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Santa Monica, California, RAND, Labor and Population Program, 1999 Mar.  p. (Labor and Population Program Working Paper Series 99-03; DRU-2061-NIA)The goal of this paper is to analyze a model to explain consumption by couples. It is an extension of the model for singles by Yaari (1965), and therefore emphasizes the role of mortality risk. It also allows for a what I call a "true" bequest motive, bequeathing by a couple to the next generation, or at least to others outside of their own two-person household. The distinction between a true bequest motive and simply the provision for a surviving spouse is important because the surviving spouse is the extension of the original household, and the survivor had a direct influence in choosing the consumptions by the couple when the deceased spouse was alive. This makes the situation very different from a true bequest where the bequest depends at least partly on motives other than purely selfish consumption and where the bequeathed has no direct control on the consumption by the household. There is also a difference in the planning horizon which causes important differences for public policy: if a couple desires to give bequests to their children, and possibly to their grandchildren, they will act in a very different way in response to, say, an increase in Social Security benefits than if they only want to bequeath to each other. (excerpt)
[Opinions on population development. The recent past and future of the Hungarian population] Korkerdes a nepesedesrol. A Magyar nepesedes kozelmultja es jovoje.
DEMOGRAFIA. 1999; 42(3-4):306-11.Two world wars, the great depression between the wars, dictatorships, the crushing of the revolution in 1956, and subsequent decades all account for the fact that frustrated and disintegrated generations make up Hungarian society, which is starting to reorganize itself very slowly. Nevertheless, the low fertility rate in Hungary is paralleled by developed European countries. The common link in this phenomenon is consumerism. In Mediterranean countries traditional values have lost ground and fertility dropped, while in post-communist countries rising expectations caused by the free flow of information have contributed to the development of a crisis of values. In the majority of the countries of the European Union further reduction in fertility did not take place; in fact, there has been improvement in some cases. In Hungary the economic recession after 1990 was unavoidable, but the continuing declining fertility rate was also attributable to current consumerism and the fiscal austerity policy introduced in 1995. In recent years a slight improvement of mortality can be observed, possibly owing to healthier living and somewhat improved health care. The biggest challenge is the support of an aging population which could be enhanced either by the boosting of fertility or receiving masses of immigrants from high fertility regions. In general, in Europe and in developed countries, narcissistic societies have emerged and in Hungary even the establishment of a civil society is missing.
New York, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. xii, 329 p.The World Bank's 16th annual World Development Report focuses on the interrelationship between human health, health policy, and economic development. WHO provided much of the data on health and helped the World Bank on the assessment of the global burden of disease found in appendix B. Following an overview, the report has 7 chapters covering health in developing countries: successes and challenges; households and health; the roles of the government and the market in health; public health; clinical services; health inputs; and an agenda for action. Appendix a lists and discusses population and health data. The report concludes with the World Development Indicators for 127 low, lower middle, upper middle, and high income countries in tabular form. All developed and developing countries have experienced considerable improvements in health. But developing countries, particularly their poor, still experience many diseases, many of which can be prevented or cured. They are starting to encounter the problems of increasing health system costs already experienced by developed countries. The World Bank proposes a 3-part approach to government policies for improving health in developing countries. Governments must promote an economic growth that empowers households to improve their own health. Growth policies must secure increased income for the poor and expand investment in education, particularly for girls. Government spending on health must address cost effective programs that help the poor, such as control and treatment of infectious diseases and of malnutrition. Governments must encourage greater diversity and competition in the financing and delivery of health services. Donors can finance transitional costs of change in low income countries.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. 1992 Oct 21; 9-10, 12.Discussion of world food supply identifies the reasons for shortages, based on the opinions of various food experts, as maldistribution of wealth and income, population growth, limits to production, shortage of usable land, global warming, air pollution, and civil war. In 1992, farmers produced enough food to feed the world's 5.3 billion population, but starvation and hunger occur because people cannot afford to buy enough or because of armed conflict. To meet the growing demands of expected population increases, productivity must increase by 3 times within 50 years to feed 9-12 billion people. Although Dennis Avery from the Hudson Institute is optimistic, the Population Crisis Committee's International Human Suffering Index shows Mozambique as suffering the most with a population growth of 2.7% while Denmark with zero growth suffers the least. 