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[Unpublished] . Paper presented at the First Study Director's Meeting on Comparative Study on Demographic-Economic Interrelationship for Selected ESCAP Countries, 29 October-2 November 1984, Bangkok, Thailand. 17 p.The author examines in detail the criteria for selecting an economic-demographic model for use in a particular situation. 2 general principles of model selection are that 1) the model must provide insights that are not obtainable by analytical methods and 2) models should avoid unnecessary detail. The author prefers models that are 1) single rather than multi-sectoral, 2) "general equilibrium" rather than specific in focus, 3) either long or medium term in time span but not both, and 4) Social Accounting Matrix-oriented for their output. Model closure is the central issue of model selection. The choice of closure profoundly affects the main focus of model output as shown by 4 examples: 1) the neoclassical closure of forced investment, 2) the Kaldorian closure of forced profits, 3) the Johansen closure of forced consumption, and 4) the Keynesian closure of forced unemployment. The examples of closure types illustrate that the choice of closure directly affects the result--income distribution in the example given. Existing economic-demographic models often neglect 1) the linkage between technological and demographic change, 2) population effects on aggregate savings behavior, and 3) links between family size and labor force participation rates by sex.
New York, New York, Population Council, 1985 Dec. 39 p. (Population Council. Center for Policy Studies Working Papers No. 120)This essay explores the economic implications of continuing below-replacement fertility in the developed countries of the West. Effects of low fertility on labor supply, technological change and investment and consumption are noted, but their economic growth and welfare consequences, it is argued, can for the most part be discounted provided some reasonable degree of institutional adaptability is present. 2 further areas where similar complacency on economic effects appears unjustified are explored at greater length. One is the potential influence of low fertility on income distribution and economic mobility. Social security issues, while properly seen as highly important, are only a subset of an intricate mesh of distributional relationships affected by fertility patterns. The other area is that of international economic relations, given the trend toward demographic inconsequence of the rich countries and the uncertain prospects of their continued technological dominance. The chief demographic effects of below replacement fertility are: eventual but often greatly delayed contraction in population numbers; a concentration of families around completed parities of 0-3; substantial rises in the median age of the population and in the proportion of elderly; and a fall-off in the relative numbers of youth and in the ratio of labor force entrants to retirees under constant participation rates. Technological effects of population growth are meditated through factor prices: a labor shortage can elicit shifts to more capital-intensive production methods. Low fertility, even somewhat below replacement level, presents no great difficulty for a modern economy. Its effects are probably small compared to business-cycle fluctuations in economic performance, and reasonable flexibility in adjustments to complementary factor inputs and technology and in fiscal management should enable continuation of a satisfactory pace of economic growth, both aggregate and per capita.
Interactions between mortality levels and the allocation of time for leisure, training, consumption and saving over the life cycle
In: Consequences of mortality trends and differentials. New York, New York, U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1986. 126-31. (Population Studies no. 95, ST/ESA/SER.A/95)The author seeks to develop a framework depicting the interaction of mortality levels and the allocation of time for leisure, training, consumption, and saving over the life cycle in the context of a household's decision-making process. "The discussion suggests that longevity is conducive to saving, schooling and training, and technological change. Rising survivorship is postulated to be a major force behind rising productivity because rising levels of productivity are almost the only means to spread consumption of goods and leisure over an increasing life span." (EXCERPT)
[Third World cities: points of accumulation, centers of distribution] Les villes du Tiers Monde: theatres d'accumulation, centres de diffusion.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Oct-Dec; 26(104):823-40.Attention was called over 3 decades ago to the very rapid growth of Third World cities and the significance of the differences between their patterns of urbanization and those of industrialized countries. Their demographic growth occurred much faster and depended much more heavily on high fertility, their economies were geared more to export of raw materials than to manufacturing and were unable to create massive numbers of jobs to absorb the growing labor force except in the unproductive tertiary sector, and it appeared unlikely that they would be able to produce entrepreneurial classes of their own. Several economic developments during the 1970s affected the world economy and the patterns of urbanization of the Third World: the decline of the principal capitalist economies and the multiple increases in the price of oil, the floating exchange rate, the considerable increase in consumer goods, and the increasing costs of labor in industrialized countries, among others, created new conditions. World economic interdependence, international control of investment and exchange, and volume and mobility of capital increased at a time of rapid economic growth in some Third World countries, especially those whose governments took an aggressive role in promoting growth and investment. Some Third World cities now seem to be developing according to a more western model, but the same cannot be said of all Third World countries, and international economic evolution appears to have led to increasing polarization between countries as well as within them. The 1 domain where a certain convergence has occurred is consumption, beginning with the privileged classes and filtering to the lower income groups. Consumption of collective and individual consumer goods, which is concentrated in the largest cities, increases dependence on imports, technology, knowledge, and usually debt. The modern productive sector and its distribution activities become implanted in the cities to such a degree that it becomes more and more difficult for the consumption needs of regional cities and rural areas to be satisfied except through manufactured products from the capitalist sector of the principal city or through imports from industrial countries. Despite the fact that some Third World cities will be enormous by the year 2000 and that their social structures and labor forces will not closely resemble those of European cities, the thesis of "pseudourbanization" appears invalid for several reasons: the model of sectorial changes in the European labor force was not followed by the industrializing countries of North America; some Third World countries (excluding India and China) appear able to absorb most of their surplus rural population into the modern sector, and Third World cities appear less and less to be merely centers of culture. New research during the 1970s on Third World urbanization contributed several crucial elements to the analysis: recognition that insertion of developing countries into the international economic order has been a major influence on their urbanization patterns, appreciation of the role of migration in urbanization, realization of the potential role of the state in mitigating spatial and structural inequalities created by the urbanization process, and recognition of the need for more detailed microeconomic studies and construction of more elaborate models of Third World economies.
Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. xv, 463 p.Add to my documents.
In: Population change and social policy, by Nathan Keyfitz. Cambridge, Mass., Abt Books, 1982. 125-145.Add to my documents.
Bulletin of Economic Research. 1984 Nov; 36(2):97-108.This paper investigates the theoretical implications of the hypothesis that technical progress is affected by population size or growth. It extends the model of Arrow, in which technical progress is viewed as the result of learning-by-doing, in 3 ways: 1) a smooth substitutability between labor, capital, and natural resources is permitted; 2) the concept of learning-by-doing is broadened to allow for the fact that any act of production may involve some degree of learning; and 3) it addresses the stability question, left unanswered by Arrow. Models both without natural resources and with exhaustible natural resources were considered. In both versions of the model, the steady-state characteristics of the economy are independent of the initial population size. This suggests that the population-size or population-density effect advocated by Simon cannot be justified by a learning-by-doing mechanism and the initial advantage of large population size becomes insignificant over time. However, a positive population growth effect on the level or the growth rate of real per capita income is possible. In cases where natural resources are less important than man-made capital, a rise in the population growth rate would increase the growth rate of per capita income but decrease its level, whereas the opposite situation applies in cases where natural resources are more important than capital.
In: Economic consequences of population change in industrialized countries: proceedings of the Conference on Population Economics held at the University of Paderborn, West Germany, June 1-June 3, 1983, edited by Gunter Steinmann. New York, N.Y./Berlin, Germany, Federal Republic of, Springer-Verlag, 1984. 168-178. (Studies in Contemporary Economics Vol. 8)The economic impact of recent demographic changes in developed countries, particularly declining fertility, increasing divorce, delayed marriage, and demographic aging, is assessed. The focus is on household consumption behavior, with an emphasis on how declining fertility affects the level and growth rate of total and per capita consumption and consumption distribution. The importance of technological change and of age factors is noted. (ANNOTATION)
Journal of Regional Science. 1984 Nov; 24(4):509-17.A two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model is developed "to investigate the direction of migration in response to differing demographic and consumption demand behavior, as well as variations in production conditions." The model, which involves a rural sector and an urban sector, incorporates "returns to scale and the natural rate of sectoral population growth as important determinants of the direction of migration, in addition to price and income elasticities, and the sectoral technical change rate with which...previous studies dealt." (EXCERPT)
Laxenburg, Austria, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1983. viii, 57 p. (WP-83-17)Add to my documents.
Population Studies. 1983 Mar; 37(1):5-21.In conventional steady-state growth theory with technical progress exogenous, faster population growth causes lower consumption. This conclusion has influenced national policies. With technical progress endogenous, however, higher population growth causes higher consumption. Steady-state equilibrium analysis is not appropriate for policy decisions, though. Rather, appropriate analysis compares two or more growth rates beginning from equal initial positions, with comparison of the present value of consumption streams per person. In the paper the supply of and demand for knowledge is first analysed and the most plausible technical progress functions are derived. Various population growth rates are then simulated with different specifications and parameters. With virtually every variant, faster population growth shows better consumption with discount rates up to between five and ten per cent above the long-run adjusted riskless rate. With pensions included in the analysis, faster population growth would seem even more beneficial. Even at very high discount rates, lower population growth rates imply present values only a little higher than those for higher population growth rates. The advantage is overwhelmingly with higher population growth in this growth-theoretic analysis. (author's)
People. 1983; 10(1):3-5.Add to my documents.