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Your search found 17 Results

  1. 1
    063389

    The consequences of temporary emigration and remittance expenditure from rural and urban settlements: evidence from Jordan.

    Seccombe IJ; Findlay AM

    In: The impact of international migration on developing countries, edited by Reginald Appleyard. Paris, France, OECD Publications, 1989. 109-25. (Development Centre Seminars)

    This paper investigates the characteristics of temporary emigration for employment and the nature of remittance expenditure within 1 country of labor emigration to the Arab world, Jordan. It compares 2 independent household expenditure surveys conducted at opposite ends of the settlement continuum, 1 in the village of Sammu' (31 households in 1985) in northwest Jordan and the other in Marka (40 households in 1984), a suburb of the capital Amman. The results of the 2 surveys reinforce the argument that international migration is associated with non-productive investment of remittances in consumer goods and in the construction sector. In an economy such as Jordan's, this pattern of remittance expenditure encourages very marked geographical changes in both villages and large urban settlements, but the morphological and functional changes that occur vary in significance according to urban hierarchy. The common link in all scales of settlement is that emerging patterns are determined by consumer rather than by producer behavior, resulting in patterns of settlement change that are distinctly different from those found in settlement systems whose dynamics are governed by local patterns of production.
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  2. 2
    199979

    Return migration and urban change: a Jordanian case study.

    Findlay A; Samha M

    In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 171-84.

    Using a survey of 173 households from 1984, this paper examines the nature of recent return migration to Jordan, with particular reference to the capitol city, Amman. Emigration is very evident in Jordan, which has an estimated 40% of its work force employed abroad. Remittances from 20% of its gross national product. Not only has employment in oil-rich countries declined since 1979, return migration has also accelerated. Return migration as a part of international migration has become an extremely important force in generating urban change in Jordan. The date of emigration directly influenced the probability of return, but no associaton was found between the place of birth and return migration or between countries of employment and current and return migration. Return migrants had slightly smaller households than current migrants. Return migrants were much more likely to have purchased land as an investment or to have used their remittances for house construction or alterations than current migrants. Neither return nor current migrants showed much interest in devoting their remittances to agriculture and industry; a similar proportion of both groups used their foreign earnings to educate another family member. The geographic impact of return migration is evident in the present physical growth of Jordan's cities.
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  3. 3
    199978

    The readjustment of return migrants in western Ireland.

    Gmelch G

    In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 152-70.

    This paper looks at the adjustment made by return migrants to resettling in small communities in western Ireland. Although some theories suggest that the psychic costs of return migration may be low due to prior experience with the destination, the cases described here present a different picture. Some migrants pick up quickly where they left off; others become unhappy and disillusioned. While returnees are often better off financially than their neighbors, they are often bitter and disappointed about life in their homeland. The sample included 606 return migrants from County Cork in the south to County Donegal in the north. 51% of the migrants were men, and 49% were women. The average length of stay abroad was 17 years. The greatest readjustment problem for returnees is dealing with the slow pace of life in Ireland and coping with widespread inefficiency. The 2nd most important problem involves reestablishing relationships with local people; returnees felt that local people were narrow-minded and nosey. Many returnees had forgotten the severity of Irish winters. 1/10 of the returnees found the economic situation very unfavorable. A moderate relationship was found between readjustment and both housing and job satisfaction. The variable most strongly related to adjustment was a satisfactory social life. Developing friendships and gaining local acceptance are very important; conformity may be the key factor in gaining local acceptance. Migrants, on the whole, do not learn skills abroad that they are able to use at home. Purchasing a home remains returnees' highest priority, although many also use savings to set up a small business. Returnees may affect their communities most by example; young people may see them as more worldly and well-to-do than nonmigrants and be encouraged to follow their example.
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  4. 4
    199976

    The economic impact of return migration in central Portugal.

    Lewis J; Williams A

    In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 100-28.

