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A demographic dividend of the FP2020 Initiative and the SDG reproductive health target: Case studies of India and Nigeria.
Gates Open Research. 2018 Feb 22; 2:11.Background: The demographic dividend, defined as the economic growth potential resulting from favorable shifts in population age structure following rapid fertility decline, has been widely employed to advocate improving access to family planning. The current framework focuses on the long-term potential, while the short-term benefits may also help persuade policy makers to invest in family planning. Methods: We estimate the short- and medium-term economic benefits from two major family planning goals: the Family Planning 2020 (FP2020)'s goal of adding 120 million modern contraceptive users by 2020; Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 3.7 of ensuring universal access to family planning by 2030. We apply the cohort component method to World Population Prospects and National Transfer Accounts data. India and Nigeria, respectively the most populous Asian and African country under the FP2020 initiative, are used as case studies. Results: Meeting the FP2020 target implies that on average, the number of children that need to be supported by every 100 working-age people would decrease by 8 persons in India and 11 persons in Nigeria in 2020; the associated reduction remains at 8 persons in India, but increases to 14 persons in Nigeria by 2030 under the SDG 3.7. In India meeting the FP2020 target would yield a saving of US$18.2 billion (PPP) in consumption expenditures for children and youth in the year 2020 alone, and that increased to US$89.7 billion by 2030. In Nigeria the consumption saved would be US$2.5 billion in 2020 and $12.9 billion by 2030. Conclusions: The tremendous economic benefits from meeting the FP2020 and SDG family planning targets demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of investment in promoting access to contraceptive methods. The gap already apparent between the observed and targeted trajectories indicates tremendous missing opportunities. Accelerated progress is needed to achieve the FP2020 and SDG goals and so reap the demographic dividend.
Asia-Pacific Population Journal. 2006 Dec; 21(3):7-16.Every country in the Asian and Pacific region is in the midst of a demographic transition that is producing large changes in age structure with important implications for economic growth and standards of living. In the early stages of the transition, high fertility and declining infant and child mortality produce a bulge in the population at young ages. The middle of the transition is marked by an increase in the share of the population concentrated at the working ages as large cohorts of children reach adulthood and as the relative number of children are depressed by fertility decline. At the end of the transition, the share of the older population increases. In part, this is a consequence of continued reductions in mortality rates, but of greater consequence are the low fertility rates that characterize the final stages of the demographic transition. (excerpt)
JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS. 1997; 10(3):299-316.A simple general equilibrium analysis was presented about first best allocations in an economy where a consumption good is produced using labor. Considered was an economy with consumers whose preferences are identical, and their welfare depends on their private levels of consumption, the labor supply, and the aggregate emissions in the economy. Production results in pollution, which is a public bad. Pollution abatement can be achieved either by restricting production or by using additional labor. Consumers were unambiguously worse off as population grew, since the environment is a finite resource. However, the best level of emissions grew steadily as the population increased, hence the deterioration was not attributable to a fixed factor. The causes contributing to consumers being worse off included reduced consumption, increased labor supply, and/or increased pollution. The variation with population size of the first best levels of consumption, labor, and emissions indicated that per capita consumption and emissions were decreasing, while per capita labor and aggregate emissions were more ambiguous. An optimal emission tax had to be increased as the population grew. It was considered how the first best allocation and Pigouvian tax varied with population size. Consumers are unambiguously worse off when the population is larger, but not necessarily due to increased pollution. In fact, optimal policy on how pollution and labor should vary with population size is very sensitive to preferences and technology. The best response to an increase in population size might be either to increase or to decrease emissions and/or labor, depending on functional forms and parameters. However, given separable preferences and some convexity, the optimal emissions tax increases and the first best level of per capita consumption decreased with population size.
