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Population Index. 1948 Apr; 14(2):97-104.Research in migration has been peculiarly susceptible to the changing problems of the areas and the periods in which demographers work. American studies of international movements diminished after the passage of Exclusion Acts, and virtually ceased as immigration dwindled during the depression years. On the other hand, surveys of internal migration proliferated as the facts of mass unemployment and the social approaches of the New Deal focused governmental attention on the relation of people to resources and to economic opportunity. Geographers and historians took over the field the demographers had vacated. The studies of pioneer settlement directed by Isaiah Bowman and those of Marcus Hansen dealing with the Atlantic crossing are outstanding illustrations of this non-demographic research on essentially demographic problems. Even when demographers investigated international movements they served principally as quantitative analysts of historical exchanges. This is not to disparage such studies as that of Truesdell on the Canadian in the United States, or of Coates on the United States immigrant in Canada, but merely to emphasize the point that Americans regarded international migration as an issue of the past. (excerpt)
Population and Development Review. 2004 Sep; 30(3):507-517.World Population in 2300 (United Nations 2003b), reporting on the proceedings of a December 2003 expert group meeting on long-range population projections and presenting the results of a new set of United Nations population projections, bears out Hajnal's argument. Among his three propositions, the validity of the second is the most obvious. There has been a veritable outpouring of demographic projections during the last 50 years, prepared by various international organizations and national agencies, as well as by independent analysts. Among these, the United Nations Population Division's now biennially revised projections are by far the most detailed, best known, and most widely used. This well-deserved prominence reflects the Division's unparalleled access to national data, its in-house analytic experience and resources, and its willingness to draw on outside expertise whenever that might usefully complement its own. The most recent of the biennial projections, the 2002 Revision (United Nations 2003a), is the immediate predecessor of World Population in 2300, and indeed the former provides the year 2000 to 2050 component for the new set of long-term projections covering the next 300 years. This new set is not just one among the many. It is distinguished from the routine by an exceptionally brave ambition: to draw a picture of plausible demographic futures up to the year 2300 and to do so in extraordinary detail: country-by-country according to the political map of the early twenty-first century. (excerpt)
[A model of world population growth as an experiment in systematic research] Model' rosta naseleniya zemli kak opyt sistemnogo issledovaniya.
VOPROSY STATISTIKI. 1997; (8):46-57.A mathematical model was developed for the estimation of global population growth, and the estimates were compared with those of the UN and covered the stretch of 4.4 million years B.C. to the years 2175 and 2500 A.D. The estimates were also broken down into human, geological, and technological historical periods. The model showed that human population would stabilize at the level of 14 billion around 2500 A.D. and 13 billion around 2200 A.D., in accordance with UN projections. It also revealed the history of human population growth through the following stages (UN figures are listed in parentheses): 100,000, about 1.6 million years ago; 5 (1-5) million, 35,000 B.C.; 21 (10-15) million, 7000 B.C.; 46 (47) million, 2000 B.C.; 93 (100-230) million, at the time of Christ; 185 (275-345) million, 1000 A.D.; 366 (450-540) million, 1500 A.D.; 887 (907) million, 1800 A.D.; 1158 (1170) million, 1850 A.D.; 1656 (1650-1710) million, 1900 A.D.; 2812 (2515) million, 1950 A.D.; 5253 (5328) million, 1990 A.D.; 6265 (6261) million, 2000 A.D.; 10,487 (10,019) million, 2050 A.D.; 12,034 (11,186) million, 2100 A.D.; 12,648 (11,543) million, 2150 A.D.; 12,946 (11,600) million, 2200 A.D.; and 13,536 million, 2500 A.D. The model advanced the investigation of phenomena by studying the interactions between economical, technological, social, cultural, and biological processes. The analysis showed that humanity has reached a critical phase in its growth and that development in each period depended on external, not internal, factors. This permits the formulation of the principle of demographic imperative (distinct from the Malthusian principle), which states that resources determine the speed and extent of the growth of population.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard Institute for International Development, 1990 Jun. , 52 p. (Development Discussion Paper No. 344)Ideology of population control has fueled population research and fertility control programs. This ideology comprises the prochoice and prolife positions; the Roman Catholic doctrine on responsible parenthood and contraception; and fertility control professed by Marxists and environmentalists. The predominant ideology of demographic research and family planning (FP) from the 1950s to 1974 is examined. The solution of population was to be by voluntary action as demonstrated by knowledge-attitude-practice (KAP) surveys sponsored by the Population Council that was founded at the behest of John D. Rockefeller III in 1952. The Council also supported technical assistance and vigorously promoted (FP). The Ford Foundation developed a population control program in 1958, funding research with over $181 million during the period. In 1967 the Agency for International Development (USAID) joined population donors, and became the largest financier of FP programs that produced a decline of fertility from 6.1 children/woman to 4.5 in 28 countries. At the World Population Conference in 1974 held in Bucharest the claim of population growth inhibiting development was challenged, and the development of socioeconomic and health care conditions was advocated. The Project on Cultural Values and Population Policy was an 8-nation study on cultural values in FP program implementation whose utility was questioned by UNFPA staff. The World Development Report 1984 by the World Bank was influential and reiterated the danger of population growth checking economic development, although critics charged biases and distortions. The Lapham-Mauldin Scale devised for the evaluation of FP program success is replete with value judgments. FP program implementation difficulties and shortcomings are further examined in Latin America, China, India, and Indonesia.
