there is a well defined refugee policy and an administrative mechanism for implementing that policy at all levels. This will be particularly important in Zambia as it will undoubtedly continue to receive large influxes of refugees, from countries such as Namibia, Uganda, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW. 1986 Summer; 20(2):283-98.This article reviews the evolution of the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), which advanced discussions on the connection between refugees and the development process and provided a forum to address refugee-related development burdens in Africa. A consensus now exists regarding how to address these burdens, but several challenges complicate realization of the ICARA II agenda, including: 1) the need for greater coordination between development and refugee agencies in the UN system and governments, 2) the need for provision of adequate resources by donors, 3) the weakness of host country capacity to absorb and manage assistance in the context of overall development planning, and 4) the poor visibility of refugee-related development needs as compared to emergency ones (author's).
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1983 May; 467:62-77.Large Scale refugee flows, typically koccurring in developing countries, inspire the formation of transnational networks that pose new issues of policy Making, direction, execution, and legitimacy. Institutional responses to the presence of refugees, often in the poorest and least well-administered areas on earth, comprise reactions at the local, national, and transnational levels, including both intergovernmental and voluntary organizations. These responses produce ad hoc organizational entities to deal with unanticipated difficulties. Even after news of a refugee flow is spread, governments can still adopt an isolating policy but more likely will be forced to turn to such transnational networks for help. In a widely felt political disturbance, the positions of the great powers will have a substantial conditioning effect on the handling of refugees. Whatever the pattern of response, refugees tend to involve the asylum state in transnational networks in order to cope with local repercussions as well as care of those in flight. Later, the emphasis may well shift from emergency to diplomatic networks is shifting and unpredictable, conditioned by specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the High Commissioner for Refugees and other intergovenmental bodies serve as natural nuclei for expansion. More integrated modes of organization currently are of doubtful utility. (author's)