Boulder, Colorado, National Audubon Society, Human Population and Resource Use Dept., . 39 p.Human population growth and energy consumption will radically alter the quality of life for Americans, even though most Americans do not experience the poverty and crude life conditions suffered by most inhabitants of the world. Americans can limit family size to two children in the present generation. If world fertility declines from 4.3 in 1990 to 2.3 by 2025, and energy consumption in developing countries does not increase, world energy consumption will increase by 33% by 2025, or 22.5 billion barrels of oil annually. 55% more energy will be consumed if developed countries halve their energy consumption and developing countries double theirs. The recommendations are made to increase energy efficiency and conservation, promote the transition to alternative energy sources, exercise international leadership in energy, and stabilize population growth. The US should promote energy efficiency in buildings. For instance, 80% of every energy dollar is spent on lighting. Heating units can be replaced with more efficient models. Fluorescent light bulbs should replace incandescent bulbs. 65% of US oil consumption is due to automobiles. A change to more efficient models with fuel rates of 50 miles per gallon is feasible. The federal government should set an example by buying right. Photovoltaic and other alternative energy sources should be encouraged. The price of energy should reflect its true cost. Incentives can work. Foreign assistance and multilateral banks should promote energy efficiency, particularly in rural areas of developing countries. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change should be implemented fully by the US government. The social status of women should be improved, and funding for family planning and contraceptive research should be increased. Programs should be developed to suit the needs, values, and cultures of populations. Foreign policies must recognize population as a major factor in sustainable development and not solely as a developing country problem. For example, the impact on the environment is the same for 100 births in Bangladesh as it is for only one birth in the US. US teenage pregnancies result in many unwed mothers and unwanted births. The 1992 Earth Summit established that sustainable development and new models of energy use must be implemented.
AMBIO. 1992 Feb; 21(1):56-62.Since 1960, The Republic of Korea has experienced 1 of the most spectacular levels of economic development in the world. At the same time, it experienced 1 of the most rapid demographic transitions from high to extremely low levels of fertility and mortality. These changes had profound impact on all aspects of life for the Koreans. The social norms of extended family gave way to nuclear families; the reduction in family size combined with a rise in income led to changes in the lifestyle and consumption patterns of Koreans. These changes, together with rapid industrialization resulted in greater demands on the use of natural resources. As a result, the environmental degradation and, therefore, levels of all kinds of pollution (air, water, and waste) have been the consequence. The gains from slower population growth rates have thus been partially offset by these trends. Efforts must be directed toward informing and educating the people about the sustainable use of resources, especially when a range of opportunities becomes available due to a rise in income and reduction in family size. (author's modified)
WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS QUARTERLY. RAPPORT TRIMESTRIEL DE STATISTIQUES SANITAIRES MONDIALES. 1991; 44(4):189-97.The world's urban population, at 2048 million in 1985 is projected to increase by 56% to 3197 million by 2000, and another 72% to 5.493 million by 2025. This urbanization will grow by natural increase, rural-urban migration, and declining mortality. 28 mega-cities of >8 million are expected by 2000. In many Latin American countries cities will account for most of the population increase; in parts of Africa, Asia and China, spectacular increases in urban population is expected. In many of these areas the phenomenon called the "demographic trap" rather than a proper demographic transition seems to be occurring, that is stagnation in the phase of high fertility despite a decline in death rates. The patterns of urbanization peculiar to regions and continents are described, such as the "core regions" around Buenos Aires and Mexico City. Unlike the historical urbanization that accompanied the Western industrial revolution, current urbanization is not driven by economic opportunity but by rural poverty and ecological collapse, and aggravated by recession, external debt, natural disasters and welfare, among other factors. It is estimated that 50% of urban dwellers will subsist in extreme poverty, and they will account for 25% of the world's population by 2000. 30% of these households are headed by women, >50% in Latin America. Policies that governments have applied unsuccessfully to reverse urbanization include disincentives for rural urban migration, land reform, rural minimum wage, tax reform, agricultural subsidies, an urban decentralization settlement. More effective policies are integrated rural and urban development, coercive measures to prevent migration accompanied by economic incentives for rural areas, and resettlement schemes. Some positive cultural developments in urban slums are cited as stemming from the resourcefulness of the squatters, such as growing food.
Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1989. , iii, 139 p. (Order No. 8923677)A population of low-income urban squatter households in Amman, Jordan, many of whom are migrants, is used to investigate the degree to which fertility has been affected by exposure to the influence of an urban environment. The data are provided by 2 surveys, carried out in 1981 and 1985, before and after a substantial upgrading program was carried out. The program included the provision of physical and social infrastructure (paved roads, piped water and sewerage, electricity, community centers, and women's training centers, etc.). Since the program also provided the opportunity for households to purchase the land on which they had settled, it represented altogether a substantial change in living conditions and choices for the study population. The surveys thus allowed the investigation of the effects of land ownership on fertility; the factors involved were those such as ethnic background, presence of extended family members in the household, as well as urban exposure. The aspects of fertility which were investigated were: cumulative fertility--analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on cross-sectoral data; contraceptive use--examined using logit and probit analysis as well as OLS, on a subsample of the study population; and current fertility--investigated using Poisson regression to analyze the number of children born between the 2 surveys and the open interval at the time of the 2nd survey to analyze OLS regression. The various analyses do not support a hypothesis of urban exposure per se as being negatively associated with fertility. Apart from the expected findings regarding the biological variables included (age, marital status), and the pervasive negative effect of women's education, the variables tested tend to influence fertility in a direction contrary to expectation. "Higher status" variables such as land ownership, skilled occupation of household head, and income, tend to operate in the direction of allowing larger numbers of children. Contraceptive use levels are higher than would be expected on the basis of observed fertility levels, but are much lower than the potential need for birth spacing, given the relatively large proportion of the women surveyed who did not desire a pregnancy. What emerges, essentially, is that those households studied still either have a large desired family size, due possibly to cultural factors not seen in the analysis (those that would affect the entire population) or that their altered perceptions concerning number of children have not yet been translated into lower fertility. The main policy implications for this population are: changes in dwelling ownership, household head's job status, and household income are unlikely to, on their own, have a strong negative impact on fertility in the shortterm. There is considerable scope, however, for reducing fertility among the older age groups. In view of the likelihood of a decline in breastfeeding popularity, the potential demand for birth spacing, and the positive correlation between contraceptive use and income in the study population, reductions in cost and increased availability of contraceptive methods as part of a healthcare program would likely be beneficial. (author's modified)
WORLD DEVELOPMENT. 1990 Apr; 18(4):513-27.As the literature on fuelwood in Africa has increased in quality over the recent past, it has become evident that generalizations about Africa's fuelwood crisis must be treated with great caution. As a consequence, some commonly held beliefs may now need to be reexamined. This paper subjects 3 such beliefs, the existence of a linear relationship between population growth, fuelwood consumption, and rates of fuelwood-induced deforestation; that fuelwood-induced deforestation approximates ripples spreading outward from urban consuming centers; and that land conversion to agriculture always reduces fuelwood supplies, to close scrutiny. The 2nd and 3rd assumptions are analyzed in light of recently collected field data in the Kano area of northern Nigeria; while the examination of the 1st is based on a reinterpretation of information from a wider range of environments. The paper concludes that although available data are inadequate for definitive conclusions to be drawn on the 1st count, it seems likely that variations arising out of demographic differentials in urban populations, in particular, changes in per capita fuelwood consumption resulting from changes in consuming unit size, distort direct links between population growth rates and rates of increase in fuel consumption. Further information on the demographic characteristics of African towns is needed for meaningful analyses of temporal changes in the affected variables to be undertaken. The 2nd and 3rd assumptions are found to not be applicable in the Kano case. However, this should be interpreted much less as justification for their outright rejection than as a reminder of the great potential of time- and space-specific considerations for rendering universal rules locally inapplicable. (author's)
TROPICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL MEDICINE. 1990 Jul; 42(3):197-206.An exposition of the ethical arguments for placing sustainability as a priority in implementation of public health programs is made, considering the definition of sustainability, theories of the demographic transition, the ecological transition, the relationship between sustainability of the ecosystem and the human birth rate, types of ethical conflicts over the issue of child survival interventions, a suggested way of resolving the dilemma and a possible paradigm shift constituting a scientific revolution in the field of international health. Sustainability means maintenance of the capacity to support life in quantity and variety. Although most demographers are familiar with Notestein's classic definition of the demographic transition, many are unaware of the likelihood that many countries will become entrapped in stage 2, to the extent that they destroy their ecosystem and thus their population, the "demographic trap." The 3 stages of the ecological transition are 1) expanding human demands with sustainable yield; 2) excess human demands with consumption of biological reserves; 3) ecosystem collapse and death or exit of the human population. An early sign of the 3rd phase is a rise in infant mortality. Sustainability can be increased by adjusting the environment or by lowering human birth rate, with Chinese rigor in need be, or by adding sustainable elements to the system that outweigh de-sustaining ones. Unfortunately there are too many unremovable constraints, and not enough time to wait for socioeconomic gains to lower birth rates. The current attempt by UNICEF to lower the child death rate to effect a demographic transition is attractive but unsound, since it has been proven that numbers of child deaths do not affect family fertility sufficiently. Reducing child deaths will only make population pressure worse. Ethical principles arguing for lowering child deaths have been articulated in Western culture, but now the challenge of sustainability may outweigh them all. It may be possible to apply sustaining measures to countries where possible, but for others, it is argued that child survival measures should not be instituted. These would only make the demographic transition impossible and prolong human misery for larger numbers. For these societies, only the kind of care Mother Teresa gives is appropriate. Finally, residents of developed countries must assume a "deep green" behavior code, a sustainable consumption level. WHO's definition of health should be updated to "Health is a sustainable state of complete...well-being."