786 million still go hungry today. The agronomists' solution is to lesson the political conditions that lead to conflicts, to make agriculture sustainable, to enhance farm productivity with modern techniques, and encourage economic development. The political challenges are exemplified in the case of Tenneco West's investment in mechanized agriculture in northern Sudan which doubled agricultural productivity but civil war disrupted activities. Famine in Africa is due to war, i.e., Somalia in the present context. 11% of the earth's land surface is cultivated (3.7 billion acres). Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute pessimistically points out that the farmland base stopped growing in 1980, air pollution can reduce crop yields by 10%, and part of the world's food output is not sustainable. Avery states that a billion acres of African wetlands and another billion of savanna could be changed over to agriculture, that African farmers could triple corn production using high yield varieties, but Africa will have a "slow, desperately difficult struggle." Dr. Harwood at Michigan State says that global warming might increase yields as well as contribute to flooding. Dennis Leopold from the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture at Iowa State University suggests that a balance must be reached between the farmer and the community, and large farms may not be the best. World trade is low compared with production and consumption, yet countries like Indonesia clear 1.5 million acres of jungle for crop production regardless of the environmental degradation.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT. 1992 Sep; 20(9):1,279-312.The authors critique the work of Amartya K. Sen on the consequences of China's rural reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and specifically his contention that these reforms resulted in an increase in mortality. They conclude that the reforms brought substantial gains in welfare for most Chinese citizens in the form of improved diets, better housing, and new items of consumption, and that "post-Mao China saw a geographically widespread decline in death rates, compared to the late Mao years, and little change from the exceptionally low figures achieved in the late 1970s." A reply by Sen is included (pp. 1,305-12). (EXCERPT)
WORLD DEVELOPMENT. 1990 Apr; 18(4):513-27.As the literature on fuelwood in Africa has increased in quality over the recent past, it has become evident that generalizations about Africa's fuelwood crisis must be treated with great caution. As a consequence, some commonly held beliefs may now need to be reexamined. This paper subjects 3 such beliefs, the existence of a linear relationship between population growth, fuelwood consumption, and rates of fuelwood-induced deforestation; that fuelwood-induced deforestation approximates ripples spreading outward from urban consuming centers; and that land conversion to agriculture always reduces fuelwood supplies, to close scrutiny. The 2nd and 3rd assumptions are analyzed in light of recently collected field data in the Kano area of northern Nigeria; while the examination of the 1st is based on a reinterpretation of information from a wider range of environments. The paper concludes that although available data are inadequate for definitive conclusions to be drawn on the 1st count, it seems likely that variations arising out of demographic differentials in urban populations, in particular, changes in per capita fuelwood consumption resulting from changes in consuming unit size, distort direct links between population growth rates and rates of increase in fuel consumption. Further information on the demographic characteristics of African towns is needed for meaningful analyses of temporal changes in the affected variables to be undertaken. The 2nd and 3rd assumptions are found to not be applicable in the Kano case. However, this should be interpreted much less as justification for their outright rejection than as a reminder of the great potential of time- and space-specific considerations for rendering universal rules locally inapplicable. (author's)
In: Population policies and programmes: current status and future directions, [compiled by] United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP]. New York, New York, United Nations, 1987. 17-26. (Asian Population Studies Series No. 84; ST/ESCAP/563)Concentrating upon the Asian and Pacific region, this paper considers the consequences of rapid population growth. Already the world's most densely populated area, 1987 population projections predict the region to account for 56% of the world's 5 billion inhabitants. While annual growth rates for the region are expected to decline for the period 1985-2000, absolute population increase will, nonetheless, be greater than during the previous 15-year period, contributing 53% to overall world population growth. Future fertility declines are not expected to be as marked as observed during the previous decade. Changing age structure combined with the size and proportion of the population of women of child-bearing age will contribute to an impending baby boom. National family planning programs need to be expanded and strengthened to combat such future trends. Planning for production, consumption, investment, and distribution should also reflect age structure dynamics. Life expectancy at birth remains below levels representative of more developed regions, suggesting room for further strides against mortality-related conditions in the region. Industrialization and modernization should, however, play roles in changing mortality patterns. A lack of reliable data is recognized, as is concern over demographic aging soon to be faced by many countries of the region.
