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  1. 1

    National autonomy, labor migration and political crisis: Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

    Okruhlik G; Conge P

    MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. 1997 Autumn; 51(4):554-65.

    This article explores the political and economic relationships in the 1980s and 1990s between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen as related to Yemeni labor migration and return migration in 1990. Saudi Arabia was home to about 2 million Yemeni labor migrants. This work force was reduced to about 1 million when oil prices declined. Yemen received substantial remittances, which fueled consumption and autonomy among rural institutions. Governments came to depend on indirect taxation of remittances through customs duties. Local institutions were funded largely by donations from migrants and their families. Central elites at the national level pressured local elites, who were weakened by the loss of revenue when labor migration declined in the 1980s. Central policies helped local areas adjust to declining funds. This enhanced national political power. In 1990, when Saudi Arabia shifted policy on Yemeni labor migration and Yemenis fled home, the united North and South Yemen absorbed the massive return migration. The state's control over society had increased sufficiently during the 1980s that Saudi Arabia's desire to exploit local autonomous groups failed and a smooth unification of the two Yemeni populations proceeded. Yemen had been united for 3 months before the Saudi decision. Yemen's decision to remain neutral in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict stimulated the Saudi action to threaten Yemeni migrants. Saudi Arabia tried again to undermine stability in Yemen when violence erupted in 1994; but Yemen was cohesive, independent, and secure and had a newly discovered oil reserve, which buffered the Saudis' efforts to influence events in Yemen.
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  2. 2
    Peer Reviewed

    Women-headed households and household welfare: an empirical deconstruction for Uganda.

    Appleton S

    WORLD DEVELOPMENT. 1996 Dec; 24(12):1811-27.

    This study examines the well-being of female-headed households (FHHs) in Uganda. Data were obtained from the first nationally representative sample survey, the 1992 Integrated Household Survey. 2729 households were classified as female-headed. 25.8% of households and 22.2% of individuals in Uganda were female household heads. Well-being was measured by consumption, income, assets, housing, time use, education, and health. Only around 1% of the poor were urban FHHs. FHHs were not significantly poorer as measured by consumption or low income. There were few differences between food consumption in male-headed households (MHHs) and FHHs. FHHs had significantly lower food consumption only in urban areas. People in FHHs worked longer hours in the busiest 12 hours of each day than in MHHs. Men in FHHs worked longer hours. Women in FHHs worked shorter hours than women in MHHs. Urban women in FHHs worked longer hours than those in MHHs. FHHs had less cultivable land and greater landlessness. FHHs in rural areas were significantly less likely to own their homes. FHHs had better built housing but inferior sanitation. In urban areas, FHHs were less likely to live in an independent house. Girls in FHHs were slightly less likely to be enrolled in school. Enrollment rates for boys were the same regardless of the gender of the household head. Female heads received less education than male heads. Mortality rates were nearly a third higher in FHHs. Adults in FHHs were less likely to seek medical care, but men in urban areas were more likely than women to be sent for treatment. Vaccination rates were higher in FHHs. Although women received less schooling, women did not receive less returns for schooling. Findings suggest that without remittances FHHs would be significantly poorer. Women in Uganda should not be targeted for poverty reduction interventions.
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  3. 3

    Macroeconomic impacts of worker remittances on Arab world labor exporting countries.

    Looney RE


    The author discusses the effect of remittances from workers in oil-producing states in the Arab world on macroeconomic development patterns in non-oil-producing regions. Consideration is given to the impact of remittances on consumption and domestic growth and their interrelationships with foreign exchange. (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA) (ANNOTATION)
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  4. 4

    The consequences of temporary emigration and remittance expenditure from rural and urban settlements: evidence from Jordan.

    Seccombe IJ; Findlay AM

    In: The impact of international migration on developing countries, edited by Reginald Appleyard. Paris, France, OECD Publications, 1989. 109-25. (Development Centre Seminars)

    This paper investigates the characteristics of temporary emigration for employment and the nature of remittance expenditure within 1 country of labor emigration to the Arab world, Jordan. It compares 2 independent household expenditure surveys conducted at opposite ends of the settlement continuum, 1 in the village of Sammu' (31 households in 1985) in northwest Jordan and the other in Marka (40 households in 1984), a suburb of the capital Amman. The results of the 2 surveys reinforce the argument that international migration is associated with non-productive investment of remittances in consumer goods and in the construction sector. In an economy such as Jordan's, this pattern of remittance expenditure encourages very marked geographical changes in both villages and large urban settlements, but the morphological and functional changes that occur vary in significance according to urban hierarchy. The common link in all scales of settlement is that emerging patterns are determined by consumer rather than by producer behavior, resulting in patterns of settlement change that are distinctly different from those found in settlement systems whose dynamics are governed by local patterns of production.
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  5. 5

    International labour migration and remittances: experience in Thailand.

