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[The Permanent Household Survey: provisional results, 1985] Enquete Permanente Aupres des Menages: resultats provisoires 1985
Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Ivory Coast. Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances. Direction de la Statistique, 1985. 76 p.This preliminary statistical report provides an overview of selected key economic and social indicators drawn from a data collection system recently implemented in the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast's Direction de la Statistique and the World Bank's Development Research Department are collaborating, under the auspices of the Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study, to interview 160 households per month on a continuous basis for 10 months out of the year. Data are collected concerning population size, age structure, sex distribution, family size, nationality, proportion of female heads of household, fertility, migration, health, education, type of residence, occupations, employment status, financial assistance among family members, and consumption. Annual statistical reports based on each round of the survey are to be published, along with brief semiannual updates.
The state of the world's women 1985: World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women, Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15-26, 1985.
[Unpublished] 1985. 19 p.This report, based on results of a questionnaire completed by 121 national governments as well as independent research by UN agencies, assesses the status of the world's women at the end of the UN Decade for Women in the areas of the family, agriculture, industrialization, health, education, and politics. Women are estimated to perform 2/3 of the world's work, receive 1/10 of its income and own less than 1/100 of its property. The findings revealed that women do almost all the world's domestic work, which combined with their additional work outside the home means that most women work a double day. Women grow about 1/2 the world's food but own very little land, have difficulty obtaining credit, and are overlooked by agricultural advisors and projects. Women constitute 1/3 of the world's official labor force but are concentrated in the lowest paid occupations and are more vulnerable to unemployment than men. Although there are signs that the wage gap is closing slightly, women still earn less than 3/4 of the wage of men doing similar work. Women provide more health care than do health services, and have been major beneficiaries of the global shift in priorities to primary health care. The average number of children desired by the world's women has dropped from 6 to 4 in 1 generation. Although a school enrollment boom is closing the gap between the sexes, women illiterates outnumber men by 3 to 2. 90% of countries now have organizations promoting the advancement of women, but women are still greatly underrepresented in national decision making because of their poorer educations, lack of confidence, and greater workload. The results repeatedly point to the major underlying cause of women's inequality: their domestic role of wife and mother, which consumes about 1/2 of their time and energy, is unpaid, and is undervalued. The emerging picture of the importance and magnitude of the roles women play in society has been reflected in growing concern for women among governments and the community at large, and is responsible for the positive achievements of the decade in better health care and more employment and educational opportunities. Equality for women will require that they have equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities in every area of life.
In: The global possible: resources, development, and the new century, edited by Robert Repetto. New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1985. 457-73. (World Resources Institute Book)If certain institutional conditions are upheld, markets can provide supplies and allocate use so that minerals and materials will satisfy our needs for a very long time, likely forever. These conditions include internalization of environmental damages, worldwide trade access to raw materials, access to the earth's crust for exploration, and prevention of market control by either sellers or buyers. Contrary to popular belief, primary mineral supplies are indeed infinite since they flow to the world economy at a cost that will support their demand as influenced by supplies from scrap. Rarely do interruptions in supply justify government interference in mineral markets. Technology tends to provide new supplies or changes material demands. For example, in the mid 1970s in Zaire, the military prevented cobalt supplies from reaching the markets. Manufacturers of jet engine turbines and high temperature magnets asked the US government to open up strategic cobalt stockpiles to meet their needs. The government did not do so since no state of emergency existed. Cobalt prices increased. This predicament forced research and/or development of new technologies: Cobalt-free magnets and use of other materials such as ceramics for turbine blades. Many people do not consider the large mineral deposits in the seabed because of the tremendous costs to extract them. Technological development is need to identify means to explore and extract them. Mineral and material demand are not always in those countries where the deposits exist so international trade is very important. Thus policies permit efficient trade, production, and use should be promoted. The market works.