[Economic-demographic results of the life of one cohort (based on the cohort born in 1950)] Ekonomiko-demograficheskie itogi zhizni odnogo pokoleniya (na primere pokoleniya 1950 g. rozhdeniya).
VESTNIK STATISTIKI. 1989; (12):7-14.Data from a five percent sample of the Soviet population, collected in 1985, are used to analyze the demographic and economic characteristics of the cohort born in 1950. Factors considered include mortality, marriage and divorce, income, consumption, and wealth. Differences in these factors by age and region are explored. (ANNOTATION)
Period and cohort trends for mortality and cigarette consumption in England and Wales, 1946 to 1980, with emphasis on sex ratios.
JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY. 1988; 41(4):373-84.This study continues previous work on the relationship between smoking and mortality using data for England and Wales for the period 1946-1980. "In this paper temporal changes in the sex ratio of cumulative cigarette consumption by cohort, and of smoking rates by age, are considered in relation to changes in the sex ratio of mortality. Again, no consistent correlations emerge and it is evident that factors other than smoking have played a dominant part in determining recent changes in the sex ratio of mortality in all age groups from 35-39 to 80-84 years. Among these 'other factors' are birth cohort effects that can be attributed, in part, to birth cohort changes in the sex ratio of mortality from bronchitis and emphysema." (EXCERPT)
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. 1988 Feb; 103(1):1-25.An economic analysis of the linkages in fertility rates and capital accumulation across generations is developed, considering the determination of fertility and capital accumulation in each generation when wage rates and interest rates are parameters to each family and to open economies. The model is based on the assumption that parents are altruistic toward their children. The utility of parents depends on their own consumption and on the utility of each child and the number of children. By relating the utility of children to their own consumption and to the utility of their children, a dynastic utility function was obtained that depends on the consumption and number of descendants in all generations. The term "reformulation" was used because of the emphasis on dynastic utility model of altruism toward children and deriving the budget constraint and utility function of a dynastic family, the model was applied to the Great Depression and World War II. The 1st-order conditions to maximize utility imply that fertility in any generation depends positively on the real interest rate and the degree of altruism and negatively on the rate of growth in per capita consumption from 1 generation to the next. Consumption of each descendant depends positively on the net cost of rearing a desdendant. Applying the model, it is shown that the analysis is consistent with baby busts during the Depression and the war and with a baby boom after the war. The effects on fertility of child mortality, subsidies to (or taxes on) children, and social security and other transfer payments to adults were considered. The demand for surviving children rises during the transition to low child mortality, but demand for survivors return to its prior level once mortality stabilizes at a low level. Fertility falls in response to declines in international real interest rates and increases in an economy's rate of technological progress. Extending the analysis to include life-cycle variations in consumption, earnings, and utility, fertility emerges as a function of expenditures on the subsistence and human capital of children but not of expenditures that simply raise the consumption of children. The path of aggregate consumption in demographic steady states does not depend on interest rates, time preference, or other determinants of life-cycle variations in consumption.
