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Television, value constructs, and reproductive behavior in Brazilian "excluded" communities. [Televisión, construcción de valores y conducta reproductiva en las comunidades "excluidas" de Brasil]
[Unpublished] 2001. Presented at the 24th International Union for the Scientific Study of Population [IUSSP] Conference, Salvador, Brazil, August 2001.  p.This paper is motivated by the unintended consequences hypothesis, developed by Faria (1988) and Faria and Potter (1990). They argue that the policies implemented by the Brazilian government after the military coup of 1964, combined with fast economic growth in the seventies -- which enhanced the consolidation of a consumer society -- played a major role in the fertility decline in Brazil. The argument is based on the fact that the military regime developed some state policies which did not intend to control population growth or establish a family planning policy. Yet, the main unintended consequence of these policies was a sharp decline in fertility. Four state policies were relevant in this process: telecommunications, consumer credit, “medicalization”, and social security coverage. The first two policies are more important to this paper. The development of a telecommunication policy aimed the country’s geographic integration through satellite signals. This policy was crucial to the geographic diffusion of television in Brazil. The prices charged to the TV networks for the transmission of signals were highly subsidized. The most important commercial television network, Globo, benefited from this process. It became competitive, modern, and a long time leader in audience ratings. Due to this policy, almost all localities in Brazil received TV signals at some point between 1965 and 1990. (excerpt)
The state of the world's women 1985: World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women, Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi, Kenya, July 15-26, 1985.
[Unpublished] 1985. 19 p.This report, based on results of a questionnaire completed by 121 national governments as well as independent research by UN agencies, assesses the status of the world's women at the end of the UN Decade for Women in the areas of the family, agriculture, industrialization, health, education, and politics. Women are estimated to perform 2/3 of the world's work, receive 1/10 of its income and own less than 1/100 of its property. The findings revealed that women do almost all the world's domestic work, which combined with their additional work outside the home means that most women work a double day. Women grow about 1/2 the world's food but own very little land, have difficulty obtaining credit, and are overlooked by agricultural advisors and projects. Women constitute 1/3 of the world's official labor force but are concentrated in the lowest paid occupations and are more vulnerable to unemployment than men. Although there are signs that the wage gap is closing slightly, women still earn less than 3/4 of the wage of men doing similar work. Women provide more health care than do health services, and have been major beneficiaries of the global shift in priorities to primary health care. The average number of children desired by the world's women has dropped from 6 to 4 in 1 generation. Although a school enrollment boom is closing the gap between the sexes, women illiterates outnumber men by 3 to 2. 90% of countries now have organizations promoting the advancement of women, but women are still greatly underrepresented in national decision making because of their poorer educations, lack of confidence, and greater workload. The results repeatedly point to the major underlying cause of women's inequality: their domestic role of wife and mother, which consumes about 1/2 of their time and energy, is unpaid, and is undervalued. The emerging picture of the importance and magnitude of the roles women play in society has been reflected in growing concern for women among governments and the community at large, and is responsible for the positive achievements of the decade in better health care and more employment and educational opportunities. Equality for women will require that they have equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities in every area of life.
NPG FORUM. 1990 Jul; 1-6.Cultural evolution has allowed humans to change their behaviors and adapt to new conditions much faster than biological evolution. The most critical of these is the overpopulation trap, caused by the imbalance between the short-term incentives to have children and the longterm social and ecological costs of having too many. This process of short-run incentives getting out of sync with longterm goals has been called social traps, as the decision maker is trapped by the local conditions into making a bad decision viewed from a longer perspective. The biological and cultural incentives to procreate combined with rapid reductions in mortality have changed the long-run ecological cost structure. The elimination of social traps requires intervention by education (about the longterm, distributed impacts), insurance, superordinate authority (legal systems, government, religion), and converting the trap to a trade-off. In a sense, this is an extension of the polluter pays principle. Summary suggestions: establish a hierarchy of goals for national and global ecological economic planning and management, sustainability should be the primary longterm goal, replacing the current GNP growth mania; develop better global ecological economic models about the interrelated impacts of population, per capita resource use, and wealth distribution; adjust current incentives to reflect long-run, global costs, including uncertainty; and allow no further decline in the stock of natural capital by taxing natural capital consumption. The US population in 1986 was about 240 million. Current technology and consumption patterns from renewable energy alone could sustain about 85 million people, or about 35% of the current population, or with a more equitable distribution 170 million at a high quality life style on renewable energy alone.
Austin, Texas, University of Texas, Texas Population Research Center, 1990. 19,  p. (Texas Population Research Center Paper No. 12.02)This paper offers a new perspective on the fertility decline in Brazil, and argues that a number of government policies have had substantial unintended and unanticipated effects on the rapid changes in reproductive behavior that have taken place since 1960. The four policy areas we focus on are consumer credit, telecommunications, social security, and health care....We address the question of how Brazilian development yielded values and norms consistent with controlled fertility. We claim to have identified significant institutional changes that had a direct and immediate bearing on the way people thought about sex and reproduction, and that facilitated the massive adoption of modern contraception. Our approach to the role of the state differs from that of most Brazilians in that we focus on the unintended effects of real policies rather than the intended effects of a non-policy....[Data are from] the 1980 Northeastern Brazil Survey of Maternal Child Health/Family Planning.... This paper was originally presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America (see Population Index, Vol. 56, No. 3, Fall 1990, p. 400).