In: The global possible: resources, development, and the new century, edited by Robert Repetto. New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1985. 363-95. (World Resources Institute Book)Policymakers in developing countries must orient environmentally sound energy strategies toward their needs so that they rely only on themselves for those needs. Policymakers in developed countries should make their energy strategies be economically stable, environmentally safe, and strategically secure. The domination of oil worldwide is a relatively recent occurrence. In 1973, the oil exporting countries imposed an embargo which raised oil prices, caused an oil scarcity, and panicked oil markets. This forced many developed nations to cut back on oil consumption but oil resources will still deplete. People in developing countries depend on fuelwood which they are depleting rapidly. Oil prices exclude most of the population here. This results in deforestation, erosion, and desertification in developing countries. Nuclear power is an energy source that poses concerns over reactor safety and radioactive waste disposal in developed countries. Fossil fuel use degrades the planet. Vital interests of developed countries in outside territories make for global insecurity and a threat of nuclear war. This condition results in nuclear weapons proliferation. Thus they need to lessen their dependence on foreign oil and develop their own energy sources. Yet energy is needed now to grow and to distribute crops to stave off malnutrition. To reduce energy demands, population growth must slow down, but energy is needed to stimulate population decline. Thus nations must adopt energy strategies to bring about sustainable development worldwide. These strategies should disassociate energy consumption from gross national product and incorporate improvements in efficiencies of energy end use technologies. National policies must bring energy prices in line with marginal costs to allow markets to work better. Governments should also eliminate subsidies to energy producers. Energy service industries which market conservation technologies and services would also conserve energy. International cooperation is needed to improve energy conservation and cease nuclear proliferation.
In: The global possible: resources, development, and the new century, edited by Robert Repetto. New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1985. 255-98. (World Resources Institute Book)Everyone uses fresh water. Water is the most used substance by industry. Even though industry only makes up 5-10% of current worldwide water use, it contributes a disproportionate amount of toxic contaminants to the water supply. The most important socioeconomic factors of municipal water demand are household income and size. Agricultural demand is the single largest demand for water. In the US, it makes up 83% of annual total water consumption. Water demand has resulted in some of the world's biggest construction and weather modification projects which greatly alter basic ecosystems. Multinational institutions such as the World Bank and the International Development Association support most of these projects in developing countries. We have abused water perhaps more than any other resource. These abuses have caused considerable adverse effects. For example, after farmers in Africa and Asia began irrigating fields, many people fell ill with schistomosiasis. Other waterborne diseases include typhoid fever and diarrheal diseases. Investments in water supplies as well as in wastewater treatment are needed to improve public health. The largest consumers of fresh water in the world are those countries with the largest populations (49% of the world's population) and largest total land area (32% of the this area): China, India, the US, and the USSR. These 4 countries have 61-70% of the world's total irrigated land, but China and India have most of it (54%). Most US water expenditures are for water pollution control. The US has a very efficient agricultural system but the efficiency is technical rather than economic. Most water expenditures in the USSR and India are for irrigation. China spends most of its water resource funds on irrigation and drainage systems. All countries in the world should conduct a rational analysis of fresh water uses, implement rational water pricing policies to conserve water use, and stabilize water supplies such as capturing surface runoff.
In: Nutrition and development, edited by Margaret Biswas and Per Pinstrup-Andersen. Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1985. 60-76. (Oxford Medical Publications)The reasons for manipulation of food production, prices and distribution by governments are economic and development strategy, tax revenues, political support in urban areas and management of indirect transfers within the emerging secondary and tertiary sectors. Governments in developing countries tend to tax agriculture in favor of urban consumers. Subsidized food consumption for urban residents is discussed with the examples of China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Market interventions become difficult to change because they benefit the poor, bureaucrats, food importers, wholesalers, retailers and some of the middle class. Sri Lanka is an exception for targeting subsidies for low income people. The nutritional consequences of market intervention policies are usually reduced productivity, but elimination of acute malnutrition. The welfare consequences are a weaker budget balance of payments, inflation, rising unemployment and failing incomes. Political risks of reform threaten vested interests. Despite drawbacks, food policies serve useful social purposes.
[Unpublished] 1985. 20 p.This paper examines general patterns of urban-rural food and diet consumption in Indonesia. Diet is a critical element in the welfare of urban dwellers, especially newcomers from rural areas. Food prices are likely to be higher in urban areas; with the same levels of income, urban dwellers are likely to be worse-off. Customary diets may be upset by differential food prices. For any given level of income, city life offers more options which compete with food consumption for household income, and may be detrimental to the diet. There is nothing in the urban environment that can support one's diet, whereas food gathering is common in rural areas where people are close to food sources. The data used are from the 1978 National Socioeconomic Survey. The authors compare levels of expenditure as well as food and nutrition consumption in urban and rural areas in an attempt to establish dietary and nutritional patterns. In spite of the relative affluence of the urban population, it does not fare better than the rural population in terms of diet. Urban diets are more expensive in absolute terms; relative prices also bias consumption away from grains which are rich in calories towards other foods which are rich in protein and fat. Price differentials between the areas appear to outweigh the income differentials as far as food consumption is concerned. As a result, the urban population is on average better-off in terms of the consumption of protein and vitamin C, and worse-off in terms of calories and other micronutrients.