BMJ. British Medical Journal. 1988 Oct 1; 297(6651):824-6.To estimate the excess mortality due to alcohol [consumption] in England and Wales death rates specific to alcohol consumption that had been derived from five longitudinal studies were applied to the current population divided into categories of alcohol consumption....This resulted in an estimate of 28,000 deaths each year in England and Wales as the excess mortality among people aged 15-74 associated with alcohol consumption. (EXCERPT)
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1987 Dec; 13(4):639-70, 763-4, 766.This article examines the demographic consequences of China's Great Leap Forward--the massive and ultimately unsuccessful drive during 1958-62 to leap ahead in production by mobilizing society and reorganizing the peasantry into large-scale communes. Severe excess mortality and massive fertility shortfalls are documented, but with wide variations among provinces and between rural and urban areas. The demographic crisis was caused, in the first instance, by nationwide food shortages. However, these are attributable to declines in grain production, entitlement failure, and changes in consumption patterns, all of which are ultimately traceable to political and economic policies connected with the Great Leap. (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA) (EXCERPT)
Bangkok, Thailand, United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP], 1987. 10 p. (Population Research Leads No. 25)The Asian and Pacific region's decline in fertility and mortality over the past 2 decades has resulted in large shifts in the age composition of national populations, which affects planning in nearly every social and economic sector. For the region as a whole, the crude birthrate is estimated to have remained at 40/1000 population until about 1970, declining to 27/1000 in the 1980-85 period. This rapid decline in fertility has complicated population policy formulation and the integration of population factors into development planning. The demonstration that government programs could alter demographic trends meant that population no longer could be treated simply as an exogenous variable in development planning. The combination of previously high fertility and declining mortality, which particularly affected the survival rates of infants and children, resulted in a small increase in the proportion of the population of the region below age 15, from 37% in 1950 to 41% in 1970. By 1985, the latter proportion dropped to 35% because of declining fertility. Due to the previously high fertility and more recent declines, the proportion of the population in working-age groups increased from 56% in 1975 to 61% in 1985 and is projected to reach 65% by 2000. Providing employment for this rapidly increasing population of labor-force age is a major challenge for countries of the region over the next several decades. For those few countries in the Asian and Pacific regions who had low birth and death rates by 1960, the current issue is demographic aging. As the rate of population growth per se decreases in importance as a planning goal, other aspects of population, such as spatial distribution, take on more significance. The rising marriage age and organized family planning programs were the primary causes of fertility decline in the region, although the decline was limited in South Asia where large pockets of high fertility (a total fertility rate in the range of 5-7) remain. The contribution of rising marriage age to further fertility decline is approaching the limit, except in the countries of South Asia where the marriage age continues to be below 20 years. In most of the countries of the region, the potential also exists for a 2nd generation "baby boom" resulting from a changing age structure. This would in turn slow down the pace of fertility decline unless compensated by a rapid fall in fertility of younger married women caused by successful implementation of family planning programs and other associated socioeconomic changes. Aside from the straightforward implications of demographic change, changes in age structure also imply changes in consumption patterns. Thus, planning for production, consumption, investment, and distribution always should incorporate changes in age structure.
[Greece and the European Economic Community: relations between mortality rates by cause and indexes of development] La Grece et la Communaute Economique Europeenne: relations entre les taux de mortalite par cause et les indices de developpement.
SOZIAL- UND PRAVENTIVMEDIZIN/MEDECINE SOCIALE ET PREVENTIVE. 1986; 31(3):178-82.Differences among the countries of the European Community concerning the relationship between mortality rates and various indexes of socioeconomic development are analyzed. These indexes include the pace of industrial development, the level of urbanization, and the quantity and quality of individual consumption. The analysis is primarily concerned with differences among countries concerning causes of death. (SUMMARY IN ENG AND GER) (ANNOTATION)