International Demographics. 1986 May; 5(5):1-9.In 1964, at independence, Zambia's economic future looked brighter than that of most other developing countries. Its copper production accounted for 8% of total world production, and only neighboring Zaire outpaced it in the production of cobalt. Its Central Province around Kabwe held rich deposits of both zinc and lead; uranium deposits also had been found, but their projected yield remained undetermined. Since 1974, the decline in the price of copper and the increase in the price of oil have played havoc with Zambia's balance of payments. Copper, which accounted for 40% of the gross national product (GNP) and 98% of all foreign exchange in 1964, shrank to 12% of the GNP in 1978 while still generating most of the foreign exchange. As a result, imports were cut back markedly from $1.5 billion in 1973 to $690 million in 1983. Although this trend is beginning to make a U-turn, Zambia's economic situation is grave. In 1984 the GNP continued to register negative growth and inflation stood at 25%. With its urbanization rate doubling from 21% in 1964 to 43% in 1985, Zambia is now the most urbanized country south of the Sahara. Zambia's 1985 population is estimated to be 6.8 million. Between 1963 and 1969, the average annual population growth rate was 2.5: it was 3.1% between 1969-80. The current birthrate of about 48/1000 is expected to decline only marginally in the next 15 years, but the death rate is declining more rapidly -- from 19/1000 in the late 1960s to 15/1000 in 1985. Life expectancy is expected to rise from the current 51 years to about 58 years. As a result of the high growth rate, Zambia's population is young, with a median age of about 16.3 years. Traditional African values stress the importance of large families. Zambia's total fertility rate was 6.9 in 1985. According to the World Bank, only 1% of married women of childbearing age in 1982 used contraceptives. Although tribal links are weakening, Zambia still counts 73 officially recognized tribes. Together, they speak about 40 different dialects. Zambia now apportions over 15% of its national budget to education. Despite some noticeable progress, the public health structure remains deficient. Principal health problems include malaria, tuberculosis, and, in Northern Province and Luapula Province, sleeping sickness and river blindness. About 2/3 of the labor force, an estimated 2.2 million persons in 1982, still work in agriculture. Female labor force participation is lower in Zambia than in many African nations.
Oxford Economic Papers. 1985 Jun; 37(2):264-81.This paper analyzes a model of ideal choice of consumption and fertility, and then examines the circumstances in which such choices may not fully reflect their consequences; the analysis is confined to the case of an economy experiencing decreasing returns to scale. The model studied is designed to relate population size and growth to production and consumption. To determine an individual's fertility and consumption choices requires that an individual: 1) perceive a connection between his own fertility and the change in the population of the whole community; 2) perceive and forcast the effect of population change on future household earnings; 3) calculate the solution paths; and 4) act in accordance with the solution of the problem. The model produced in this paper requires the household to possess a considerable degree of sophistication. There would seem to be the potential for externalities from population change to the extent that the earnings of individuals depend on the size of the population. The potential for external effects would naturally not exist if an individual's plans took no account at all of the welfare of future generations. Fertility limitation programs of less developed countries may thus be seen in part as an attempt to remedy the inability of families to plan adequately for their descendents. In this approach, it is the possible failure of the individual family to perceive the demographic trends in the economy and their consequences which may result in too many children in the decreasing scale returns case. The decreasing returns example in this paper applies to economies where population growth was accompanied by failing per capita output.
In: Rural development and human fertility, edited by Wayne A. Schutjer and C. Shannon Stokes. New York, N.Y., Macmillan, 1984. 121-50.This chapter examines the effect of changing income on fertility in rural areas, focusing particular attention on 2 variables which intervene between income and fertility: educational aspirations and consumption aspirations. The chapter's 1st part considers the income/fertility relation in rural areas of less developed countries. (LDCs). It appears that in rural areas at the micro level the effect of income on fertility is nonlinear: positive at low levels of income and negative at relatively high levels. The chapter's 2nd part deals with educational aspirations and the so-called quantity/quality tradeoff. The 3rd part of the chapter examines the hypothesis that a negative income/fertility relationship is more likely once a transformation of consumption aspirations has occurred. Some macrolevel evidence is considered along with microlevel studies. Review of the empirical evidence concerning the income/fertility relation in LDCs indicates that the relation is negative in urban areas and in rural areas where development is relatively advanced, but positive in rural areas at earlier stages of development. The pure positive income effect may be reinforced by indirect positive effects in poor rural populations. In such populations, income increases may lead to better health, nutrition, and higher survival rates among women of childbearing age. In addition, rising income may lead to more optimistic expectations concerning permanent income, and, in some countries, rural women may withdraw from the labor force or reduce work inputs when the farm earns more money. At later stages of rural development, negative indirect effects of increasing income on fertility may outweigh positive effects. Rising educational and consumption patterns are among these potential negative indirect effects, but there are others, particularly the anticipation of declining economic benefits from children. The observed income/fertility pattern suggests first that aspirations respond more strongly to income advances in urban than in rural settings and during later than during earlier phases of rural development. It also suggests that the sensitivity of fertility to rising aspirations may be quite low in traditional rural societies. This 2nd proposition derives support from an analysis of the quantity/quality tradeoff. The depressing effect of consumption aspirations on fertility seem to be modest, yet it appears that a policy of austerity with regard to new consumer goods may make it more difficult to lower birthrates. Investment aspirations have been neglected in the literature. A policy of creating conditions conducive to investment in nonhuman capital for a broad spectrum of rural household is desirable in its own right. If high investment aspirations also lowered birthrates, they would represent a doubly valuable policy goal.
[Unpublished] 1983. 40 p.Add to my documents.