JOURNAL OF POPULATION STUDIES (TAIWAN). 1989 Jun; (12):67-89.This study uses KAP data sets to analyze the determinants of Taiwan's fertility decline between 1964 and 1980 and to evaluate whether innovation-diffusion or adjustment or both can be applied to explain the transition. Furthermore, this study examines the roles of innovation-diffusion and adjustment in the stages of the transition of Taiwan's fertility from high to low levels. The 5 cross-sectional KAP surveys, collected by the Taiwan Provincial Institute of Family Planning and used in this study, focus on the fertility behavior of married women living in Taiwan in 1965, 1969, 1970, 1973, and 1980. Analyses of both cross-sectional and pooled-time series data sets provide evidence to support the theory that demand-side diffusion of birth control behavior from urban centers to more rural areas plays an important role in Taiwan's fertility transition. Contradictory findings on the supply-side of diffusion suggest that family planning programs have no consistently direct effects on fertility behavior. The adjustment variables of wife's education, husband's occupation, and the index of consumer goods generally have important influences on changes in family size, suggesting that the adjustment model has significant impact on fertility transition in Taiwan. Duration of marriage, not surprisingly, is the most powerful explanatory variable. Overall, the innovation-diffusion model is more useful in explaining Taiwanese fertility transition in the 1960s, and the adjustment model plays a more important role throughout the late years.
[Unpublished] 1989. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Baltimore, Maryland, March 30 - April 1, 1989. 30 p.The relationship of population to the Industrial Revolution is such that population density and economic development in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe were causes of each other. Industrialized society allowed larger numbers of people to survive than did agrarian society. Greater agricultural yields produced by fewer people permitted more people for both non-agricultural activities and for creating demand for more products. The population in Europe during this period increased exponentially because of a plummeting death rate, higher marriage rates and birth rates, and increased life expectancy. The precise causes of these trends are still unclear, but changes in climate and rodent disease vectors and improved nutrition, transportation, and public health are cited. Contrary to accepted demographic theory, this increase in population density lead to the 1st permanent increase in living standards for the bulk of the population to above subsistence levels. Thus more people, wealthy and poor, were enabled to live. The Industrial Revolution was both a cause and a consequence of an exodus from farming. More consumers demanded better food, and thus created a demand for agricultural technology. Similar demand relationships appeared for energy development, physical and social capital, infrastructure, and social and political organization. Population density lead to better organized markets. Why an industrial revolution did not occur in China or India was probably due to serfdom and social immobility. Demographic change was an indispensable element woven into the fabric of the Industrial Revolution.
Bangkok, Thailand, United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP], 1987. 10 p. (Population Research Leads No. 25)The Asian and Pacific region's decline in fertility and mortality over the past 2 decades has resulted in large shifts in the age composition of national populations, which affects planning in nearly every social and economic sector. For the region as a whole, the crude birthrate is estimated to have remained at 40/1000 population until about 1970, declining to 27/1000 in the 1980-85 period. This rapid decline in fertility has complicated population policy formulation and the integration of population factors into development planning. The demonstration that government programs could alter demographic trends meant that population no longer could be treated simply as an exogenous variable in development planning. The combination of previously high fertility and declining mortality, which particularly affected the survival rates of infants and children, resulted in a small increase in the proportion of the population of the region below age 15, from 37% in 1950 to 41% in 1970. By 1985, the latter proportion dropped to 35% because of declining fertility. Due to the previously high fertility and more recent declines, the proportion of the population in working-age groups increased from 56% in 1975 to 61% in 1985 and is projected to reach 65% by 2000. Providing employment for this rapidly increasing population of labor-force age is a major challenge for countries of the region over the next several decades. For those few countries in the Asian and Pacific regions who had low birth and death rates by 1960, the current issue is demographic aging. As the rate of population growth per se decreases in importance as a planning goal, other aspects of population, such as spatial distribution, take on more significance. The rising marriage age and organized family planning programs were the primary causes of fertility decline in the region, although the decline was limited in South Asia where large pockets of high fertility (a total fertility rate in the range of 5-7) remain. The contribution of rising marriage age to further fertility decline is approaching the limit, except in the countries of South Asia where the marriage age continues to be below 20 years. In most of the countries of the region, the potential also exists for a 2nd generation "baby boom" resulting from a changing age structure. This would in turn slow down the pace of fertility decline unless compensated by a rapid fall in fertility of younger married women caused by successful implementation of family planning programs and other associated socioeconomic changes. Aside from the straightforward implications of demographic change, changes in age structure also imply changes in consumption patterns. Thus, planning for production, consumption, investment, and distribution always should incorporate changes in age structure.