[Unpublished, 1985]. ii, 37 p. (DP/RILM/3.)Remittances from Thai workers abroad, although relatively small, have been increasing in magnitude over the years. Until recently it was looked on as a promising source of foreign exchange earnings. Remittances contributed substantially to the improvement in the standards of living and productive investments in rural areas of Thailand. The volume of remittances is determined largely by the number of workers and levels of wages that migrant workers receive from foreign employers. The present situation of the international labor market in the Middle East is not conducive either to high rates of labor migration or to high wages as in past years. Competition among labor-exporting countries may aggravate the unfavorable situation. Unregistered employment agents in Thailand send workers abroad to work for wages below the minimum set by the Department of Labor. Labor-exporting countries would benefit from cooperation to prevent further competition and to improve their bargaining position with the labor-importing countries. For Thailand, the most urgent issue is improving organizational structure for sending migrant workers abroad. This could lead immediately to a larger flow of remittances as workers would receive more net earnings as a result of the improvement. With respect to the utilization of remittances, measures to redirect remittances from consumption to investments should be based on incentives rather than controls.
Remittances of Indian migrants to the Middle East: an assessment with special reference to migrants from Kerala State.
[Unpublished, 1985]. ii, 61 p. (DP/RILM/4.)The future course of remittance inflows to India from the Middle East is intimately linked to what happens to the Indian work force in the Middle East. In 1979-1982, the absolute level of outflow fell from 270,000 in 1981 to 225,000 in 1984. Given the prospects, both medium and long term, of world oil prices and oil exports from the Middle East, it is quite likely that the rate of growth of both investments and output in the labor-importing countries of the Middle East will be much slower. The composition of future investments in these countries will also change to more capital intensive industries away from construction. In the next few years there may continue to be some demand for additional labor, but in the longer run workers may return home in large numbers. The demand for construction will slow down, and the demand for services will rise. Which of the labor-exporting countries will be able to respond appropriately to this changing pattern of demand for skills from the Middle East is a question that cannot be easily answered. Labor-exporting countries need flexibility in adjusting their manpower supply to changing patterns of skill demand from the Middle East. The flow of remittances form Indian workers in the Middle East has been substantial. Although the government of India offers a number of incentives for the placement of remittances, the amounts invested in these firms and companies has never added up to more than 1/5 of any year's total remittances. Individual migrant workers have priorities of their own to follow. No amount of inducement for other forms of investment can easily deflect a migrant from his preference for land. Incentive measures may have to be made much more effective and wide ranging.
RENKOU YANJIU. 1985 Mar 29; (2):36-40.In 1980, an economic survey was conducted in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, China, in which the members of the general population were asked various questions related to their past and current employment status. The purpose of this survey was to provide information in the following areas: average life expectancy of Wuxi residents (72.32 years); ratio of average number of years of employment; difference between the number of years of employment among Wuxi residents compared with Hong Kong residents (including relevant factors); expected number of years of employment for a life expectancy of 72.32 years; total goods and services consumed in an average lifetime vs. Expected income over an average lifetime; age at which Wuxi residents begin to produce more than they consume; and the age of highest economic productivity. Survey and statistical methods and interpretation of data are explained at length. The information provided by this economic survey should prove useful for economic planning, as well as providing baseline figures for future comparative studies.
DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE. 1985; (2):56-68.The central question to be addressed when discussing the adequacy and relevance of pharmaceutical action in a country, or in the world generally, is what are the objectives of such pharmaceutical action. The central and overwhelmingly preeminent objective is to restore the health of suffering and sick people. There is consensus among practitioners worldwide that health services in 3rd World countries have followed an urban-centered, hospital-based pattern. The consumption has, therefore, followed a similar pattern. In 1979, the urban hospitals of Thailand, both public and private, accounted for 30% of the total drug consumption, or an estimated US$85 million. The urban population within reach was less than 15% of the total population. The primary health care (PHC) policies adopted at Alma Ata resulted in the establishment of a special PHC unit in 1981 and a number of pharmaceutical studies were undertaken at the time. In 1982, the urban hospitals' share of drug consumption had slightly decreased. Overconsumption of unnecessary products by urban elites leaves the poor majority underserved and bearing very high levels of morbidity for which no treatment is accessible, despite the availability of drugs in the country as a whole. During 1969-81, there has been a 10-fold increase of the pharmaceutical market.
DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE. 1985; (2):15-37.This paper discusses the principles involved in formulating international standards to regulate the appropriate use of drugs. It focuses particular attention on the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in organizing this. The following questions are addressed: What is meant by the appropriate use of drugs? What are the main determinants of appropriate drug use that all the main actors agree on? How appropriately are drugs used today? To what extent are the standards agreed on in principle actually observed in practice? Is regulation called for? What kind of regulation is appropriate? What standards would meet the needs of all countries? Appropriate drug use is the provision of drugs to people who really need them and restiction of the supply of drugs to those who don't need them. Primary health care requires a continuous supply of essential drugs. As many as 70% of the pharmaceuticals on the market today are inessential and/or undesirable products, and many pharmaceutical products are marketed today with little concern for the differing health needs and priorities of individual countries. Few countries systematically monitor drug prescribing standards and consumption patterns. There is chronic and serious under-reporting of adverse reactions to drugs. Regulation implies control over the activities of the main drug producers. This requires international initiatives, since an essentially transnational industry is involved. Transnational corporations dominate the world market for drugs. All pharmaceutical products must be approved and registered for use by the competent government authority. All pharmaceutical products shall have full regard to the needs of public health.
DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE. 1985; (2):5-13.The provision of appropriate medicines of the right kind, quality and quantity, and at reasonable prices is a central concern for any government. Simultaneously, there is increasing recognition of the serious problems inherent in the existing systems of pharmaceutical development, promotion, marketing, distribution and use in all countries and particularly in the 3rd World. The vast majority of people in most 3rd World countries have little or no access to effective and safe medicines. The Dag Hammarskjold Foundation organized a consultation on Another Development in Pharmaceuticals in June 1985. It was based on some papers commissioned for that occasion with a view to developing new approaches to fundamental problems in this field and involving both national and international actors and institutions. The basic concern of these papers was to place the debate on pharmaceuticals in its proper historical, contemporary and future context. The 5 major areas discussed were: 1) man and medicines: a historical perspective; 2) towards a healthy use of pharmaceuticals; 3) towards a healthy pharmaceutical industry by the year 2000; 4) 1st principles for the prescription, promotion and use of pharmaceuticals: towards a code of conduct; and 5) monitoring Another Development in Pharmaceuticals. 90% of the world's production of pharmaceuticals originates in the industrialized countries, which also accounts for 80% of the consumption. 3rd World countries have been supplied with a very inappropriate assortment of products by the pharmaceutical industry. There is a growing demand for improved practices that are conducive to health development. An international harmonization of regulatory standards is needed.
[Using demographic statistics in market studies and specifically for the business planning] Utilisation des statistiques demographiques dans les etudes de marche et specifiquement pour les plans des entreprises.
In: Utilisation des statistiques demographiques au Cameroun. Actes d'une Seminaire tenu du 16 au 19 Juillet 1984 a Yaounde. Yaounde, Cameroon, Ministere du Plan et de l'Amenagement du Territoire, 1985 Jul. 308-32.This article assesses the potential use of demographic statistics in determining the volume and structure of consumption through market studies and the sources of demographic data used in market studies, and presents concrete examples of demographic data use in market studies in Cameroon. The age and sex structure of the population influences the availability of labor and the extent of the market for particular products, while the socioeconomic structure is related to income and purchasing power. Population movements of particular interest to business planning include rural-urban migration, change in the numbers of households or household size, and change in household budgets. Population growth, determined by prevailing patterns of fertility, mortality, and migration, is the most important determinant of total consumption of many products. The 3 major data sources for market studies are population censuses, demographic surveys, and civil registration systems. Censuses furnish exhaustive statistics on individual and collective characteristics for population units of all sizes, serve as bases for sampling studies, and are useful for study of population movement. Budget-consumption studies with demographic content are the usual method of determining effective consumption. The budget-consumption survey underway in Cameroon is expected to yield data on a wide range of household expenditures. A well-functioning civil registration system combined with accurate knowledge of migratory trends would permit calculation of the population growth rate. Concrete examples of market studies undertaken in Cameroon using available demographic data include a footwear manufacturer that used demographic data to help estimate the proportion of shoes to offer for different ages and sizes of feet, a producer of school notebooks who used data on population structure to determine the number of each type of notebook to produce, and a life insurance company which needed to structure rates to fit Cameroon, a country with few actuaries. A cigarette company and a brewery requiring data for planning of distribution and possible expansion are other examples of enterprises requiring demographic data. Limited availability of official statistics and out-of-date data forced each company to some extent to develop supplementary data collection systems.
[Migrations and rural capitalization in Egypt: changes in the peasant family] Migrations et capitalisation de la campagne en Egypte: la reconversion de la famille paysanne.
