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  1. 1

    The challenge of uncertainty: the unexpected occurrence.

    Nierenberg D

    Genus. 2005 Jul-Dec; 61(3-4):91-110.

    This paper will deal with some of the issues that create demographic uncertainty and some of the trends which are likely to shape demographics in the future. World population has dramatically swelled to over 6 billion people today, more than double the number in 1950, when it was about 2.5 billion people. But population growth has not been linear over time. During the last half of the XX century, the annual growth rate of world population has been at first increasing to the value of almost 2% around the end of the 1950s, then decreasing until the beginning of the 1960s. It reached the pick of 2.19% in 1963. Afterwards it started an endless downward trend. In 2004 it was estimated to be 1.4%. World population is likely to keep on increasing through the first decades of the XXI century, although at a less rapid pace. The United Nations Population Division has acknowledged the lack of continuity in the population growth rate since the mid-1990s by periodically adjusting its estimates of population growth to 2050. Why the uncertainty? This paper will first quickly consider some of the reasons which cause the demographic uncertainty - economic and political changes, consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and of the improvements in girls' education levels. Second it will tackle some of the issues we should watch for in relation to population - aging populations, growing youth bulges in many countries, increasing urbanization in the developing world, spreading infectious diseases and rising consumption. It will end up providing reflections upon some prospective challenges for world population. (excerpt)
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  2. 2

    The role of population growth in global warming.

    Bartiaux F; van Ypersele JP

    In: International Population Conference / Congres International de la Population, Montreal 1993, 24 August - 1st September. Volume 4, [compiled by] International Union for the Scientific Study of Population [IUSSP]. Liege, Belgium, IUSSP, 1993. 33-54.

    Global warming is a relatively new issue for demographers, although many theories link population growth to environmental impact. There are different ways to quantify the responsibilities for global warming, and, by presenting a set of scenarios, it is possible to assess the roles of various factors. The topic of population and climate has been avoided since publication of a 1915 claim that certain climates are conducive to high levels of civilization. The link between population and the food supply has been of continual concern, however, since the time of Confucius. Recent studies of the connection between family planning and environmental degradation conclude that simply slowing growth will not provide a short-term solution. Some attempts to quantify the links between population and climate change have been relatively simple, such as comparisons between less developed (LDC) and more developed (MDC) countries' fossil fuel-derived carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, or CO2 emissions from deforestation, or per capita CO2 emission. Others have been more complex, including developing an index of various greenhouse gases called the "Greenhouse Warming Potential." This index has been criticized by 2 Indian scientists who propose that natural sinks to absorb pollution should be assigned each country on the basis of population, with the share of pollution to be based on any excess. Another complex quantifier is the Ehrkich-Holden equation, I = PAT, where I is negative impact on the environment, P is population size, A is affluence, and T is environmental impact/quantity of consumption. The problem with the use of this equation lies in aggregation; it must be applied to a homogeneous region to yield useful indicators. The equation also ignores the impact of international trade. Tabulation of annual CO2/capita emissions for 9 regions of the world in 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 and, for the same time periods, tabulation of the role of population growth in past CO2/capita consumption in MDCs and LDCs are variously assigned 1950 values which are compared to real annual data, lead to following conclusion. Population increase in LDCs contributed much less to CO2 emissions than did consumption and population increases in MDCs. This would argue for an emphasis on changing consumption habits in MDCs to reduce CO2 emissions and allow population growth to be checked to achieve sustainable development. As demographers become familiar with the debate on global warming, they can apply their techniques to place the role of population in its proper perspective.
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  3. 3
    Peer Reviewed

    Intergenerational transfers in industrialised countries: effects of age distribution and economic institutions.

    Ermisch J


    In Great Britain, using mid 1980s data and assuming no productivity increase over generations thereby making the discount rate and population growth rate 0, the average ages of household consumption and production stood at 46.3 and 41.3 respectively. Further, assuming 2% annual productivity growth and discount rates, the average consumption age was 41.7 and the average production age was 38.7. Therefore, net transfers here passed from the younger to older generations. In Japan, 1985 data shows that, under the same assumptions as Great Britain, the average ages of household consumption and production stood at 50.8 and 44.3 respectively. When assuming 2% annual productivity growth and discount rates, Japan's average consumption age was 41.7 and it's average production age was 38.7. Like Great Britain, Japan's net transfers passed from the younger to older generations. Specifically, production was significantly higher than consumption in the 20-60 year old age group and the reverse occurred in the older age groups. Even though there were similar patterns between the 2 countries, the difference between the average ages of consumption and production for Japan is much larger than for Great Britain. Further, it is even greater than the United States' whose estimates correspond to Japan's and Great Britain's. Specifically, the strength of the transfer effect is higher for Japan than Great Britain or the US because of the longer life expectancy among the Japanese. In addition, due to changes in fertility and mortality, the proportion of the <15 year olds has decreased and the proportion of those > or = 65 years old has increased. Therefore net transfers have shifted in favor of the older generations.
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  4. 4

    Demographic causes and consequences of the industrial revolution.

    Simon JL

    [Unpublished] 1989. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Baltimore, Maryland, March 30 - April 1, 1989. 30 p.

