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WORLD DEVELOPMENT. 1990 Apr; 18(4):513-27.As the literature on fuelwood in Africa has increased in quality over the recent past, it has become evident that generalizations about Africa's fuelwood crisis must be treated with great caution. As a consequence, some commonly held beliefs may now need to be reexamined. This paper subjects 3 such beliefs, the existence of a linear relationship between population growth, fuelwood consumption, and rates of fuelwood-induced deforestation; that fuelwood-induced deforestation approximates ripples spreading outward from urban consuming centers; and that land conversion to agriculture always reduces fuelwood supplies, to close scrutiny. The 2nd and 3rd assumptions are analyzed in light of recently collected field data in the Kano area of northern Nigeria; while the examination of the 1st is based on a reinterpretation of information from a wider range of environments. The paper concludes that although available data are inadequate for definitive conclusions to be drawn on the 1st count, it seems likely that variations arising out of demographic differentials in urban populations, in particular, changes in per capita fuelwood consumption resulting from changes in consuming unit size, distort direct links between population growth rates and rates of increase in fuel consumption. Further information on the demographic characteristics of African towns is needed for meaningful analyses of temporal changes in the affected variables to be undertaken. The 2nd and 3rd assumptions are found to not be applicable in the Kano case. However, this should be interpreted much less as justification for their outright rejection than as a reminder of the great potential of time- and space-specific considerations for rendering universal rules locally inapplicable. (author's)
Luxembourg, STATEC, 1987 Dec. xx, 529 p.The 1987/88 Statistical Yearbook of Luxembourg contains data on a wide variety of topics organized into 23 chapters with data on economic and noneconomic topics specific to Luxembourg and a final chapter with a series of international comparisons. Each of the chapters and many of the tables and graphs contain introductory notes and explanations. The work opens with a listing of basic statistics followed by chapters on territory and climate and on population. The chapter on population includes subsections on evolution of the total population, the active population, natural movement of the population, migratory movement, and housing and households. The major section on economic statistics includes chapters on national accounts, agriculture and forestry, industry, artisanry, services, banks and credit, public finances, income and social security, consumption and prices, research and external economic relations. The section on noneconomic statistics includes chapters on accidents, anthropometry, culture and education, environment, justice, names and surnames of the national population, politics, religion, health, and sports.
Ithaca, New York, American Demographics, Inc., 1988. xvi, 217 p.To better understand consumer markets in today's world, this annual volume clusters the world's 150 largest countries according to their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The 5 clusters--the Dependents, the Seekers, the Climbers, the Ultimate Consumers, and the Rocking Chairs--help identify the kind of consumer markets the countries represent. The clusters give market researchers a quick way of targeting potential world markets for further research effort. Population trends are powerful movers and shakers. For Seeker and Climber countries, current and anticipated growth in populations and income mean expanding markets far into the future. For Ultimate Consumer and Rocking Chair countries, increasingly sophisticated tastes and the needs of the aging will fuel the market. For Dependent countries--the poorest part of the world economy--only intensified efforts by the countries themselves and greater assistance from the international development community can pull these countries up in the face of relentless demographic pressure. The sheer size of the market in Seeker and Climber countries is enough to indicate increasing consumer demand. 4 demographic factors help identify market potential: 1) the average annual population growth rate, 2) the average number of lifetime births per woman, 3) the status of women, and 4) urbanization. Dependent countries rely primarily on others for food supplies, for professional assistance in building infrastructure, and for educating their youth. Concerted efforts are being made in Seeker countries to improve health and education, slow population growth, upgrade the status of women by encouraging them to participate in higher education and the labor force, and increase access to family planning. Climber countries are demographically the most important expanding markets in the world today. Change lies ahead in the purchasing behavior of mature households in Ultimate Consumer countries as the more educated, more moneyed middle-aged people enter the ranks of the elderly.
ATLANTIC ECONOMIC JOURNAL. 1986 Dec; 14(4):106.This paper uses the life cycle hypothesis to explain why personal savings in the U.S. have fallen to a low of 1.9% of disposable income in 1985, despite tax cuts. Life cycle theory envisions an individual's lifetime as a series of choices of current consumption and allocation of net worth between alternative assets and liabilities so as to maximize the expected utility of consumption over life. The mathematical expression for the utility function implies the stochastic nature of future return on aessts and independence at any given age of the ratio of consumption to resources to total resources. Population growth leads to positive saving overall by increasing the ratio of younger households. The proportion of younger households (ages 25-44) in the U.S. population increased by 10.3 million from 1980-1985, and this growth is expected to continue. Older households increased their savings, but younger families are borrowing more and spending the money their elders saved.