    Kerdpibule U

    [Unpublished, 1985]. ii, 37 p. (DP/RILM/3.)

    Remittances from Thai workers abroad, although relatively small, have been increasing in magnitude over the years. Until recently it was looked on as a promising source of foreign exchange earnings. Remittances contributed substantially to the improvement in the standards of living and productive investments in rural areas of Thailand. The volume of remittances is determined largely by the number of workers and levels of wages that migrant workers receive from foreign employers. The present situation of the international labor market in the Middle East is not conducive either to high rates of labor migration or to high wages as in past years. Competition among labor-exporting countries may aggravate the unfavorable situation. Unregistered employment agents in Thailand send workers abroad to work for wages below the minimum set by the Department of Labor. Labor-exporting countries would benefit from cooperation to prevent further competition and to improve their bargaining position with the labor-importing countries. For Thailand, the most urgent issue is improving organizational structure for sending migrant workers abroad. This could lead immediately to a larger flow of remittances as workers would receive more net earnings as a result of the improvement. With respect to the utilization of remittances, measures to redirect remittances from consumption to investments should be based on incentives rather than controls.
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  6. 6

    Remittances of Indian migrants to the Middle East: an assessment with special reference to migrants from Kerala State.

    Gulati IS; Mody A

    [Unpublished, 1985]. ii, 61 p. (DP/RILM/4.)

    The future course of remittance inflows to India from the Middle East is intimately linked to what happens to the Indian work force in the Middle East. In 1979-1982, the absolute level of outflow fell from 270,000 in 1981 to 225,000 in 1984. Given the prospects, both medium and long term, of world oil prices and oil exports from the Middle East, it is quite likely that the rate of growth of both investments and output in the labor-importing countries of the Middle East will be much slower. The composition of future investments in these countries will also change to more capital intensive industries away from construction. In the next few years there may continue to be some demand for additional labor, but in the longer run workers may return home in large numbers. The demand for construction will slow down, and the demand for services will rise. Which of the labor-exporting countries will be able to respond appropriately to this changing pattern of demand for skills from the Middle East is a question that cannot be easily answered. Labor-exporting countries need flexibility in adjusting their manpower supply to changing patterns of skill demand from the Middle East. The flow of remittances form Indian workers in the Middle East has been substantial. Although the government of India offers a number of incentives for the placement of remittances, the amounts invested in these firms and companies has never added up to more than 1/5 of any year's total remittances. Individual migrant workers have priorities of their own to follow. No amount of inducement for other forms of investment can easily deflect a migrant from his preference for land. Incentive measures may have to be made much more effective and wide ranging.
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  7. 7

    Remittances, exchange rates and the labor supply of Mexican migrants in the U.S..

    Fox M; Stark O

    Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Center for Population Studies, 1987. 16 p. (Discussion Paper Series No. 33.)

    This paper assumes that migrants derive utility from their own consumption, their own leisure and remittances to their family. It hypothesizes that the labor supply and remittances of Mexican migrants in the US are jointly determined. Shifts in real exchange rates affect the cost of sending a given real volume of remittances back to the family in the sending country. This in turn induces income and substitution effects on both remittances and labor supply. It is argued that the substitution effect would dominate. Therefore, under reasonable conditions, a real depreciation of the peso should lead to an increase in both remittances and labor supply. Empirical work using US Census data and a data set containing information on Mexican migrants in the US lends support to the theoretical predictions. (author's)
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  8. 8

    Return migration and urban change: a Jordanian case study.

    Findlay A; Samha M

    In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 171-84.