International Demographics. 1986 May; 5(5):1-9.In 1964, at independence, Zambia's economic future looked brighter than that of most other developing countries. Its copper production accounted for 8% of total world production, and only neighboring Zaire outpaced it in the production of cobalt. Its Central Province around Kabwe held rich deposits of both zinc and lead; uranium deposits also had been found, but their projected yield remained undetermined. Since 1974, the decline in the price of copper and the increase in the price of oil have played havoc with Zambia's balance of payments. Copper, which accounted for 40% of the gross national product (GNP) and 98% of all foreign exchange in 1964, shrank to 12% of the GNP in 1978 while still generating most of the foreign exchange. As a result, imports were cut back markedly from $1.5 billion in 1973 to $690 million in 1983. Although this trend is beginning to make a U-turn, Zambia's economic situation is grave. In 1984 the GNP continued to register negative growth and inflation stood at 25%. With its urbanization rate doubling from 21% in 1964 to 43% in 1985, Zambia is now the most urbanized country south of the Sahara. Zambia's 1985 population is estimated to be 6.8 million. Between 1963 and 1969, the average annual population growth rate was 2.5: it was 3.1% between 1969-80. The current birthrate of about 48/1000 is expected to decline only marginally in the next 15 years, but the death rate is declining more rapidly -- from 19/1000 in the late 1960s to 15/1000 in 1985. Life expectancy is expected to rise from the current 51 years to about 58 years. As a result of the high growth rate, Zambia's population is young, with a median age of about 16.3 years. Traditional African values stress the importance of large families. Zambia's total fertility rate was 6.9 in 1985. According to the World Bank, only 1% of married women of childbearing age in 1982 used contraceptives. Although tribal links are weakening, Zambia still counts 73 officially recognized tribes. Together, they speak about 40 different dialects. Zambia now apportions over 15% of its national budget to education. Despite some noticeable progress, the public health structure remains deficient. Principal health problems include malaria, tuberculosis, and, in Northern Province and Luapula Province, sleeping sickness and river blindness. About 2/3 of the labor force, an estimated 2.2 million persons in 1982, still work in agriculture. Female labor force participation is lower in Zambia than in many African nations.
Interactions between mortality levels and the allocation of time for leisure, training, consumption and saving over the life cycle
In: Consequences of mortality trends and differentials. New York, New York, U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1986. 126-31. (Population Studies no. 95, ST/ESA/SER.A/95)The author seeks to develop a framework depicting the interaction of mortality levels and the allocation of time for leisure, training, consumption, and saving over the life cycle in the context of a household's decision-making process. "The discussion suggests that longevity is conducive to saving, schooling and training, and technological change. Rising survivorship is postulated to be a major force behind rising productivity because rising levels of productivity are almost the only means to spread consumption of goods and leisure over an increasing life span." (EXCERPT)
[Is population growth the source of misery in the Third World?] La croissance demographique est-elle responsable de la misere du Tiers Monde.
Recherche. 1985 Nov; 16(171):1380-1.The developing countries experienced their most rapid demographic growth of 2-4% per year between 1950-80, with the highest rates occurring in the 1960s and a slight easing taking place in the 1970s. The most direct way of assessing whether this extraordinary demographic growth impeded economic development is to calculate the correlation between demographic growth and the per capita gross national product (GNP) at constant prices. The average annual growth of GNP in developing countries from 1950-75 was 3.4% compared to 3.2% in developed countries, while the rates from 1975-80 were 2.4% and 2.8% respectively. The average rate of growth of GNP in developed countries was only about 2% in the 1st half of this century, while that in many developing countries has been zero for centuries. The postwar demographic explosion therefore coincided with an unprecedented economic explosion. Between 1950-80, the population of India and China increased by about 800 million persons, but economic progress even in India was substantial. China and Pakistan saw a doubling and Mexico and Brazil a tripling of per capita income. This undeniable economic progress was not achieved without some cost; it was accompanied by increased debt and has been very unequal between countries. Outside of some extreme cases like Bangladesh where demographic pressure threatens the equilibrium between population and resources, it is most often the less densely populated African countries which are most backward. Factors of underdevelopment appear to be more often political instability and strategic-errors such as insufficient investment in agriculture and general infrastructure than demographic constraints. The correlation between mortality decline and increased per capita income was very strong, especially in the 1950s and 1960s and especially in Japan and the newly industrializing Asian countries and Latin America. The growth of income permitted improved nutrition and education of the population, which in turn stimulated growth of income and population. In view of the data, there appears to be a contradiction between the historic reality and the pessimism of postwar economic literature. The error appears to have arisen because of a failure to recognize that not only do economic and demographic growth have common structural roots, but they are susceptible to dynamic and cumulative interaction. Also, the overattention to high fertility led to neglect of the stimulating role of mortality decline, which is closely related to economic development. Growth of income and growth of population are a priori associated: they are 2 facets of the same development process.