Ithaca, New York, International Demographics, 1986. x, 217 p.This volume contains descriptions of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and basic statistics on social indicators, the status of women, urbanization, and economic indicators for 50 countries grouped into 5 clusters--the Dependents, the Seekers, the Climbers, the Ultimate Consumers, and the Rocking Chairs--to help identify the kind of consumer markets the countries represent. The clusters give market researchers a quick way of targeting potential world markets for further research effort. Population trends are powerful movers and shakers. For Seeker and Climber countries, current and anticipated growth in populations and income mean expanding markets far into the future. For Ultimate Consumer and Rocking Chair countries, increasingly sophisticated tastes and the needs of the aging will fuel the market. For Dependent countries--the poorest part of the world economy--only intensified efforts by the countries themselves and greater assistance from the international development community can pull these countries up in the face of relentless demographic pressure. The sheer size of the market in Seeker and Climber countries is enough to indicate increasing consumer demand. 4 demographic factors help identify market potential; 1) the average annual population growth rate, 2) the average number of lifetime births per woman, 3) the status of women, and 4) urbanization. Dependent countries rely primarily on others for food supplies, for professional assistance in building infrastructure, and for educating their youth. Concerted efforts are being made in Seeker countries to improve health and education, slow population growth, upgrade the status of women by encouraging them to participate in higher education and the labor force, and increase access to family planning. Climber countries are demographically the most important expanding markets in the world today. Change lies ahead in the purchasing behavior of mature households in Ultimate Consumer countries as the more educated, more moneyed middle-aged people enter the ranks of the elderly.
INTERNATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS. 1986 Sep; 5(9):1-8.Focus in this discussion of Belgium is on: cities and regions, population change, households and families, labor force, consumption, communication and transport, and sources of information. Belgium was created in 1830 as a constitutional monarch and buffer state amidst great European powers. Its constitution creating a parliamentary system of government has served as a model for many emerging democracies. Unemployment dropped from more than 14% in 1984 to just over 12% in the 1st quarter of 1986. Belgium also is experiencing a somewhat improved balance of payments and respectable overall economic growth of around 2.5% through the 1st half of 1986 along with close trading links and minimum customs formalities with Luxembourg and Holland. Yet, wages lag behind inflation after the last government suspended an index system that mandated automatic income adjustments in line with the cost of living. In 1983, for the 1st time since the country's economic boom of the 1960s, purchasing power for the average Belgium declined. About 90% of Belgium's estimated 9,880,000 inhabitants live in cities and towns ranging over a territory of only 30,518 KM. Administratively, the region of Flanders has 5 provinces, Wallonia, 4. Regions are further broken down into arrondissements and communes. Belgium's under replacement level birth rate is expected to decline further, and its proportion of elderly persons in the total population is expected to rise, straining even further an already overburdened system of social security and health care. Belgium's 10-year intercensal population gain (between 1971-81) was the smallest in the country's history. Belgium's total population stood at 9,853,023 on January 1, 1984, a decline of almost 5000 from the preceding year. Belgium's average household size is decreasing due to a larger aged population, an upsurge in divorces and unmarried young couples, and a declining birth rate. About 1/3 of the population works. At mid-1984, the figure stood at 3,638,000. The service sector generates more than half the country's jobs. The largest share of household consumption in 1983 was on food, at 18.6%.
[Using demographic statistics in market studies and specifically for the business planning] Utilisation des statistiques demographiques dans les etudes de marche et specifiquement pour les plans des entreprises.