TIERS-MONDE. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):523-32.Economic changes in Egypt over the past decade have resulted from a series of influences including the rise in the cost of oil, the world economic crisis, and governmental efforts to develop a new policy of economic development. Although the effects of economic change are more immediately apparent in urban areas, their import has perhaps been more profound in the countryside. The most comfortable agricultural producers are growing a greater variety of crops, are more highly capitalized operations, and are more closely influenced by the world and local markets. Producers failing to make these changes are being bought out in a type of agrarian self-reform financed ultimately by income from migration to oil producing states. Members of an Egyptian family studied from 1969-84 were typical landless rural cultivaters renting lands until 1969, when they obtained title to a small quantity of land under the 3rd law of agrarian reform, promulgated in March 1969. Despite the agrarian reform, the role of the landlord initially was largely replaced by that of the state, on which the family now became dependent. The family retained the essential characteristics of the landless peasant: low standard of living, necessity of selling their labor to larger producers, and absence of decision making capacity concerning type of cultivation and direct experience with the market. The agrarian reform cooperative now played the role of intermediary formerly filled by the landlord. During the period from 1974-81, which saw a new government policy development, 2 brothers in the family worked as laborers in Iraq, leaving their wives and children behind in the care of the extended family. Their father ceased to fill the role of patriach; the new need for an entrepreneur was filled by 1 of the emigrating brothers, who arranged for purchase of a house to replace the family's rented quarters and also bought a tractor to be rented to other cultivators, representing a new source of income, mechanization of the countryside, and a form of capitalization. Tomatoes and other vegetables were added to the family crops. The family's standard of living continued to improve, and greater efforts were made to educate the children. The entrepreneur brother was replaced after his accidental death by a younger brother who continued his activities while still striving to maintain the family labor pool, which now amounted to 32 workers based on 5 marriages. The original new house was rented and then sold to finance more land purchases, and a constant supply of migrant remittances was available. The local wage rate also increased significantly, raising the possibility of significant earnings. The progress of this family was not atypical and was partly due to the internal aptitude of Egyptian society for integrating change.
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS. 1985 Aug; 18(2-3):243-52.That the introduction of a means for transferring present to future consumption other than children in a developing country will reduce the rate of population growth is shown to depend crucially on the assumption that parents do not care about the numbers or the welfare of the children they have. When parents do care, the conclusion no longer unambiguously follows because the new means for providing for parents' old age leads to a positive income effect. (EXCERPT)
["Zero growth" of population and its consequences for the West] Nulevoi rost naseleniya i ego posledstviya dlya stran Zapada
Memo: Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. 1985; (8):41-54, 159.The consequences of the decline in fertility in Western Europe and Northern America are analyzed. The author first describes current demographic trends and suggests that the trend toward population decline is probably irreversible. Consideration is given to determinants of fertility such as industrialization, urbanization, women's economic activity, educational standards, health services, social security, demographic policy, and income. Factors affecting Western fertility are identified as inflation, unemployment, and spiritual impoverishment. The existence of various schools of thought in Western countries concerning the implications of these trends is noted. These include the fear of the environmental impact of further population growth and the fear of the consequences of population decline. The author concludes that a period of stable population growth will mean a decline in the available labor force, an increase in the age of the labor force, an increase in the number of pensioners, a change in the structure of demand, and other problems for capitalist societies. (summary in ENG)
Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik. 1985 Sep; 200(5):508-31.The paper seeks intuitively-satisfying models of optimum population growth. The authors build upon Phelps's model of endogenous technical progress plus the Steinmann-Simon extension, which imply that the per-person consumption growth rate depends positively and linearly upon the population growth rate, without bound....They suggest that the consumption rate ultimately turns downwards as population growth increases because of decreasing adoption of available technology as labor cheapens relative to capital, and as high population growth overtaxes people's will and ability to respond. Including a convex-downward function in the model yields sensible results. (summary in GER) (EXCERPT)
New York, New York, Population Council, 1985 Dec. 39 p. (Population Council. Center for Policy Studies Working Papers No. 120)This essay explores the economic implications of continuing below-replacement fertility in the developed countries of the West. Effects of low fertility on labor supply, technological change and investment and consumption are noted, but their economic growth and welfare consequences, it is argued, can for the most part be discounted provided some reasonable degree of institutional adaptability is present. 2 further areas where similar complacency on economic effects appears unjustified are explored at greater length. One is the potential influence of low fertility on income distribution and economic mobility. Social security issues, while properly seen as highly important, are only a subset of an intricate mesh of distributional relationships affected by fertility patterns. The other area is that of international economic relations, given the trend toward demographic inconsequence of the rich countries and the uncertain prospects of their continued technological dominance. The chief demographic effects of below replacement fertility are: eventual but often greatly delayed contraction in population numbers; a concentration of families around completed parities of 0-3; substantial rises in the median age of the population and in the proportion of elderly; and a fall-off in the relative numbers of youth and in the ratio of labor force entrants to retirees under constant participation rates. Technological effects of population growth are meditated through factor prices: a labor shortage can elicit shifts to more capital-intensive production methods. Low fertility, even somewhat below replacement level, presents no great difficulty for a modern economy. Its effects are probably small compared to business-cycle fluctuations in economic performance, and reasonable flexibility in adjustments to complementary factor inputs and technology and in fiscal management should enable continuation of a satisfactory pace of economic growth, both aggregate and per capita.