    This paper analyzes the economic behavior of returned emigrants from Europe (regressados), refugees from the ex-colonies (retornados), and nonmigrants in contrasting regions of central Portugal. Due to the overwhelming importance of migration to its economy, Portugal offers an excellent opportunity to assess both the behavior of different types of migrants and the effects of their behavior in regions with marked variations in economic development. Both international emigration and regional inequality are long-standing features of the Portugese economy; they act as mutually reinforcing trends. The lack of opportunity in the poorer regions means that emigration offers one of the few opportunities for advancement, but its beneficial effects for households are not dispersed widely enough to present sufficient opportunities for the next generation. The economic instincts of returnees are to follow the lead of nonmigrants in a given community and not to swim against the tide. More innovative returnees have the option of migrating to one of the more dynamic environments in the region. The type of emigration that has been undertaken influences subsequent behavior, although similarities in economic behavior exist between retornados, regressados, and non-emigrants. A closer specification of these similarities will help to reduce the expectations placed on returnees to areas with poor economic prospects. Regressados return to their villages to retire or to run small farms; others prefer to invest in industrial firms only where there is an expanding market. Well-intentioned policies to harness the economic potential of returnees in developing poor regions will not work any better in the future than they have worked in the past.
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  5. 5
    199973

    Gastarbeiter go home: return migration and economic change in the Italian Mezzogiorno.

    King R; Strachan A; Mortimer J

    In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 38-68.

    Most migrants return home not because of redundancy in the host country but because of a more complex mix of personal, family, emotional, and economic reasons, which conditions the impact that returnees have on their regions. This paper examines the economic impact of return migration on southern Italy, especially employment and the use of savings and remittances. 705 interviews in 486 households (including 197 wives and 22 working-age children) comprised the sample. Study results generally confirm the more pessimistic evaluations of other work in the backward and environmentally deprived areas of southern Italy. Migration and return have not generally had positive long-term economic effects on southern Italy. At the individual level, however, migration appears to be a successful and valued experience in financial terms. Emigration is not desirable in itself but as a means to an end--an improved standard of living, possessions, social status, and the satisfaction these bring. Emigration does not generally lead to better job prospects on return. "Sacrifice" and "duty to one's family" were recurrent themes in the interviews; only 6.7% of the returnees were planning to go abroad again. Acquired skills and accumulated capital do flow in with the returnees, but these inputs are not used to their full potential, partly due to the uncoordinated, individualistic, and familistic behavior of returnees and partly due to the lack of a government framework to make use of funds.
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  6. 6
    033046

    [Migrations and rural capitalization in Egypt: changes in the peasant family] Migrations et capitalisation de la campagne en Egypte: la reconversion de la famille paysanne.

    El-Singaby T

    TIERS-MONDE. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):523-32.

    Economic changes in Egypt over the past decade have resulted from a series of influences including the rise in the cost of oil, the world economic crisis, and governmental efforts to develop a new policy of economic development. Although the effects of economic change are more immediately apparent in urban areas, their import has perhaps been more profound in the countryside. The most comfortable agricultural producers are growing a greater variety of crops, are more highly capitalized operations, and are more closely influenced by the world and local markets. Producers failing to make these changes are being bought out in a type of agrarian self-reform financed ultimately by income from migration to oil producing states. Members of an Egyptian family studied from 1969-84 were typical landless rural cultivaters renting lands until 1969, when they obtained title to a small quantity of land under the 3rd law of agrarian reform, promulgated in March 1969. Despite the agrarian reform, the role of the landlord initially was largely replaced by that of the state, on which the family now became dependent. The family retained the essential characteristics of the landless peasant: low standard of living, necessity of selling their labor to larger producers, and absence of decision making capacity concerning type of cultivation and direct experience with the market. The agrarian reform cooperative now played the role of intermediary formerly filled by the landlord. During the period from 1974-81, which saw a new government policy development, 2 brothers in the family worked as laborers in Iraq, leaving their wives and children behind in the care of the extended family. Their father ceased to fill the role of patriach; the new need for an entrepreneur was filled by 1 of the emigrating brothers, who arranged for purchase of a house to replace the family's rented quarters and also bought a tractor to be rented to other cultivators, representing a new source of income, mechanization of the countryside, and a form of capitalization. Tomatoes and other vegetables were added to the family crops. The family's standard of living continued to improve, and greater efforts were made to educate the children. The entrepreneur brother was replaced after his accidental death by a younger brother who continued his activities while still striving to maintain the family labor pool, which now amounted to 32 workers based on 5 marriages. The original new house was rented and then sold to finance more land purchases, and a constant supply of migrant remittances was available. The local wage rate also increased significantly, raising the possibility of significant earnings. The progress of this family was not atypical and was partly due to the internal aptitude of Egyptian society for integrating change.
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  7. 7
    224870

    International migration, remittances and economic welfare in the source country.

    Rivera-Batiz FL

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC STUDIES. 1986; 13(3):3-19.