In: Utilisation des statistiques demographiques au Cameroun. Actes d'une Seminaire tenu du 16 au 19 Juillet 1984 a Yaounde. Yaounde, Cameroon, Ministere du Plan et de l'Amenagement du Territoire, 1985 Jul. 308-32.This article assesses the potential use of demographic statistics in determining the volume and structure of consumption through market studies and the sources of demographic data used in market studies, and presents concrete examples of demographic data use in market studies in Cameroon. The age and sex structure of the population influences the availability of labor and the extent of the market for particular products, while the socioeconomic structure is related to income and purchasing power. Population movements of particular interest to business planning include rural-urban migration, change in the numbers of households or household size, and change in household budgets. Population growth, determined by prevailing patterns of fertility, mortality, and migration, is the most important determinant of total consumption of many products. The 3 major data sources for market studies are population censuses, demographic surveys, and civil registration systems. Censuses furnish exhaustive statistics on individual and collective characteristics for population units of all sizes, serve as bases for sampling studies, and are useful for study of population movement. Budget-consumption studies with demographic content are the usual method of determining effective consumption. The budget-consumption survey underway in Cameroon is expected to yield data on a wide range of household expenditures. A well-functioning civil registration system combined with accurate knowledge of migratory trends would permit calculation of the population growth rate. Concrete examples of market studies undertaken in Cameroon using available demographic data include a footwear manufacturer that used demographic data to help estimate the proportion of shoes to offer for different ages and sizes of feet, a producer of school notebooks who used data on population structure to determine the number of each type of notebook to produce, and a life insurance company which needed to structure rates to fit Cameroon, a country with few actuaries. A cigarette company and a brewery requiring data for planning of distribution and possible expansion are other examples of enterprises requiring demographic data. Limited availability of official statistics and out-of-date data forced each company to some extent to develop supplementary data collection systems.
[Socioeconomic consequences of the aging of the population] A nepesseg oregedesenek nehany tarsadalmi--gazdasagi osszefuggese
Statisztikai Szemle. 1986 Feb; 64(2):109-21.The author addresses some of the economic and social implications of the aging of the population in Hungary. The study is based on a paper prepared within the scope of the project on Economic and Social Implications of Changing Age Distribution in Selected ECE Eountries carried out by the Secretariat of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (Population Activities Unit, GEAD) with support from the UNFPA. The 1st part of this study outlines the demographic characteristics of the aging process. In the 2nd part of the paper, various kinds of dependency ratios are presented, and changes in the age distribution of the working age population are reviewed. To estimate the influence of aging on the level of total consumption, age profiles of consumption are applied, and changes in the costs of selected social services are assessed through age-cost profiles of education, health services, and old age pensions. (author's) (summaries in ENG, RUS)
[Is population growth the source of misery in the Third World?] La croissance demographique est-elle responsable de la misere du Tiers Monde.
Recherche. 1985 Nov; 16(171):1380-1.The developing countries experienced their most rapid demographic growth of 2-4% per year between 1950-80, with the highest rates occurring in the 1960s and a slight easing taking place in the 1970s. The most direct way of assessing whether this extraordinary demographic growth impeded economic development is to calculate the correlation between demographic growth and the per capita gross national product (GNP) at constant prices. The average annual growth of GNP in developing countries from 1950-75 was 3.4% compared to 3.2% in developed countries, while the rates from 1975-80 were 2.4% and 2.8% respectively. The average rate of growth of GNP in developed countries was only about 2% in the 1st half of this century, while that in many developing countries has been zero for centuries. The postwar demographic explosion therefore coincided with an unprecedented economic explosion. Between 1950-80, the population of India and China increased by about 800 million persons, but economic progress even in India was substantial. China and Pakistan saw a doubling and Mexico and Brazil a tripling of per capita income. This undeniable economic progress was not achieved without some cost; it was accompanied by increased debt and has been very unequal between countries. Outside of some extreme cases like Bangladesh where demographic pressure threatens the equilibrium between population and resources, it is most often the less densely populated African countries which are most backward. Factors of underdevelopment appear to be more often political instability and strategic-errors such as insufficient investment in agriculture and general infrastructure than demographic constraints. The correlation between mortality decline and increased per capita income was very strong, especially in the 1950s and 1960s and especially in Japan and the newly industrializing Asian countries and Latin America. The growth of income permitted improved nutrition and education of the population, which in turn stimulated growth of income and population. In view of the data, there appears to be a contradiction between the historic reality and the pessimism of postwar economic literature. The error appears to have arisen because of a failure to recognize that not only do economic and demographic growth have common structural roots, but they are susceptible to dynamic and cumulative interaction. Also, the overattention to high fertility led to neglect of the stimulating role of mortality decline, which is closely related to economic development. Growth of income and growth of population are a priori associated: they are 2 facets of the same development process.
[Third World cities: points of accumulation, centers of distribution] Les villes du Tiers Monde: theatres d'accumulation, centres de diffusion.