London, England, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Evaluation and Planning Centre for Health Care, 1985 Winter. 97 p. (EPC Publication No. 8)Many developing countries spend sizeable sums on the purchase of drugs yet an estimated 60-80% of their populations, particulary in rural areas, do not have constant access to even the most essential drugs. The provision of adequate amounts of effective drugs to treat the most important and common disease conditions is crucial if health services are to be effective and credible. Many problems are associated with the provision and utilization of therapeutic drugs in developing countries: inequitable access to cost-effective safe drugs; inequitable production and consumption with market concentration in the hands of a few multinationals encouraging competition based on product differntion and not price; escalating drug costs; inefficient procurement, distribution, management; and irrational prescription and consumption. To combat these problems, the essential drug concept was introduced by the WHO in 1977. In 1981, WHO established a special Action Program on Essential Drugs. This is a worldwide collaborative program that aims at urging member states to adopt national drug policies, as well as helping developing countries procure and use essential drugs. Several countries have implemented some of the suggestions of the Drug Action Program. Though some progress has been made towards achieving an increase in the use and availability of cost-effective drugs, very few countries have succeeded in decreasing the use of unsafe drugs and those of low cost-effectiveness. Effective legislation is a prerequisite to the effective use of drugs. Recommended action for governments of developing countries to involve the private sector include: creating incentive for increased domestice production; controlling promotional practices; and exerting price controls.
[Migrations and economic and social change in Egypt] Migrations et transformations economiques et sociales en Egypte.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):493-506.The inexistence in the Arab world of institutions to facilitate development led Egypt to adopt the infitah, a policy of economic opening which is not a voluntarist economic strategy but rather is intended to create a climate favorable to a more capitalistic orientation for individuals with access to petroleum income. Egypt's gross national product grew by 4.6%/year in the dozen years through 1965, but thereafter growth was sluggish or even negative. After 1967 the choices of the dominant economic classes were oriented toward liberalism, and the arrival of Sadat allowed this orientation to prevail even before the infitah. The various measures of the infitah were designed to promote investment, reactivate the private sector, and reorganize the public sector. Most of the specific projects approved through 1978 were in the tertiary sector, they did little to stimulate further development, and the total number of jobs created was relatively insignificant. The transformation of the Egyptian economy is due not so much to the infitah as to 4 other elements: oil, income from the Suez canal, tourism, and emigration. At present petroleum represents 30% of Egypt's exports, the Suez canal will probably bring in $1.5 billion annually in coming years, and tourism brought in $1 billion in 1984, but in terms of economic and social impact on the total population emigration is much more important. The number of emigrants increased from 100,000 in 1973 to over 3 million in 1984 and the extent of their remittances increased from $184 million in 1973 to nearly $4 billion at present. Serious shortages of skilled and unskilled labor have been created by the departure of 10-15% of the overall labor force and a higher proportion for some skilled professions. The number of workers in construction more than doubled from 1971-79, while 10% of the agricultural labor force departed. Agricultural wages increased by an average of 7.1% in these years as agricultural workers were attracted to the higher wages of construction. However, the actual levels of agricultural wages were very low at outset. Differences between Egyptian wages and those paid in the Gulf states became so significant that they disrupted the prevailing norms and hierarchies of remuneration. The development of migration thus represents an individual response to 2 types of problems: the incapacity of the Egyptian state to develop an economy that creates employment, and the development of methods to allow each Arab state to benefit from petroleum income. But the future course of migration to the Gulf states is not known, and whether the improvements already observed in the lives of rural Egyptians can be sustained over the long term is a vital question.