    This article provides a formal framework for the analysis of the impact of international migration in the presence of remittances. The discussion differentiates between temporary and permanent migration and between the effects of remittances that raise investment and those that raise consumption spending in the source country. Changes in prices, income distribution and national welfare are examined. The geographic focus is worldwide. (EXCERPT)
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  8. 8
    033048

    [Migrations and economic and social change in Egypt] Migrations et transformations economiques et sociales en Egypte.

    Ged A

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):493-506.

    The inexistence in the Arab world of institutions to facilitate development led Egypt to adopt the infitah, a policy of economic opening which is not a voluntarist economic strategy but rather is intended to create a climate favorable to a more capitalistic orientation for individuals with access to petroleum income. Egypt's gross national product grew by 4.6%/year in the dozen years through 1965, but thereafter growth was sluggish or even negative. After 1967 the choices of the dominant economic classes were oriented toward liberalism, and the arrival of Sadat allowed this orientation to prevail even before the infitah. The various measures of the infitah were designed to promote investment, reactivate the private sector, and reorganize the public sector. Most of the specific projects approved through 1978 were in the tertiary sector, they did little to stimulate further development, and the total number of jobs created was relatively insignificant. The transformation of the Egyptian economy is due not so much to the infitah as to 4 other elements: oil, income from the Suez canal, tourism, and emigration. At present petroleum represents 30% of Egypt's exports, the Suez canal will probably bring in $1.5 billion annually in coming years, and tourism brought in $1 billion in 1984, but in terms of economic and social impact on the total population emigration is much more important. The number of emigrants increased from 100,000 in 1973 to over 3 million in 1984 and the extent of their remittances increased from $184 million in 1973 to nearly $4 billion at present. Serious shortages of skilled and unskilled labor have been created by the departure of 10-15% of the overall labor force and a higher proportion for some skilled professions. The number of workers in construction more than doubled from 1971-79, while 10% of the agricultural labor force departed. Agricultural wages increased by an average of 7.1% in these years as agricultural workers were attracted to the higher wages of construction. However, the actual levels of agricultural wages were very low at outset. Differences between Egyptian wages and those paid in the Gulf states became so significant that they disrupted the prevailing norms and hierarchies of remuneration. The development of migration thus represents an individual response to 2 types of problems: the incapacity of the Egyptian state to develop an economy that creates employment, and the development of methods to allow each Arab state to benefit from petroleum income. But the future course of migration to the Gulf states is not known, and whether the improvements already observed in the lives of rural Egyptians can be sustained over the long term is a vital question.
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  9. 9
    033047

    [The effects of manpower emigration on income distribution and consumption models in the Egyptian economy] Les effets de l'emigration de main-d'oeuvre sur la distribution des revenus et les modeles de consommation dans l'economie Egyptienne.

    Abdel Fadil M

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):507-22.

    This work analyzes the effects of emigration from Egypt on the distribution of income and the consumption model of the Egyptian economy. The increasing role of remittances as a principal source of household income has disturbed the old division of income among socioeconomic groups. It is difficult to estimate the volume of remittances with any precision because of the variety of ways in which they can be made. Official statistics tend to underestimate their value by ignoring black market transactions, remittances of merchandise, and other forms. An estimate was made of the value of remittances in 1980 taking account of wage levels of 5 different types of workers in the principal employing countries, their average propensities to save, and the employment structure of migrants by socioprofessional groups. The average educational level of emigrants appears to have declined somewhat between 1972-78. Average monthly income for emigrants was estimated to range from 792 Egyptian pounds for technical and professional workers to 252 for unskilled workers and the propensity to save was estimated to range from 40% for technical and scientific workers to 15% for unskilled workers. The total income remitted in 1980 in millions of Egyptian pounds was estimated at 912 for 240,000 technical and scienfific workers, 739 for 360,000 intermediate level workers, 415 for 300,000 artisans and workers, 60 for 60,000 chauffeurs, and 109 for 240,000 unskilled workers. Although remittances have elevated the per capita income of the low income groups, their impact has been diminished by severe inflationary pressures which have led to a decline in living levels and a less complete satisfaction of basic needs. Salary levels of construction workers were 7-9 times higher in Egyptian pounds in 1977 in 3 countries of immigration than in Egypt, while they were 7-10 times higher in 4 countries for university professors. Remittances are used by families receiving them for subsistence or investment; lower income groups are more likely to use a large proportion for support and to buy locally produced goods, while higher income groups tend to save more and to purchase a larger proportion of imported goods. 1 of the significant effects of remittances is to orient individual consumption toward luxury consumer goods, which in turn entails a progressive substitution of imported for local goods and a growing disparity between the consumption of those who succeed in migrating and those who don't. Remittances sent by low income emigrants for family support are the only mechanism with a stimulating effect on the demand for local goods of mediocre quality; all the other mechanisms stimulate the demand for high quality imported goods and services which have a negligible stimulating effect for the poorest segments of the population, rural or urban.
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  10. 10
    033042

    [The role of the state in the migration of workers and economic diversification in the countries of the Arab Peninsula] Le role de l'etat dans les migrations de travailleurs et la diversification economique des pays de la Peninsule Arabe.