    The relationship of population to the Industrial Revolution is such that population density and economic development in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe were causes of each other. Industrialized society allowed larger numbers of people to survive than did agrarian society. Greater agricultural yields produced by fewer people permitted more people for both non-agricultural activities and for creating demand for more products. The population in Europe during this period increased exponentially because of a plummeting death rate, higher marriage rates and birth rates, and increased life expectancy. The precise causes of these trends are still unclear, but changes in climate and rodent disease vectors and improved nutrition, transportation, and public health are cited. Contrary to accepted demographic theory, this increase in population density lead to the 1st permanent increase in living standards for the bulk of the population to above subsistence levels. Thus more people, wealthy and poor, were enabled to live. The Industrial Revolution was both a cause and a consequence of an exodus from farming. More consumers demanded better food, and thus created a demand for agricultural technology. Similar demand relationships appeared for energy development, physical and social capital, infrastructure, and social and political organization. Population density lead to better organized markets. Why an industrial revolution did not occur in China or India was probably due to serfdom and social immobility. Demographic change was an indispensable element woven into the fabric of the Industrial Revolution.
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  5. 5

    A subjective equilibrium approach to the value of children in the agricultural household.

    Yotopoulos PA; Kuroda Y

    PAKISTAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1988 Autumn; 27(3):229-76.

    A subjective equilibrium model was constructed, integrating economic and demographic behavior of agricultural households, using data from a special Philippine survey. The data were collected in 1978-1979 from 590 households in Misamis Oriental, northern Mindanao Island, sponsored by FAO/UNFPA. Households were categorized into large and small farms, and owner and tenant-operated farms. The utility maximization hypothesis was tested and could not be rejected for any socioeconomic groups. The major difference was the input of child labor. The utility maximization model also revealed demands for leisure and commodities consistent with higher valuation of children in tenant and small households compared to owner and large households. The analysis of household equilibrium with demographic characteristics suggests important policy implications: that improved endowments at the bottom could trickle up to result in higher production and lower population growth.
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  6. 6

    Marketing health care products: the contact lens market.

    Exter T

    [Unpublished] 1988. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 21-23, 1988. 7, [8] p.

    The contact lens market is a good example of a "health care product" market that is strongly affected by demographic trends. In the US, according to a 1986 survey by the Simmons Market Research Bureau, 57% of all persons 18 or over wear eyeglasses and/or contact lenses. The absolute number of contact lens users increased from 12.7 million in 1982 to 22.9 million in 1986. Most contact lens wearers are young -- between 18 and 29. 11% of men and 15% of women are contact lens wearers. Among people under 45 with a college education 21% wear contacts as opposed to 13% of those who never attended college. However, among college-educated persons 45 and over only 11% are more likely to wear contacts than noncollege people. Thus in terms of demographic breakdown by age, sex and education, contact lens wear is highest among young college-educated women. Analysis of current demographic segments in the contact lens market can provide data for estimating future trends, such as, e.g., from which segments of the population the next 1000 customers will come. Assuming constant penetration rates and constant growth rates for the 3 segments, 71% of the new users will be under 45. If the under 45 group grows 3.68%, but the over 45 segment grows 6.75%, only 52% of the new customers will be under 45; 29% will come from the under 45 college-educated segment, 28% from the over 45 noncollege segment, and 23% from the under 45 noncollege segment. Among women, youth is a more important determinant than education or choosing contact lenses. Thus demographic data can be used to understand and segment a market.
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  7. 7

    Demography and the electric utility: understanding the link between consumer and consumption.

    Buglass K

    [Unpublished] 1984. Paper presented at the Population Association of America Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, Minn., May 3-5, 1984. 12 p.

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  8. 8

    Demographic factors in South Korean economic development: 1963-1977

    Hess PN

    Chapel Hill, N.C, University of North Carolina, 1982. 436 p.

    This research investigated the role of demographic factors in economic development. Specifically, a general model of the economic development process is constructed and then applied to the experience of South Korea from 1963-77. The model emphasizes the incorporation of demographic factors, widely interpreted to include not only the size, growth rate, and composition of the population, but also the quality of the population as minifested in the levels of human capital formation. South Korea has been 1 of the most successful of recent development efforts. Most of the research on the Korean phenomenon has highlighted the economic factors. Usually cited as responsible for the rapid, export led Korean economic development are the utilization of an able, motivated, but previously underemployed labor force, the large inflows of foreign capital, and the special relationships with Japan and the US, and the establishment of a strong central government, committed to economic development and able to implement effective growth policy. Important demographic factors, however were the impressive human capital formation that had begun 15 years prior to the onset of rapid economic growth and the dramatic declines in Korean fertility, which paralleled the economic achievements in the 1960s and 1970s. Using Korean national income data and economic-demographic selected surveys, the quantitative influences of demographic factors, particularly human capital formation and population dynamics, on Korean economic development for the 15-year period beginning in 1963 are assessed. The equations of the econometric model are estimated using either ordinary least squares of the 1st order autoregressive process. The empirical results show human capital formation to have been a significant and pervasive factor in recent South Korean economic development. Human capital formation, as proxied by indexes of formal educational attainment in the sectoral labor forces, was an important influence on real sectoral outputs and investments and in the growth of Korean exports. In addition, to the extent increases in education are associated with declines in fertility, human capital formation contributed to the substantial reductions in the growth rate of the Korean population, leading to favorable burden of dependency shifts and enhancing the ability of the Korean economy to generate the savings necessary for rapid growth and structural change. (author's)
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