    Using a survey of 173 households from 1984, this paper examines the nature of recent return migration to Jordan, with particular reference to the capitol city, Amman. Emigration is very evident in Jordan, which has an estimated 40% of its work force employed abroad. Remittances from 20% of its gross national product. Not only has employment in oil-rich countries declined since 1979, return migration has also accelerated. Return migration as a part of international migration has become an extremely important force in generating urban change in Jordan. The date of emigration directly influenced the probability of return, but no associaton was found between the place of birth and return migration or between countries of employment and current and return migration. Return migrants had slightly smaller households than current migrants. Return migrants were much more likely to have purchased land as an investment or to have used their remittances for house construction or alterations than current migrants. Neither return nor current migrants showed much interest in devoting their remittances to agriculture and industry; a similar proportion of both groups used their foreign earnings to educate another family member. The geographic impact of return migration is evident in the present physical growth of Jordan's cities.
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  9. 9

    Gastarbeiter go home: return migration and economic change in the Italian Mezzogiorno.

    King R; Strachan A; Mortimer J

    In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 38-68.

    Most migrants return home not because of redundancy in the host country but because of a more complex mix of personal, family, emotional, and economic reasons, which conditions the impact that returnees have on their regions. This paper examines the economic impact of return migration on southern Italy, especially employment and the use of savings and remittances. 705 interviews in 486 households (including 197 wives and 22 working-age children) comprised the sample. Study results generally confirm the more pessimistic evaluations of other work in the backward and environmentally deprived areas of southern Italy. Migration and return have not generally had positive long-term economic effects on southern Italy. At the individual level, however, migration appears to be a successful and valued experience in financial terms. Emigration is not desirable in itself but as a means to an end--an improved standard of living, possessions, social status, and the satisfaction these bring. Emigration does not generally lead to better job prospects on return. "Sacrifice" and "duty to one's family" were recurrent themes in the interviews; only 6.7% of the returnees were planning to go abroad again. Acquired skills and accumulated capital do flow in with the returnees, but these inputs are not used to their full potential, partly due to the uncoordinated, individualistic, and familistic behavior of returnees and partly due to the lack of a government framework to make use of funds.
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  10. 10

    [Migrations and rural capitalization in Egypt: changes in the peasant family] Migrations et capitalisation de la campagne en Egypte: la reconversion de la famille paysanne.

    El-Singaby T

    TIERS-MONDE. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):523-32.

    Economic changes in Egypt over the past decade have resulted from a series of influences including the rise in the cost of oil, the world economic crisis, and governmental efforts to develop a new policy of economic development. Although the effects of economic change are more immediately apparent in urban areas, their import has perhaps been more profound in the countryside. The most comfortable agricultural producers are growing a greater variety of crops, are more highly capitalized operations, and are more closely influenced by the world and local markets. Producers failing to make these changes are being bought out in a type of agrarian self-reform financed ultimately by income from migration to oil producing states. Members of an Egyptian family studied from 1969-84 were typical landless rural cultivaters renting lands until 1969, when they obtained title to a small quantity of land under the 3rd law of agrarian reform, promulgated in March 1969. Despite the agrarian reform, the role of the landlord initially was largely replaced by that of the state, on which the family now became dependent. The family retained the essential characteristics of the landless peasant: low standard of living, necessity of selling their labor to larger producers, and absence of decision making capacity concerning type of cultivation and direct experience with the market. The agrarian reform cooperative now played the role of intermediary formerly filled by the landlord. During the period from 1974-81, which saw a new government policy development, 2 brothers in the family worked as laborers in Iraq, leaving their wives and children behind in the care of the extended family. Their father ceased to fill the role of patriach; the new need for an entrepreneur was filled by 1 of the emigrating brothers, who arranged for purchase of a house to replace the family's rented quarters and also bought a tractor to be rented to other cultivators, representing a new source of income, mechanization of the countryside, and a form of capitalization. Tomatoes and other vegetables were added to the family crops. The family's standard of living continued to improve, and greater efforts were made to educate the children. The entrepreneur brother was replaced after his accidental death by a younger brother who continued his activities while still striving to maintain the family labor pool, which now amounted to 32 workers based on 5 marriages. The original new house was rented and then sold to finance more land purchases, and a constant supply of migrant remittances was available. The local wage rate also increased significantly, raising the possibility of significant earnings. The progress of this family was not atypical and was partly due to the internal aptitude of Egyptian society for integrating change.
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  11. 11

    International migration, remittances and economic welfare in the source country.