[Is population growth the source of misery in the Third World?] La croissance demographique est-elle responsable de la misere du Tiers Monde.
Recherche. 1985 Nov; 16(171):1380-1.The developing countries experienced their most rapid demographic growth of 2-4% per year between 1950-80, with the highest rates occurring in the 1960s and a slight easing taking place in the 1970s. The most direct way of assessing whether this extraordinary demographic growth impeded economic development is to calculate the correlation between demographic growth and the per capita gross national product (GNP) at constant prices. The average annual growth of GNP in developing countries from 1950-75 was 3.4% compared to 3.2% in developed countries, while the rates from 1975-80 were 2.4% and 2.8% respectively. The average rate of growth of GNP in developed countries was only about 2% in the 1st half of this century, while that in many developing countries has been zero for centuries. The postwar demographic explosion therefore coincided with an unprecedented economic explosion. Between 1950-80, the population of India and China increased by about 800 million persons, but economic progress even in India was substantial. China and Pakistan saw a doubling and Mexico and Brazil a tripling of per capita income. This undeniable economic progress was not achieved without some cost; it was accompanied by increased debt and has been very unequal between countries. Outside of some extreme cases like Bangladesh where demographic pressure threatens the equilibrium between population and resources, it is most often the less densely populated African countries which are most backward. Factors of underdevelopment appear to be more often political instability and strategic-errors such as insufficient investment in agriculture and general infrastructure than demographic constraints. The correlation between mortality decline and increased per capita income was very strong, especially in the 1950s and 1960s and especially in Japan and the newly industrializing Asian countries and Latin America. The growth of income permitted improved nutrition and education of the population, which in turn stimulated growth of income and population. In view of the data, there appears to be a contradiction between the historic reality and the pessimism of postwar economic literature. The error appears to have arisen because of a failure to recognize that not only do economic and demographic growth have common structural roots, but they are susceptible to dynamic and cumulative interaction. Also, the overattention to high fertility led to neglect of the stimulating role of mortality decline, which is closely related to economic development. Growth of income and growth of population are a priori associated: they are 2 facets of the same development process.
In: Population policies in Asian countries: contemporary targets, measures and effects, edited by Hermann Schubnell. Lubeck, Germany, Federal Republic of, Drager Foundation, 1984. 429-43. (Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs no. 57)Population policy conforming to socioeconomic development needs to be broadly defined and organized. This term is used as a collective notion for all sorts of political action designed to influence population trends according to specific objectives. The objectives, which are usually expressed in terms of demographic numbers or rates and related to a fixed period, need to meet 2 main requirements: they must comply with anticipated socioeconomic change on the macro-level as well as with needs and interests on the micro-level. When designing population policies, both levels must be considered, the one for determining desirable objectives and the other for choosing suitable strategies to realize the objectives. The discussion first examines the impact of population growth on the macro-level and then draws conclusions for appropriate policies. All developing countries are working for quick modernization and all want to raise productivity, to overcome economic dualism, and to promote sectoral and regional integration. Considering these common goals, the discussion turns to the question of how population trends at the various stages of transition correspond with the need to speed up socioeconomic progress. Leaving migration aside, the salient demographic factors to be considered are fertility and mortality. All economic problems caused by population growth arise from the respective conditions of births and deaths. These conditions are also the targets of population policy. A fall in mortality is a prerequisite for socioeconomic change. Mortality decline should be promoted despite the fact that the population will then grow more quickly. The problems which plague most developing countries with rapid population growth such as severe underemployment, unemployment and excessive urbanization are supported by persistent high fertility, but not by falling mortality. Only if fertility decreases will the other important d emographic obstacle to economic progress, i.e., the high dependency burden, become smaller. To show the basic effects of various fertility and mortality levels on such economically relevant facts as length of working life, youth dependency, and costs of raising the young generation, 3 models are used which correspond to 3 stages of demographic transition -- ongoing transition, advanced transition, and late transitional stage. The exercise shows that birth decline tends to improve consumption standards and in this way to influence economic development before the labor force is directly affected. Almost all developing countries need population policies to set in motion and speed up a fall in birth of either total population or certain population groups. Communal self help activities are particularly useful as part of programs aimed at inducing and speeding up fertility declines. Measures in the field of family planning, which are now the core of the programs, will be accepted more readily if families regard them as a means of improving social well-being.
