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  1. 1

    Europe's ageing population: trends and challenges to 2025.

    de Jouvenel H

    Guildford, England, Butterworths, 1989. 54 p.

    This report examines the trends of demographic ageing in Europe up to 2025. By that date one European in four could be aged 65 or over. With trends continuing towards the contraction of working life, severe imbalances may occur in individual life cycles, in the structure of the workforce, and in socioeconomic provision for an ageing population. The report further considers the potential impacts of these emerging imbalances on living conditions, consumption patterns, and socio-medical/health care provision for the old. Finally, a range of responses are outlined to the challenges of possible intergenerational conflict surrounding the nexus of issues related to demographic ageing.
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  2. 2

    Implications of changing age structure for current and future development planning.

    United Nations. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP]

    Bangkok, Thailand, United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP], 1987. 10 p. (Population Research Leads No. 25)

    The Asian and Pacific region's decline in fertility and mortality over the past 2 decades has resulted in large shifts in the age composition of national populations, which affects planning in nearly every social and economic sector. For the region as a whole, the crude birthrate is estimated to have remained at 40/1000 population until about 1970, declining to 27/1000 in the 1980-85 period. This rapid decline in fertility has complicated population policy formulation and the integration of population factors into development planning. The demonstration that government programs could alter demographic trends meant that population no longer could be treated simply as an exogenous variable in development planning. The combination of previously high fertility and declining mortality, which particularly affected the survival rates of infants and children, resulted in a small increase in the proportion of the population of the region below age 15, from 37% in 1950 to 41% in 1970. By 1985, the latter proportion dropped to 35% because of declining fertility. Due to the previously high fertility and more recent declines, the proportion of the population in working-age groups increased from 56% in 1975 to 61% in 1985 and is projected to reach 65% by 2000. Providing employment for this rapidly increasing population of labor-force age is a major challenge for countries of the region over the next several decades. For those few countries in the Asian and Pacific regions who had low birth and death rates by 1960, the current issue is demographic aging. As the rate of population growth per se decreases in importance as a planning goal, other aspects of population, such as spatial distribution, take on more significance. The rising marriage age and organized family planning programs were the primary causes of fertility decline in the region, although the decline was limited in South Asia where large pockets of high fertility (a total fertility rate in the range of 5-7) remain. The contribution of rising marriage age to further fertility decline is approaching the limit, except in the countries of South Asia where the marriage age continues to be below 20 years. In most of the countries of the region, the potential also exists for a 2nd generation "baby boom" resulting from a changing age structure. This would in turn slow down the pace of fertility decline unless compensated by a rapid fall in fertility of younger married women caused by successful implementation of family planning programs and other associated socioeconomic changes. Aside from the straightforward implications of demographic change, changes in age structure also imply changes in consumption patterns. Thus, planning for production, consumption, investment, and distribution always should incorporate changes in age structure.
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  3. 3

    The Republic of Zambia.

    Hakkert R; Wieringa R

    International Demographics. 1986 May; 5(5):1-9.

    In 1964, at independence, Zambia's economic future looked brighter than that of most other developing countries. Its copper production accounted for 8% of total world production, and only neighboring Zaire outpaced it in the production of cobalt. Its Central Province around Kabwe held rich deposits of both zinc and lead; uranium deposits also had been found, but their projected yield remained undetermined. Since 1974, the decline in the price of copper and the increase in the price of oil have played havoc with Zambia's balance of payments. Copper, which accounted for 40% of the gross national product (GNP) and 98% of all foreign exchange in 1964, shrank to 12% of the GNP in 1978 while still generating most of the foreign exchange. As a result, imports were cut back markedly from $1.5 billion in 1973 to $690 million in 1983. Although this trend is beginning to make a U-turn, Zambia's economic situation is grave. In 1984 the GNP continued to register negative growth and inflation stood at 25%. With its urbanization rate doubling from 21% in 1964 to 43% in 1985, Zambia is now the most urbanized country south of the Sahara. Zambia's 1985 population is estimated to be 6.8 million. Between 1963 and 1969, the average annual population growth rate was 2.5: it was 3.1% between 1969-80. The current birthrate of about 48/1000 is expected to decline only marginally in the next 15 years, but the death rate is declining more rapidly -- from 19/1000 in the late 1960s to 15/1000 in 1985. Life expectancy is expected to rise from the current 51 years to about 58 years. As a result of the high growth rate, Zambia's population is young, with a median age of about 16.3 years. Traditional African values stress the importance of large families. Zambia's total fertility rate was 6.9 in 1985. According to the World Bank, only 1% of married women of childbearing age in 1982 used contraceptives. Although tribal links are weakening, Zambia still counts 73 officially recognized tribes. Together, they speak about 40 different dialects. Zambia now apportions over 15% of its national budget to education. Despite some noticeable progress, the public health structure remains deficient. Principal health problems include malaria, tuberculosis, and, in Northern Province and Luapula Province, sleeping sickness and river blindness. About 2/3 of the labor force, an estimated 2.2 million persons in 1982, still work in agriculture. Female labor force participation is lower in Zambia than in many African nations.
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  4. 4

    ["Zero growth" of population and its consequences for the West] Nulevoi rost naseleniya i ego posledstviya dlya stran Zapada

    Oskolkova O

    Memo: Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya. 1985; (8):41-54, 159.