    Beauge G

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):597-620.

    This work argues that analyses of the contribution of foreign workers to economic diversification of the Gulf states should begin with a study of the structure of petroleum income and the social relations of each country. This hypothesis is in contrast to those which regard the labor market or the low activity rates of Gulf countries as the principle impetus for labor migrations in the Middle East. Although the labor importing countries differ in their degrees of development, size, existing infrastructure, agricultural development, and other key aspects, they have some important features in common. Recourse to foreign labor developed in all the countries during the early 1970s as a result of the increase in petroleum prices. Until the late 1960s, the petroleum producing countries had seen the bulk of the petroleum revenues go to the large oil companies and the consuming countries. The legitimacy of their governments rested on the support of the oil companies and on a system of internal alliances among clans in which the paramount clan redistributed the income receive from the petroleum companies. The redistributed value did not strictly speaking represent the profit but only a fraction of the world petroleum profit divided up by the oil companies. The structure of the state and the relations which attached it to the civil society continue to constitute an effective and durable block to mobilization of an internal labor force. The state, becaue of its relations to the oil companies, had no need of investments. The internal economies of gulf oil producing states were weakly diversified before the 1970s, the state was highly influential, capital as a particular aspect of wealth was poorly developed or undeveloped except in enclaves with foreign capital, internal consumption was largely imported, and no mechanism existed to break the ties of the individual clans or tribes with the state. After 1974 the large oil states undertook a sustained process of productive reallocation of surplus income whose forms depended on their possibilities of insertion in the world economy and their internal social structures. The goal was to transfer a significant fraction of income into capital. The network of alliances put into place by unproductive redistributions cannot be modified without compromising the stability of the state; recourse to foreign manpower in large part is an answer to the inability to disengage local labor. Immigration however appears to be limited by the fact that almost all tensions related to growth find expression in antagonism between nationals and foreign workers. Exportation of capital to the peripheral Arab states with large labor forces does not appear to be a satisfactory solution to the problems of massive labor importation and economic diversification.
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  11. 11
    033040

    [Pakistan: emigration in the Gulf and its effects on the home economy] L'emigration Pakistanaise dans le Golfe et ses repercussions sur le pays d'origine.

    Imdad N

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):553-66.

    Pakistani emigration since the early 1970s has been primarily directed toward the oil-rich Gulf states. Over 2 million Pakistanis, 10% of the adult male workforce, now live outside their home country, 3/4 of them in the Gulf states. The emigration has shortterm advantages for Pakistan, which has a high unemployment rate and few other exports. 2 government bureaus and over 300 recruiting agencies encourage Pakistani emigration to the Gulf, and because of the foreign exchange earnings generated, such emigration has become an important concern of the government. Emigration has a long history in Pakistan as part of the migratory movements of the Indian subcontinent in general. Emigration in the 1960s was prompted by mechanization of agriculture and disturbances of traditional agrarian labor arrangements brought on by the Green Revolution. Concentrations of lands among the successful middle-sized producers led to a rural proletariat and exodus towards the cities, where possibilities of employment were scarce. Regions of declining income around the new capital of Islamabad were the 1st to take advantage of new employment opportunities in the Gulf states. Pakistani migration to the Gulf countries is temporary for individual workers, who stay an average of 3-6 years, but the effect is of chain migration as returning workers are replaced by other family members. Workers are not accompanied by family members and have almost no contact with the local Arab populations. They send most of their earnings to their families in Pakistan. 3/4 are under 30 years old, most are of rural origin, and the majority are from the northern provinces. Although 70% are married, only 4% of migrants, the most highly qualified, are accompanied by their families. About 41% are unskilled workers and 42.6% are semiskilled or skilled manual workers. In 1981, the average annual salary repatriated by a Pakistani working in the Gulf was $3000. The Pakistani government has not defined a migration policy but has established rules and procedures to curtail clandestine departures. Most migrants use the services of licensed private employment agencies and very few use public channels. Because the migration is relatively new and few studies have been done, it is difficult to evaluate its effects on the local economy. 1 result is a severe local shortage of labor, especially in construction and transportation, which has promoted inflation and particularly affected the most impoverished classes. Remissions are now the most important source of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, but are not being invested in economic, industrial, or agricultural development, which has remained stagnant while 55% of the national budget is directed to defense. Most migrant earnings are invested in housing, marriages and dowries, and luxury imported consumer goods. In the current state of Pakistan's economy, migration is the sole means of socioeconomic advancement for the vast majority, but the future of the movement is uncertain.
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  12. 12
    033038