International Demographics. 1986 Feb; 5(2):1-9.This discussion of Italy focuses on the following: cities and regions; population growth; households and families; housing and construction; ethnicity and religion; education; economy and labor force; consumption; and transport and communications. Italy, with its total area of 116,374 square miles, is about the size of Florida and Georgia combined. Its 56.6 million people form the 2nd largest population in Western Europe, after West Germany, but slightly larger than Great Britain and France. The main administrative divisions are 20 regions, subdivided into 95 provinces. The provinces in turn are divided into 8090 "comuni" or municipalities. The 6 cities with more than 500,000 people are Roma, Milano, Napoli, Torino, Genova, and Palermo. They account for 14% of the population. The 43 cities with between 100,000-500,000 account for another 13%. There are 373 middle-sized communities with between 20,000 and 100,000 people, accounting for 26% of population. Italy has a regional problem. The line separating the regions of Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, and Lazio from the regions to the south and east is important. The regions north of it hold 62% of the population but are responsible for 73% of the gross national product (GNP) and 78% of the industrial product. The regions to the south are economically much weaker. At the time of the last Italian census on October 25, 1981, the country counted 56.6 million inhabitants. Compared to 33.5 million at the turn of the century, this implies an average annual growth rate of .61%. Between 1900-70, nearly 20 million Italians left their country. Most settled in the US, Argentina, and Brazil. Beginning in the 1960s, a new sort of migration was added as young Italians temporarily left to work in the more prosperous countries of northern Europe. The birthrate, which had declined slowly to 18/1000 during the 1960s, fell more rapidly during the 1970s, to 10.9/1000 in 1981 and 10.3 in 1984. The death rate in Italy has changed little since 1950. Presently, it hovers around 9.5/1000. With its low birthrate and outmigration of young adults, Italy is aging. The median age is about 34 years, and 13% of the population is aged 65 and older. Despite the stereotypical image of the large Italian family, household size in Italy, as in other industrialized nations, is declining, from a mean of 3.6 in 1961 to 3.4 in 1971 and 3.0 in 1981. Culturally, Italy is a homogeneous country. In 1984 there were 23 million people in Italy's work force. Among the economically inactive, 33% were younger than age 14, 30% were housewives, 23% were retired, and 11% were students. In 1984, average annual family income varied from the equivalent of about $15,900 in Emilia Romagna to $9,500 in Sicilia. Mean annual household budgets in 1983 varied from te equivalent of $11,950 in Lombardia to $7,400 in Molise, with a national average of $10,026.
Economic Development and Cultural Change. 1986 Jan; 34(2):245-62.The authors analyze aspects of Palestinian demographic change in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the years 1922-1982. "The research is initiated in Section II with a brief historical overview of demographic change in the territories, including comparison of fertility, natality, and mortality during periods of Jordanian and Israeli administration. Section III focuses on composition, destination, and local demographic impacts of Palestinian migration. In Section IV, econometric evaluation of migratory determinants is undertaken." Data are from official Jordanian, Kuwaiti, Israeli, and Palestinian sources and from other published literature. The significance of migration in explaining demographic trends in the region is noted. Migratory movements in the wake of the 1948 and 1967 wars are shown to be similar in magnitude to those observed during periods of relative political stability. The authors also suggest that "consumption patterns, housing development, and indices of employment opportunity in local and foreign labor markets are highly significant in an explanation of Palestinian emigration over the post-1967 period." Population growth forecasts and policy implications are briefly considered. (EXCERPT)