New York, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. xvii, 423 p.This text on international health covers historical and contemporary health issues ranging from water distribution systems of the ancient Aztecs to the worldwide endemic of AIDS. The author has also included areas not in the 1979 version: the 1978 Alma Ata conference on primary health care, infant and maternal mortality, health planning, and the role of science and technology. The 1st chapter discusses how each population movement, political change, war, and technological development has changed the world's or a region's state of health. Next the book highlights health statistics and how they can be applied to determine the health status of a population. A text on international health would be incomplete without a chapter on understanding sickness within each culture, including a society's attitude towards the sick and individual behavior which causes disease, e.g. smoking and lung cancer. 1 chapter features risk factors of a disease that are found in the environment in which individuals live. For example, in areas where iodine is not present in the soil, such as the Himalayas, the population exhibits a high degree of goiter and cretinism. Others present the relationship between socioeconomic development and health, e.g., countries at the low socioeconomic development spectrum have low life expectancies compared to those at the high socioeconomic end. An important chapter compares national health care systems and identifies common factors among them. An entire chapter is dedicated to organizations that provide health services internationally, e.g., private voluntary organizations. 1 chapter covers 3 diseases exclusively which are smallpox, malaria, and AIDS. The appendix presents various ethical codes.
[Unpublished] 1987. 13,  p.Africa's colonial legacy is such that countries contain not only a multiplicity of nations and languages, but their governments operate on separate cultural and linguistic planes, remnants of colonial heritage, so that neighboring peoples often have closed borders. Another problem is poor demographic data, although some censuses, World Fertility Surveys, Demographic Sample Surveys and Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys have been done. About 470 million lived in the region in 1984, growing at 3% yearly, ranging from 1.9% in Burkina to 4.6% in Cote d'Ivoire. Unique in Africa, women are not only having 6 to 8.1 children, but they desire even larger families: Senegalese women have 6.7 children and want 8.8. This gloomy outlook is reflected in the recent history of family planning policy. Only Ghana, Kenya and Mauritius began family planning in the 1960s, and in Kenya the policy failed, since it was begun under colonial rule. 8 countries made up the African Regional Council for IPPF in 1971. At the Bucharest Population Conference in 1974, most African representatives, intellectuals and journalists held the rigid view that population was irrelevant for development. Delegates to the Kilimanjaro conference and the Second International Conference on Population, however, did espouse the importance of family planning for health and human rights. And the Inter-Parliamentary Union of Africa accepted the role of family planning in child survival and women's status. At the meeting in Mexico in 1984, 12 African nations joined the consensus of many developing countries that rapid population growth has adverse short-term implications on development. Another 11 countries allow family planning for health and human rights, and a few more accept it without stating a reason. Only 3 of 47 Sub-Saharan nations state pro-natalist policies, and none are actively against family planning.
New York, United Nations Fund for Population Activities; London, England, Croom Helm, 1980. 215 p.The Arab population, consisting of 20 states and the people of Palestine, was almost 153 million in 1978 and is expected to reach 300 million by the year 2000. Most Arab countries have a high population growth rate of 3%, a young population structure with about 50% under age 15, a high rate of marriage, early age of marriage, large family size norm, and an agrarian rural community life, along with a high rate of urban expansion. Health patterns are also similar with epidemic diseases leading as causes of mortality and morbidity. But there is uneven distribution of wealth in the region with per capita annual income ranging from US$100 in Somalia to US$12,050 in Kuwait; health care is also more elaborate in the wealthier countries. Fertility rates are high in most countries, with crude birthrates about 45/1000 compared with 32/1000 in the world as a whole and 17/1000 in most developed countries. In many Arab countries up to 30-50% of total investment is involved in population-related activities compared to 15% in European countries. There is also increasing pressure in the educational and health systems with the same amount of professionals dealing with an increasing amount of people. Unplanned and excessive fertility also contributes to health problems for mothers and children with higher morbidity, mortality, and nutrition problems. Physical isolation of communities contributes to difficulties in spreading health care availability. Urban population is growing rapidly, 6%/year in most Arab cities, and at a rate of 10-15% in the cities of Kuwait and Qatar; this rate is not accompanied by sufficient urban planning policies or modernization. A unique population problem in this area is that of the over 2 million Palestinians living in and outside the Middle East who put demographic pressures on the Arab countries. 2 major constraints inhibit efforts to solve the Arab population problem: 1) the difficulty of actually reallocating the people to achieve more even distribution, and 2) cultural and political sensitivities. Since in the Arab countries fertility does not correlate well with social and economic indicators, it is possible that development alone will not reduce the fertility of the Arab countries unless rigorous and effective family planning policies are put into action.
[Society and procreation: the social factors that affect them] Societe et procreation: les facteurs sociaux qui l'influencent
Brussels, Belgium, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1981. 291 p. (In series: Etudes sur la Famille)This volume contains a collection of papers by members of the Study Group for Family Roles, an organization of scholars which pursues studies on family roles from both historical and analytical perspectives. The theme of the present volume is the control imposed by the collectivity on individual fertility behavior through mores, laws, sterotypes, and other means, and which is apparent in widely varying historical situations. The 10 articles concern Malthusian problems in archaic societies; voluntary birth control in the Roman empire; aspects of birth limitation in traditional Jewish society; Islam and contraception; social pressure and material incentives in Chinese demographic policy; social aspects of procreation in the Soviet Union; social aspects of precreation in Rumania and Hungary; procreation and education; attitudes of family planning personnel toward contraception in Belgium; and the role of the UN in family planning.