    [Manpower migrations in the Arab world: the reverse of the New Economic Order] Migrations de main-d'oeuvre dans le monde Arabe l'envers du Nouvel Ordre Economique.

    Halliday F

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):665-79.

    Population and petroleum, 2 essential factors in the development of the Arab world, are unequally distributed in the 18 Arab countries. The abstract possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation between the countries with large populations and no oil and those with oil but small populations is far from being realized; on the contrary, growing inequality and deterioration of human and productive resources can be observed in the Arab world. The apparent economic progress of the oil producing states is illusory, because it has permitted them to defer development of their own internal resources such as agriculture, industry, professional training and education in favor of greater dependence on the temporary palliative of petroleum revenues. In 1980, over 3 million Arabs had emigrated toward other Arab countries, where they were joined by approximately 1.8 million non-Arabs. 4 types of Arab migration have been important: movement from the countryside to cities within countries, movement of Arab migrants to non-Arab countries, movement from 1 Arab state to another because of political factors and especially to earn high wages in the oil producing states, and immigration of non-Arabs and especially Asians to Arab countries. 6 of the principal manpower importing countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, had total labor forces of about 5.2 million in 1985, of which only 41% were nationals. There have been 4 main consequences for the states importing manpower: 1) petroleum production is very capital intensive and creates few jobs; the jobs filled by migrants are mostly in construction and services funded by oil revenues 2) the expansion is temporary because petroleum is a nonrenewable resource; the manpower transfers will therefore not be permanent 3) the migrants represent a large proportion of the labor force and populations of the Gulf oil-producing states, and 4) the migrants are systematically excluded from the political and social life of the countries in which they work, have no juridical protection or political rights, and are the objects of growing hostility in the countries where they work. The most important consequence may be the least visible: because of the petroleum income and the migratory flows the local populations are less and less motivated to work. The immigrants are almost all single or unaccompanied men who send most of their earnings to their home countries. Thus far there has been little apparent political activity or labor unrest among them in the host countries, but it is unclear how long the apparent calm can be sustained. The most obvious consequence of the migration for the sending countries is the massive flow of remittances. In 1980, such transfers between Arab countries were estimated to total around $3 billion, not counting income in kind. The remittances do not appear to be invested in productive enterprises with any frequency but rather to be used for purchases of mostly imported consumer goods and in speculation. Few migrants learn useful job skills, and some countries have lost large proportions of their skilled workers to migration. Migrant earnings have depressed local production by encouraging imports, especially of foodstuffs, and have fostered inflation by stimulating demand for land and wage increases.
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  13. 13
    196729

    Impermanent mobility in Indonesia: what do we know about its contemporary scale, causes and consequences?

    Hugo GJ

    [Unpublished] 1981. Paper presented at the Population Association of America Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., Mar. 26-28, 1981. 44 p.

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  14. 14
    208852

    [Family situation and social adjustment according to emigrant letters] Situazione familiare e inserimento nella societa locale attraverso le lettere di emigrati.

    Campus A

    Studi Emigrazione. 1981 Mar; 18(61):3-28.

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  15. 15
    198213

    Promoting the productive use of remittances.

    Saket BK

    In: International migration in the Arab world: proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference, Nicosia, Cyprus, 11-16 May 1981, v. 2. Beirut, Lebanon, U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1982. 1093-1127.

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  16. 16
    198196

    The socio-cultural effects of intraregional migration.

    Khoury M

    In: International migration in the Arab world: proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference, Nicosia, Cyprus, 11-16 May 1981, v. 1. Beirut, Lebanon, U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1982. 591-623.

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  17. 17
    204558

    Circulation and proletarianisation.

    Standing G

    Geneva, Switz., International Labour Organisation, 1982. 35 p. (World Employment Programme research working papers; Population and Labour Policies Programme working paper, no. 119; WEP 2-21/WP.119)

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