    Rivera-Batiz FL

    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC STUDIES. 1986; 13(3):3-19.

    This article provides a formal framework for the analysis of the impact of international migration in the presence of remittances. The discussion differentiates between temporary and permanent migration and between the effects of remittances that raise investment and those that raise consumption spending in the source country. Changes in prices, income distribution and national welfare are examined. The geographic focus is worldwide. (EXCERPT)
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  12. 12

    [The effects of manpower emigration on income distribution and consumption models in the Egyptian economy] Les effets de l'emigration de main-d'oeuvre sur la distribution des revenus et les modeles de consommation dans l'economie Egyptienne.

    Abdel Fadil M

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):507-22.

    This work analyzes the effects of emigration from Egypt on the distribution of income and the consumption model of the Egyptian economy. The increasing role of remittances as a principal source of household income has disturbed the old division of income among socioeconomic groups. It is difficult to estimate the volume of remittances with any precision because of the variety of ways in which they can be made. Official statistics tend to underestimate their value by ignoring black market transactions, remittances of merchandise, and other forms. An estimate was made of the value of remittances in 1980 taking account of wage levels of 5 different types of workers in the principal employing countries, their average propensities to save, and the employment structure of migrants by socioprofessional groups. The average educational level of emigrants appears to have declined somewhat between 1972-78. Average monthly income for emigrants was estimated to range from 792 Egyptian pounds for technical and professional workers to 252 for unskilled workers and the propensity to save was estimated to range from 40% for technical and scientific workers to 15% for unskilled workers. The total income remitted in 1980 in millions of Egyptian pounds was estimated at 912 for 240,000 technical and scienfific workers, 739 for 360,000 intermediate level workers, 415 for 300,000 artisans and workers, 60 for 60,000 chauffeurs, and 109 for 240,000 unskilled workers. Although remittances have elevated the per capita income of the low income groups, their impact has been diminished by severe inflationary pressures which have led to a decline in living levels and a less complete satisfaction of basic needs. Salary levels of construction workers were 7-9 times higher in Egyptian pounds in 1977 in 3 countries of immigration than in Egypt, while they were 7-10 times higher in 4 countries for university professors. Remittances are used by families receiving them for subsistence or investment; lower income groups are more likely to use a large proportion for support and to buy locally produced goods, while higher income groups tend to save more and to purchase a larger proportion of imported goods. 1 of the significant effects of remittances is to orient individual consumption toward luxury consumer goods, which in turn entails a progressive substitution of imported for local goods and a growing disparity between the consumption of those who succeed in migrating and those who don't. Remittances sent by low income emigrants for family support are the only mechanism with a stimulating effect on the demand for local goods of mediocre quality; all the other mechanisms stimulate the demand for high quality imported goods and services which have a negligible stimulating effect for the poorest segments of the population, rural or urban.
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  13. 13

    [Pakistan: emigration in the Gulf and its effects on the home economy] L'emigration Pakistanaise dans le Golfe et ses repercussions sur le pays d'origine.

    Imdad N

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):553-66.

    Pakistani emigration since the early 1970s has been primarily directed toward the oil-rich Gulf states. Over 2 million Pakistanis, 10% of the adult male workforce, now live outside their home country, 3/4 of them in the Gulf states. The emigration has shortterm advantages for Pakistan, which has a high unemployment rate and few other exports. 2 government bureaus and over 300 recruiting agencies encourage Pakistani emigration to the Gulf, and because of the foreign exchange earnings generated, such emigration has become an important concern of the government. Emigration has a long history in Pakistan as part of the migratory movements of the Indian subcontinent in general. Emigration in the 1960s was prompted by mechanization of agriculture and disturbances of traditional agrarian labor arrangements brought on by the Green Revolution. Concentrations of lands among the successful middle-sized producers led to a rural proletariat and exodus towards the cities, where possibilities of employment were scarce. Regions of declining income around the new capital of Islamabad were the 1st to take advantage of new employment opportunities in the Gulf states. Pakistani migration to the Gulf countries is temporary for individual workers, who stay an average of 3-6 years, but the effect is of chain migration as returning workers are replaced by other family members. Workers are not accompanied by family members and have almost no contact with the local Arab populations. They send most of their earnings to their families in Pakistan. 3/4 are under 30 years old, most are of rural origin, and the majority are from the northern provinces. Although 70% are married, only 4% of migrants, the most highly qualified, are accompanied by their families. About 41% are unskilled workers and 42.6% are semiskilled or skilled manual workers. In 1981, the average annual salary repatriated by a Pakistani working in the Gulf was $3000. The Pakistani government has not defined a migration policy but has established rules and procedures to curtail clandestine departures. Most migrants use the services of licensed private employment agencies and very few use public channels. Because the migration is relatively new and few studies have been done, it is difficult to evaluate its effects on the local economy. 1 result is a severe local shortage of labor, especially in construction and transportation, which has promoted inflation and particularly affected the most impoverished classes. Remissions are now the most important source of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, but are not being invested in economic, industrial, or agricultural development, which has remained stagnant while 55% of the national budget is directed to defense. Most migrant earnings are invested in housing, marriages and dowries, and luxury imported consumer goods. In the current state of Pakistan's economy, migration is the sole means of socioeconomic advancement for the vast majority, but the future of the movement is uncertain.
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  14. 14