Tiers-Monde. 1985 Oct-Dec; 26(104):823-40.Attention was called over 3 decades ago to the very rapid growth of Third World cities and the significance of the differences between their patterns of urbanization and those of industrialized countries. Their demographic growth occurred much faster and depended much more heavily on high fertility, their economies were geared more to export of raw materials than to manufacturing and were unable to create massive numbers of jobs to absorb the growing labor force except in the unproductive tertiary sector, and it appeared unlikely that they would be able to produce entrepreneurial classes of their own. Several economic developments during the 1970s affected the world economy and the patterns of urbanization of the Third World: the decline of the principal capitalist economies and the multiple increases in the price of oil, the floating exchange rate, the considerable increase in consumer goods, and the increasing costs of labor in industrialized countries, among others, created new conditions. World economic interdependence, international control of investment and exchange, and volume and mobility of capital increased at a time of rapid economic growth in some Third World countries, especially those whose governments took an aggressive role in promoting growth and investment. Some Third World cities now seem to be developing according to a more western model, but the same cannot be said of all Third World countries, and international economic evolution appears to have led to increasing polarization between countries as well as within them. The 1 domain where a certain convergence has occurred is consumption, beginning with the privileged classes and filtering to the lower income groups. Consumption of collective and individual consumer goods, which is concentrated in the largest cities, increases dependence on imports, technology, knowledge, and usually debt. The modern productive sector and its distribution activities become implanted in the cities to such a degree that it becomes more and more difficult for the consumption needs of regional cities and rural areas to be satisfied except through manufactured products from the capitalist sector of the principal city or through imports from industrial countries. Despite the fact that some Third World cities will be enormous by the year 2000 and that their social structures and labor forces will not closely resemble those of European cities, the thesis of "pseudourbanization" appears invalid for several reasons: the model of sectorial changes in the European labor force was not followed by the industrializing countries of North America; some Third World countries (excluding India and China) appear able to absorb most of their surplus rural population into the modern sector, and Third World cities appear less and less to be merely centers of culture. New research during the 1970s on Third World urbanization contributed several crucial elements to the analysis: recognition that insertion of developing countries into the international economic order has been a major influence on their urbanization patterns, appreciation of the role of migration in urbanization, realization of the potential role of the state in mitigating spatial and structural inequalities created by the urbanization process, and recognition of the need for more detailed microeconomic studies and construction of more elaborate models of Third World economies.
International Demographics. 1986 Feb; 5(2):1-9.This discussion of Italy focuses on the following: cities and regions; population growth; households and families; housing and construction; ethnicity and religion; education; economy and labor force; consumption; and transport and communications. Italy, with its total area of 116,374 square miles, is about the size of Florida and Georgia combined. Its 56.6 million people form the 2nd largest population in Western Europe, after West Germany, but slightly larger than Great Britain and France. The main administrative divisions are 20 regions, subdivided into 95 provinces. The provinces in turn are divided into 8090 "comuni" or municipalities. The 6 cities with more than 500,000 people are Roma, Milano, Napoli, Torino, Genova, and Palermo. They account for 14% of the population. The 43 cities with between 100,000-500,000 account for another 13%. There are 373 middle-sized communities with between 20,000 and 100,000 people, accounting for 26% of population. Italy has a regional problem. The line separating the regions of Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, and Lazio from the regions to the south and east is important. The regions north of it hold 62% of the population but are responsible for 73% of the gross national product (GNP) and 78% of the industrial product. The regions to the south are economically much weaker. At the time of the last Italian census on October 25, 1981, the country counted 56.6 million inhabitants. Compared to 33.5 million at the turn of the century, this implies an average annual growth rate of .61%. Between 1900-70, nearly 20 million Italians left their country. Most settled in the US, Argentina, and Brazil. Beginning in the 1960s, a new sort of migration was added as young Italians temporarily left to work in the more prosperous countries of northern Europe. The birthrate, which had declined slowly to 18/1000 during the 1960s, fell more rapidly during the 1970s, to 10.9/1000 in 1981 and 10.3 in 1984. The death rate in Italy has changed little since 1950. Presently, it hovers around 9.5/1000. With its low birthrate and outmigration of young adults, Italy is aging. The median age is about 34 years, and 13% of the population is aged 65 and older. Despite the stereotypical image of the large Italian family, household size in Italy, as in other industrialized nations, is declining, from a mean of 3.6 in 1961 to 3.4 in 1971 and 3.0 in 1981. Culturally, Italy is a homogeneous country. In 1984 there were 23 million people in Italy's work force. Among the economically inactive, 33% were younger than age 14, 30% were housewives, 23% were retired, and 11% were students. In 1984, average annual family income varied from the equivalent of about $15,900 in Emilia Romagna to $9,500 in Sicilia. Mean annual household budgets in 1983 varied from te equivalent of $11,950 in Lombardia to $7,400 in Molise, with a national average of $10,026.