International Demographics. 1985 Dec; 4(12):1-4.This discussion of the Netherlands covers the country's cities and regions, population growth, households and families, housing, contruction, and spatial planning; ethnicity and religion; education; labor force and income; consumption; and transport and communications. As a small and mineral poor nation with a seafaring tradition, the Netherlands survives on foreign trade. In 1983, total export earnings amounted to nearly 62% of the entire national income. Over 72% of Dutch exports go to other member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), but imports are more diversified, with 47% originating outside the EEC. Since 1848, the Netherlands has been a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. As such, it is one of the most stable democracies in the world. The main administrative units are the 11 provinces, of which Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland are the most populous and economically most important. Amsterdam remains the commercial center of the country, but its role as the principal port city has been taken over by Rotterdam. No community has more than 700,000 inhabitants, but the country as a whole is highly urbanized because of the large numbers of medium-sized cities. In 1983 the population of the Netherlands totaled 14.34 million, compared to 5.10 million at the turn of the century. In 1965, the total fertility rate was 3.0. The death rate has virtually stabilized at 8/1000. The Dutch life expectancy stands at 72.7 years for men and 79.4 for women (1983). Natural increase has already dropped to 0.4% a year. Apart from the slight impact of net immigration, the positive growth rate reflects the large proportion (53%) of the population in its reproductive years. Mean household sizes in the 11 provinces vary from 2.5 in Noord-Holland (in 1981) to nearly 3 in Overijssel and Noord-Brabant, whereas the proportion of 1 person households ranges from 16% in Drenthe and 17% in the somewhat traditionalist southern provinces of Limburg and Noord-Brabant to 27% in Noord-Holland and 28% in Groningen. Only 26% of the Dutch own their own homes. The Netherlands has historically been a nation of little ethnic, religious, or cultural conflict. The central government finances education at all levels, making education and science the 2nd largest budget item (19%), preceded only by welare and social policy (22%). In 1983 the economically active population consisted of 3.8 million men and nearly 2 million women.
[Hunger and disease in less developed countries and en route to development (the Third World). Proposal for solutions] Hambre y enfermedades en los paises menos adelantados y en vias de desarrollo (Tercer Mundo). Propuesta de soluciones.
Anales de la Real Academia Nacional de Medicina. 1984; 101(1):39-96.The extent, causes, and possible solutions to problems of hunger, inequality, and disease in developing countries are discussed in this essay. Various frameworks and indicators have been proposed for identifying the poorest of nations; currently, 21 African, 9 Asian, and 1 American nation are regarded as the poorest of the poor. The 31 least developed countries, the 89 developing countries, and the 37 developed countries respectively have populations of 283 million, 3 billion; infant mortality rates of 160, 94, and 19/1000 live births; life expectancies of 45, 60, and 72 years; literacy rates of 28, 55, and 98%; per capita gross national products of $170, and $520, and $6230; and per capita public health expenditures of $1.70, $6.50, and $244. Developing countries in the year 2000 are expected to have 4.87 billion of the world's 6.2 billion inhabitants. The 3rd world contains 70% of the world's population but receives only 17% of world income. 40 million persons die of hunger or its consequences each year. Economic and social development is the only solution to problems of poverty and underdevelopment, and will require mobilization of all present and future human and material resources to achieve maximum possible wellbeing for each human being. Among principal causes of underdevelopment in the 3rd World are drought, illness, exile, socioeconomic disorder, war, and arms expenditures. Current food production and a long list of possible new technologies would be adequate to feed the world's population, but poor distribution condemns the world's people to hunger. Numerous UN agencies, organizations, and programs are dedicated to solving the problems of hunger, underdevelopment, and disease. In 1982, 600 billion dollars were spent in armanents, of $112 for each of the world's inhabitants; diversion of these resources to development goals would go a long way toward solving the problem of underdevelopment. The main problem is not lack of resources, but the need to establish a new and more just economic and distributive order along with genuine solidarity in the struggle against underdevelopment. Several steps should be taken: agricultural production should be increased with the full participation of the developng nations; the industrialized or petroleum-producing nations should aid the poor states with at least .7% and up to 5% of their gross national products for the struggle against drought, disease, illiteracy, and for the green revolution and new agropastoral technologies; prices paid to poor countries for raw materials should be fair; responsible parenthood, education, women's rights, clean drinking water, environmental sanitation and primary health care should be promoted; the arms race should be halted, and the North-South dialogue should be pursued in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation.
Canadian Studies in Population. 1980; 7:67-80.Add to my documents.