[The effects of manpower emigration on income distribution and consumption models in the Egyptian economy] Les effets de l'emigration de main-d'oeuvre sur la distribution des revenus et les modeles de consommation dans l'economie Egyptienne.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):507-22.This work analyzes the effects of emigration from Egypt on the distribution of income and the consumption model of the Egyptian economy. The increasing role of remittances as a principal source of household income has disturbed the old division of income among socioeconomic groups. It is difficult to estimate the volume of remittances with any precision because of the variety of ways in which they can be made. Official statistics tend to underestimate their value by ignoring black market transactions, remittances of merchandise, and other forms. An estimate was made of the value of remittances in 1980 taking account of wage levels of 5 different types of workers in the principal employing countries, their average propensities to save, and the employment structure of migrants by socioprofessional groups. The average educational level of emigrants appears to have declined somewhat between 1972-78. Average monthly income for emigrants was estimated to range from 792 Egyptian pounds for technical and professional workers to 252 for unskilled workers and the propensity to save was estimated to range from 40% for technical and scientific workers to 15% for unskilled workers. The total income remitted in 1980 in millions of Egyptian pounds was estimated at 912 for 240,000 technical and scienfific workers, 739 for 360,000 intermediate level workers, 415 for 300,000 artisans and workers, 60 for 60,000 chauffeurs, and 109 for 240,000 unskilled workers. Although remittances have elevated the per capita income of the low income groups, their impact has been diminished by severe inflationary pressures which have led to a decline in living levels and a less complete satisfaction of basic needs. Salary levels of construction workers were 7-9 times higher in Egyptian pounds in 1977 in 3 countries of immigration than in Egypt, while they were 7-10 times higher in 4 countries for university professors. Remittances are used by families receiving them for subsistence or investment; lower income groups are more likely to use a large proportion for support and to buy locally produced goods, while higher income groups tend to save more and to purchase a larger proportion of imported goods. 1 of the significant effects of remittances is to orient individual consumption toward luxury consumer goods, which in turn entails a progressive substitution of imported for local goods and a growing disparity between the consumption of those who succeed in migrating and those who don't. Remittances sent by low income emigrants for family support are the only mechanism with a stimulating effect on the demand for local goods of mediocre quality; all the other mechanisms stimulate the demand for high quality imported goods and services which have a negligible stimulating effect for the poorest segments of the population, rural or urban.
[The role of the state in the migration of workers and economic diversification in the countries of the Arab Peninsula] Le role de l'etat dans les migrations de travailleurs et la diversification economique des pays de la Peninsule Arabe.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):597-620.This work argues that analyses of the contribution of foreign workers to economic diversification of the Gulf states should begin with a study of the structure of petroleum income and the social relations of each country. This hypothesis is in contrast to those which regard the labor market or the low activity rates of Gulf countries as the principle impetus for labor migrations in the Middle East. Although the labor importing countries differ in their degrees of development, size, existing infrastructure, agricultural development, and other key aspects, they have some important features in common. Recourse to foreign labor developed in all the countries during the early 1970s as a result of the increase in petroleum prices. Until the late 1960s, the petroleum producing countries had seen the bulk of the petroleum revenues go to the large oil companies and the consuming countries. The legitimacy of their governments rested on the support of the oil companies and on a system of internal alliances among clans in which the paramount clan redistributed the income receive from the petroleum companies. The redistributed value did not strictly speaking represent the profit but only a fraction of the world petroleum profit divided up by the oil companies. The structure of the state and the relations which attached it to the civil society continue to constitute an effective and durable block to mobilization of an internal labor force. The state, becaue of its relations to the oil companies, had no need of investments. The internal economies of gulf oil producing states were weakly diversified before the 1970s, the state was highly influential, capital as a particular aspect of wealth was poorly developed or undeveloped except in enclaves with foreign capital, internal consumption was largely imported, and no mechanism existed to break the ties of the individual clans or tribes with the state. After 1974 the large oil states undertook a sustained process of productive reallocation of surplus income whose forms depended on their possibilities of insertion in the world economy and their internal social structures. The goal was to transfer a significant fraction of income into capital. The network of alliances put into place by unproductive redistributions cannot be modified without compromising the stability of the state; recourse to foreign manpower in large part is an answer to the inability to disengage local labor. Immigration however appears to be limited by the fact that almost all tensions related to growth find expression in antagonism between nationals and foreign workers. Exportation of capital to the peripheral Arab states with large labor forces does not appear to be a satisfactory solution to the problems of massive labor importation and economic diversification.