International Demographics. 1985 Dec; 4(12):1-4.This discussion of the Netherlands covers the country's cities and regions, population growth, households and families, housing, contruction, and spatial planning; ethnicity and religion; education; labor force and income; consumption; and transport and communications. As a small and mineral poor nation with a seafaring tradition, the Netherlands survives on foreign trade. In 1983, total export earnings amounted to nearly 62% of the entire national income. Over 72% of Dutch exports go to other member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), but imports are more diversified, with 47% originating outside the EEC. Since 1848, the Netherlands has been a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. As such, it is one of the most stable democracies in the world. The main administrative units are the 11 provinces, of which Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland are the most populous and economically most important. Amsterdam remains the commercial center of the country, but its role as the principal port city has been taken over by Rotterdam. No community has more than 700,000 inhabitants, but the country as a whole is highly urbanized because of the large numbers of medium-sized cities. In 1983 the population of the Netherlands totaled 14.34 million, compared to 5.10 million at the turn of the century. In 1965, the total fertility rate was 3.0. The death rate has virtually stabilized at 8/1000. The Dutch life expectancy stands at 72.7 years for men and 79.4 for women (1983). Natural increase has already dropped to 0.4% a year. Apart from the slight impact of net immigration, the positive growth rate reflects the large proportion (53%) of the population in its reproductive years. Mean household sizes in the 11 provinces vary from 2.5 in Noord-Holland (in 1981) to nearly 3 in Overijssel and Noord-Brabant, whereas the proportion of 1 person households ranges from 16% in Drenthe and 17% in the somewhat traditionalist southern provinces of Limburg and Noord-Brabant to 27% in Noord-Holland and 28% in Groningen. Only 26% of the Dutch own their own homes. The Netherlands has historically been a nation of little ethnic, religious, or cultural conflict. The central government finances education at all levels, making education and science the 2nd largest budget item (19%), preceded only by welare and social policy (22%). In 1983 the economically active population consisted of 3.8 million men and nearly 2 million women.
In: Rural development and human fertility, edited by Wayne A. Schutjer and C. Shannon Stokes. New York, N.Y., Macmillan, 1984. 121-50.This chapter examines the effect of changing income on fertility in rural areas, focusing particular attention on 2 variables which intervene between income and fertility: educational aspirations and consumption aspirations. The chapter's 1st part considers the income/fertility relation in rural areas of less developed countries. (LDCs). It appears that in rural areas at the micro level the effect of income on fertility is nonlinear: positive at low levels of income and negative at relatively high levels. The chapter's 2nd part deals with educational aspirations and the so-called quantity/quality tradeoff. The 3rd part of the chapter examines the hypothesis that a negative income/fertility relationship is more likely once a transformation of consumption aspirations has occurred. Some macrolevel evidence is considered along with microlevel studies. Review of the empirical evidence concerning the income/fertility relation in LDCs indicates that the relation is negative in urban areas and in rural areas where development is relatively advanced, but positive in rural areas at earlier stages of development. The pure positive income effect may be reinforced by indirect positive effects in poor rural populations. In such populations, income increases may lead to better health, nutrition, and higher survival rates among women of childbearing age. In addition, rising income may lead to more optimistic expectations concerning permanent income, and, in some countries, rural women may withdraw from the labor force or reduce work inputs when the farm earns more money. At later stages of rural development, negative indirect effects of increasing income on fertility may outweigh positive effects. Rising educational and consumption patterns are among these potential negative indirect effects, but there are others, particularly the anticipation of declining economic benefits from children. The observed income/fertility pattern suggests first that aspirations respond more strongly to income advances in urban than in rural settings and during later than during earlier phases of rural development. It also suggests that the sensitivity of fertility to rising aspirations may be quite low in traditional rural societies. This 2nd proposition derives support from an analysis of the quantity/quality tradeoff. The depressing effect of consumption aspirations on fertility seem to be modest, yet it appears that a policy of austerity with regard to new consumer goods may make it more difficult to lower birthrates. Investment aspirations have been neglected in the literature. A policy of creating conditions conducive to investment in nonhuman capital for a broad spectrum of rural household is desirable in its own right. If high investment aspirations also lowered birthrates, they would represent a doubly valuable policy goal.