    The consequences of the decline in fertility in Western Europe and Northern America are analyzed. The author first describes current demographic trends and suggests that the trend toward population decline is probably irreversible. Consideration is given to determinants of fertility such as industrialization, urbanization, women's economic activity, educational standards, health services, social security, demographic policy, and income. Factors affecting Western fertility are identified as inflation, unemployment, and spiritual impoverishment. The existence of various schools of thought in Western countries concerning the implications of these trends is noted. These include the fear of the environmental impact of further population growth and the fear of the consequences of population decline. The author concludes that a period of stable population growth will mean a decline in the available labor force, an increase in the age of the labor force, an increase in the number of pensioners, a change in the structure of demand, and other problems for capitalist societies. (summary in ENG)
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  5. 5

    [Colombia in statistics, 1985] Colombia Estadistica 85.

    Colombia. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica [DANE]

    Bogota, Colombia, DANE, 1984 Dec. 580 p.

    This volume contains recent and earlier statistics on a variety of social and economic topics in Colombia. The work opens with a description in Spanish and English of general background on the geography, population, economy, and government and administrative structure of Colombia, followed by geographic and economic profiles of each of the country's 23 departments, 4 intendencies, and 5 commisaries. Chapter 3, on demography, provides population figures from censuses dating back to 1770; age and sex distributions from the 1951, 1964, and 1973 censuses; results of studies of the population resident in private housing; data on birth registration between 1976-82; and discussion of various aspects of the demography of Latin America. The following chapters consider educational status, illiteracy, and educational needs and facilities at the primary, secondary, and higher level; labor force participation rates by sex and geographic areas and unemployment; results of the National Food, Nutrition, and Housing Survey of 1981; health resources and services; the civil and criminal justice systems; and information on elections and returns for various elections. The remaining 14 chapters provide data on significant areas of economic activity, including agriculture and animal husbandry, manufacturing and industry, construction and housing, prices, salaries and income, public finance, national accounts, mining and energy, social organization including cooperatives and community action groups, transportation, external commerce, internal commerce, tourism, and communications.
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  6. 6

    The economic consequences of declining population growth.

    Maillat D

    In: Council of Europe. Proceedings of the European Population Conference 1982 (Strasbourg, 21-24 September 1982). Strasbourg, France, Council of Europe, 1983. 291-313.

    The possible drawbacks and adverse effects of the current population trend of the fall in fertility and steady aging of the population were analyzed. Areas in which links may exist between the economy and population trends, which, in a European context, appeared most pertinent were chosen. It is generally considered that a reduction in the number of births well result in a reduction in certain areas of public expenditure. Thus, the "numbers" effect would appear to be favorable as far as public finance is concerned. Reduction in education expenditure could offset the increase in health expenditure. The education sector is rapidly affected by a decline in the number of births, and the impact of demographic fluctutations is felt for many years as the cohorts grow older. Germany, where the birth rate has fallen markedly, provides valuable information about what can happen in such a case and illustrates the need to adapt education facilities. Focus is on the number of pupils, demand for teachers it is possible that education costs may be somewhat reduced, health costs and social security contributions will definitely increase. The relationship between health expenditures and age can be depicted by means of a U-shaped curve. The largest consumers of medical care and advice are children under the age of 1 year and adults over the age of 65. A sudden fall in the birth rate may reduce health expenditure, but since the aging of the population continues inexorably, what is saved on the youngest will be used to care for the oldest. The underlying tendency imposed by the changes in the structure of population until the end of the century will be to reinforce the upward trend in expenditure. Social security expenditure clearly will be much more strongly affected by demographic trends than other forms of expenditure. There is no demographic reason why overall household consumption should fall since, assuming that there are no economic fluctuations, per capita income is likely to increase. With a declining population growth, the building of housing to meet demographic needs will also diminish. Since such facilities as schools, hospitals, housing, and transport, are generally planned from a longterm standpoint, decisions to build may be delayed, possibly indefinitely, because of variations in population size. If present demographic conditions persist, all regions should, in the long run and to varying degrees, experience population decline. The demographic conditions in which Europe is going to live will not necessarily damage production capacity, but they will make it more difficult to develope and adapt that capacity.
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