[Pakistan: emigration in the Gulf and its effects on the home economy] L'emigration Pakistanaise dans le Golfe et ses repercussions sur le pays d'origine.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):553-66.Pakistani emigration since the early 1970s has been primarily directed toward the oil-rich Gulf states. Over 2 million Pakistanis, 10% of the adult male workforce, now live outside their home country, 3/4 of them in the Gulf states. The emigration has shortterm advantages for Pakistan, which has a high unemployment rate and few other exports. 2 government bureaus and over 300 recruiting agencies encourage Pakistani emigration to the Gulf, and because of the foreign exchange earnings generated, such emigration has become an important concern of the government. Emigration has a long history in Pakistan as part of the migratory movements of the Indian subcontinent in general. Emigration in the 1960s was prompted by mechanization of agriculture and disturbances of traditional agrarian labor arrangements brought on by the Green Revolution. Concentrations of lands among the successful middle-sized producers led to a rural proletariat and exodus towards the cities, where possibilities of employment were scarce. Regions of declining income around the new capital of Islamabad were the 1st to take advantage of new employment opportunities in the Gulf states. Pakistani migration to the Gulf countries is temporary for individual workers, who stay an average of 3-6 years, but the effect is of chain migration as returning workers are replaced by other family members. Workers are not accompanied by family members and have almost no contact with the local Arab populations. They send most of their earnings to their families in Pakistan. 3/4 are under 30 years old, most are of rural origin, and the majority are from the northern provinces. Although 70% are married, only 4% of migrants, the most highly qualified, are accompanied by their families. About 41% are unskilled workers and 42.6% are semiskilled or skilled manual workers. In 1981, the average annual salary repatriated by a Pakistani working in the Gulf was $3000. The Pakistani government has not defined a migration policy but has established rules and procedures to curtail clandestine departures. Most migrants use the services of licensed private employment agencies and very few use public channels. Because the migration is relatively new and few studies have been done, it is difficult to evaluate its effects on the local economy. 1 result is a severe local shortage of labor, especially in construction and transportation, which has promoted inflation and particularly affected the most impoverished classes. Remissions are now the most important source of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, but are not being invested in economic, industrial, or agricultural development, which has remained stagnant while 55% of the national budget is directed to defense. Most migrant earnings are invested in housing, marriages and dowries, and luxury imported consumer goods. In the current state of Pakistan's economy, migration is the sole means of socioeconomic advancement for the vast majority, but the future of the movement is uncertain.
[Manpower migrations in the Arab world: the reverse of the New Economic Order] Migrations de main-d'oeuvre dans le monde Arabe l'envers du Nouvel Ordre Economique.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):665-79.Population and petroleum, 2 essential factors in the development of the Arab world, are unequally distributed in the 18 Arab countries. The abstract possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation between the countries with large populations and no oil and those with oil but small populations is far from being realized; on the contrary, growing inequality and deterioration of human and productive resources can be observed in the Arab world. The apparent economic progress of the oil producing states is illusory, because it has permitted them to defer development of their own internal resources such as agriculture, industry, professional training and education in favor of greater dependence on the temporary palliative of petroleum revenues. In 1980, over 3 million Arabs had emigrated toward other Arab countries, where they were joined by approximately 1.8 million non-Arabs. 4 types of Arab migration have been important: movement from the countryside to cities within countries, movement of Arab migrants to non-Arab countries, movement from 1 Arab state to another because of political factors and especially to earn high wages in the oil producing states, and immigration of non-Arabs and especially Asians to Arab countries. 6 of the principal manpower importing countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, had total labor forces of about 5.2 million in 1985, of which only 41% were nationals. There have been 4 main consequences for the states importing manpower: 1) petroleum production is very capital intensive and creates few jobs; the jobs filled by migrants are mostly in construction and services funded by oil revenues 2) the expansion is temporary because petroleum is a nonrenewable resource; the manpower transfers will therefore not be permanent 3) the migrants represent a large proportion of the labor force and populations of the Gulf oil-producing states, and 4) the migrants are systematically excluded from the political and social life of the countries in which they work, have no juridical protection or political rights, and are the objects of growing hostility in the countries where they work. The most important consequence may be the least visible: because of the petroleum income and the migratory flows the local populations are less and less motivated to work. The immigrants are almost all single or unaccompanied men who send most of their earnings to their home countries. Thus far there has been little apparent political activity or labor unrest among them in the host countries, but it is unclear how long the apparent calm can be sustained. The most obvious consequence of the migration for the sending countries is the massive flow of remittances. In 1980, such transfers between Arab countries were estimated to total around $3 billion, not counting income in kind. The remittances do not appear to be invested in productive enterprises with any frequency but rather to be used for purchases of mostly imported consumer goods and in speculation. Few migrants learn useful job skills, and some countries have lost large proportions of their skilled workers to migration. Migrant earnings have depressed local production by encouraging imports, especially of foodstuffs, and have fostered inflation by stimulating demand for land and wage increases.