Personal gasoline consumption, population patterns, and metropolitan structure: the United States, 1960-1970
Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 1984; 74(2):257-78.Using a 864 county study area, 1 containing all Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) as of 1975, and an 8% random sample of nonmetro counties, this study explores the relationships among population characteristics and change, metropolitan structure, and gasoline purchases for personal vehicles in the period 1960-70. Gasoline purchases, used as a proxy measure of energy consumption for personal travel, were estimated using information from the Censuses of Retail Trade and state gasoline tax data. 3 findings are particularly important. 1) Population redistribution among regions and 3 major categories of places--central city and ring counties within SMSAs and nonmetro counties--during the 1960s produced little or no appreciable change in gasoline used for personal vehicles at the national level. 2) During this period of sharply rising consumption, a decided convergence occurred in mean per capita values among regions and residential categories, with an especially notable increase in central city counties. 3) Surprisingly, within SMSAs, a negative association existed between suburbanization and SMSA levels of per capita consumption. This suggests that the more extended a metropolitan area and, inferentially, the more highly developed and integrated its periphery, the greater the fuel efficiency in personal transportation. It also suggests the need to reconsider our standard models of metropolitan structure. Because of major changes in socioeconomic conditions, the authors cannot safely extrapolate their findings into the 1970s and 1980s. (author's modified)
Chapel Hill, N.C, University of North Carolina, 1982. 436 p.This research investigated the role of demographic factors in economic development. Specifically, a general model of the economic development process is constructed and then applied to the experience of South Korea from 1963-77. The model emphasizes the incorporation of demographic factors, widely interpreted to include not only the size, growth rate, and composition of the population, but also the quality of the population as minifested in the levels of human capital formation. South Korea has been 1 of the most successful of recent development efforts. Most of the research on the Korean phenomenon has highlighted the economic factors. Usually cited as responsible for the rapid, export led Korean economic development are the utilization of an able, motivated, but previously underemployed labor force, the large inflows of foreign capital, and the special relationships with Japan and the US, and the establishment of a strong central government, committed to economic development and able to implement effective growth policy. Important demographic factors, however were the impressive human capital formation that had begun 15 years prior to the onset of rapid economic growth and the dramatic declines in Korean fertility, which paralleled the economic achievements in the 1960s and 1970s. Using Korean national income data and economic-demographic selected surveys, the quantitative influences of demographic factors, particularly human capital formation and population dynamics, on Korean economic development for the 15-year period beginning in 1963 are assessed. The equations of the econometric model are estimated using either ordinary least squares of the 1st order autoregressive process. The empirical results show human capital formation to have been a significant and pervasive factor in recent South Korean economic development. Human capital formation, as proxied by indexes of formal educational attainment in the sectoral labor forces, was an important influence on real sectoral outputs and investments and in the growth of Korean exports. In addition, to the extent increases in education are associated with declines in fertility, human capital formation contributed to the substantial reductions in the growth rate of the Korean population, leading to favorable burden of dependency shifts and enhancing the ability of the Korean economy to generate the savings necessary for rapid growth and structural change. (author's)
[Havana], Cuba, Comite Estatal de Estadisticas, . 126 p.This edition of "Cuba in Figures" contains selected indicators for different sectors which characterize the development of the national economy over the past few years. The statistical indicators for 1982-82 should be considered preliminary. The 16 sections provide data on the territory and climate; population, including resident population by sex and age group, the working age population by sex, the resident population by sex for provinces and municipalities and by rural or urban residence, annual growth rate, sex ratio, population distribution by social groups, and demographic rates; total production and indicators of sectoral production; labor force distribution and average salary levels; industrial production and basic indicators for the sugar, fishing, and other industries and energy consumption; contruction and housing; investment by components and provinces; agriculture and animal husbandry, including production, growth, land use patterns, irrigation, and activity indicators; transport and communications including total income, passenger and cargo totals, and structure and indicators of communications activity; internal commerce; external commerce; communal and personal services; education; culture and art; public health, including facilities, manpower resources, consultations, immunizations, and morbidity rates for reportable illnesses; tourism; and sports.