International Journal of Health Services. 1984; 14(2):289-302.All-causes mortality rates turned sharply upward for Polish men around 1972. Increases of 25 percent or greater were recorded for all five-year age groups between 40 and 59 years. Other indices, including infant mortality and death rates for women, either continued to improve or did not change. The primary causes accounting for this upturn appear to be cardiovascular diseases and cancer of the lung. It is found that "the epidemiological pattern in Poland reflects in part the long-term trend for consumption of food, alcohol, and tobacco to approximate that found in Western industrialized countries....Although it is still too early to see the effect of the social crisis of the last two years, economic disruption and shortages are not the main factors accounting for the upturn in Polish mortality through 1980. In fact, the success of the Polish economic strategy appears to be the underlying social cause." (EXCERPT)
New York, Praeger, 1971. 134 p. (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development)The study objective was to gather and analyze support for the thesis that economic growth in a developing country can be substantially increased and accelerated by reductions in fertility rates. Jamaica was chosen as a case example because of the availability and reliability of demographic and economic data. Conclusions are based on demographic and economic projections for Jamaica covering the 1970 through 2020 period. Population growth is estimated under 4 fertility assumptions: constant and reduced by 1, 2, and 3% a year. Estimates are included of numbers of persons needed to accept effective contraceptive methods to reduce births to stipulated levels of fertility. The economic part of the model considers effects on production due to the amount of capital and labor available, changes in the capital labor ratio, economies of scale, and technological progress. Important features not previously incorporated within a single model include the costs of a fertility reduction program and other welfare expenditures and the effects of changes in the capital labor ratio on employment. Savings are made a function of total income and of increases in consumption brought about by net additions to the population. Consumption is calculated on the basis of equivalent adult consumers. The economic relationships are described by a series of simultaneous equations containing 20 economic variables. Estimates, on a yearly basis, are made for gross national product; private, public, and total consumption in aggregate and per equivalent adult consumer; gross domestic savings; foreign savings; gross domestic investment; demographic investment; welfare investment; net fixed total and productive capital formation; stock of total and productive capital; capital consumption allowance; imports minus exports; net foreign transfer payments; and the capital labor ratio. The entire investigation is directed toward analyzing the effects of population growth on economic growth. The labor directed toward analyzing the effects of population growth on economic growth. The labor force in Jamaica is currently increasing much more rapidly than it ever did previously (3% per year). The growth will accelerate through 2000. Reduction in fertility rates will have no substantial influence on the size of labor force until after that item. Up through 1985, this effect is self evident because entrants into the labor force have already been born, but, even for the additional 15 years beyond that, the effect is gradual and slow. The great increase in labor force for at least the next 30 years is due to high birthrates in the recent past. The impact of mortality declines will make little difference to the size of the labor force. By 2020 the projections indicate that some decline in the rate of increase in the size of the labor force will occur under medium and low fertility assumptions. There is present in Jamaica much disguised unemployment and underemployment. A great need exists for strong and coordinated efforts in population and all other planning.
Manila, Commission on Population and the University of Philippines Population Institute, August 1973. 65pIn the Philippines, because of differential trends in fertility and mortality, the rate of natural increase--which may be viewed as a measure of population growth rate, since migration is negligible--rose to 32 per 1000 in 1960 from 12 per 1000 in 1903. Today 1/2 of the population is under 18 years of age, the completed family size is around 6 children, and the annual growth rate is 3.01%. The population problem of Filipinos, then, is a pressing one. This chartbook shows the effects of rapid population growth on socioeconomic development, and presents the measures taken to curb the growth rate. In 1973, family planning clinics were functioning in all major provinces. The acceptance rates from December 1969 to July 1973 ranged from nearly 400 per 1000 population in Manila to 140 per 1000 population in Southern Mindanao. During the same period, more than 1/2 of the acceptors chose the pill as their first method. Approximately 1 in 6 accepted the condom, 1 in 7 the IUD and 1 in 10 rhythm. The costs per couple year of protection present a general downward trend. From fiscal year 1960 to 1976, the growth rate is expected to decline from 3% to 2.57%.