    [Manpower migrations in the Arab world: the reverse of the New Economic Order] Migrations de main-d'oeuvre dans le monde Arabe l'envers du Nouvel Ordre Economique.

    Halliday F

    Tiers-Monde. 1985 Jul-Sep; 26(103):665-79.

    Population and petroleum, 2 essential factors in the development of the Arab world, are unequally distributed in the 18 Arab countries. The abstract possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation between the countries with large populations and no oil and those with oil but small populations is far from being realized; on the contrary, growing inequality and deterioration of human and productive resources can be observed in the Arab world. The apparent economic progress of the oil producing states is illusory, because it has permitted them to defer development of their own internal resources such as agriculture, industry, professional training and education in favor of greater dependence on the temporary palliative of petroleum revenues. In 1980, over 3 million Arabs had emigrated toward other Arab countries, where they were joined by approximately 1.8 million non-Arabs. 4 types of Arab migration have been important: movement from the countryside to cities within countries, movement of Arab migrants to non-Arab countries, movement from 1 Arab state to another because of political factors and especially to earn high wages in the oil producing states, and immigration of non-Arabs and especially Asians to Arab countries. 6 of the principal manpower importing countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, had total labor forces of about 5.2 million in 1985, of which only 41% were nationals. There have been 4 main consequences for the states importing manpower: 1) petroleum production is very capital intensive and creates few jobs; the jobs filled by migrants are mostly in construction and services funded by oil revenues 2) the expansion is temporary because petroleum is a nonrenewable resource; the manpower transfers will therefore not be permanent 3) the migrants represent a large proportion of the labor force and populations of the Gulf oil-producing states, and 4) the migrants are systematically excluded from the political and social life of the countries in which they work, have no juridical protection or political rights, and are the objects of growing hostility in the countries where they work. The most important consequence may be the least visible: because of the petroleum income and the migratory flows the local populations are less and less motivated to work. The immigrants are almost all single or unaccompanied men who send most of their earnings to their home countries. Thus far there has been little apparent political activity or labor unrest among them in the host countries, but it is unclear how long the apparent calm can be sustained. The most obvious consequence of the migration for the sending countries is the massive flow of remittances. In 1980, such transfers between Arab countries were estimated to total around $3 billion, not counting income in kind. The remittances do not appear to be invested in productive enterprises with any frequency but rather to be used for purchases of mostly imported consumer goods and in speculation. Few migrants learn useful job skills, and some countries have lost large proportions of their skilled workers to migration. Migrant earnings have depressed local production by encouraging imports, especially of foodstuffs, and have fostered inflation by stimulating demand for land and wage increases.
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  15. 15

    [The debate concerning immigration in Argentina at the beginning of the century according to a French observer] Cuestiones en torno a la inmigracion a la Argentina a principios del siglo segun un testigo frances.

    Weinberg F

    Studi Emigrazione. 1984 Jun; 21(74):175-185.

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  16. 16

    Promoting the productive use of remittances.

    Saket BK

    In: International migration in the Arab world: proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference, Nicosia, Cyprus, 11-16 May 1981, v. 2. Beirut, Lebanon, U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1982. 1093-1127.

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