In: Luz y sombra de la vida: mortalidad y fecundidad en Bolivia [Light and dark of life: mortality and fertility in Bolivia], by Carlos Carafa, Gerardo Gonzalez, Valeria Ramirez, Rene Pereira, and Hugo Torrez La Paz, Bolivia, Proyecto Politicas de Poblacion, 1983. 1-42.Bolivia's population policy must be framed within 3 contexts: an economic and family structure which conditions production and reproduction; as part of Latin America, which is characterized by dependent development, structural heterogeneity, and social differentiation; and as a particlar socioeconomic structure with specific population dynamics. As a peripheral country subordinate to the developed capitalist nations, Bolivia has undergone a process of social differentiation. Mining, which has shaped the economy and society, is declining. Agriculture dominates in terms of jobs, but peasant farms cannot compete with agribusiness. A weak manufacturing sector and increasing urbanization have created vast underemployment and a swollen tertiary sector. Urban-rural disparities have widened. Only 2% of all rural health care needs are met; water and sewerage services are similarly deficient. As the main investor and largest employer, the government can guide development, but its policies have favored agroindustrial interests at the expense of the small farmer. These realities suggest the following working hypotheses: 1) the size, structure and growth of the population determines both the supply of labor and the demand for goods and services. 2) Bolivia's unbalanced occupational structure heightens class differences and disparities in life chances; reproductive patterns reflect the population's social and material circumstances. 3) Outmigration is the peasantry's response to the crisis of the rural areas; migratory movement follow economic activity. 4) Mortality and fertility differentials reflect socioeconomic and cultural differences; rural families see children as assets; 5) The costs fo bearing and raising children do not affect reproductive decisions among the peasantry. 6) Early marriages, low use of contraceptives, low education all interact to raise the fertility of peasant women; these factors are weaker among salaried workers. 7) Urbanization unleashes a number of changes which depress fertility; traditional values are eclipsed by the costs of childbearing. 8) Mortality risks are higher in the rural areas and affect all subgrups; urban areas exhibit greater variation. 9) Disparities in death and fertility rates suggest that different subgroups are at different stages of the demographic transition. Bolivia as a whole is in the 1st stage of this process.
[Causal hypotheses on fertility: the preponderant role of the family unit] Hipotesis causales sobre fecundidad: el papel preponderante de la unidad familiar.
Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 1983 Jan-Mar; (21):83-101.This article reviews fertility theories proposed by economists, sociologists, and demographers over the past few decades and assesses their suitability to the Spanish case. In the early 1960s the foundations for the so-called new home economics were laid by Becker and others of the Chicago school of microeconomics. Becker held that once contraception became available to all population groups, childbearing decisions would be made in the same way as those for any other consumer good. Becker concluded that income is a direct function of the number of children and their quality. In 1962 Friedmann, within the same model, argued that children like automobiles or any other good-were associated with benefits as well as costs. Judith Blake in 1968 criticized both positions, pointing out that the rich have not had more children in any developed society and that the acquisition of children is not under the same cost constraints as that of other goods. Modifications of the theory by Becker gave greater importance to sociological variables. Leibenstein proposed an explanatory model which related fertility change to economic development through an examination of costs and benefits at different stages. Easterlin used the theory of Kuznets cycles to argue that the size of a cohort is related negatively to its fertility, with the fundamental variable being the labor market. He later proposed a more elaborate model that synthesized economic and sociological arguments and introduced new variables with emphasis on endogenous preferences and ferility. Use of sociological concepts such as "tastes", "desires", and "behavior", and of the term "relative" to suggest subjective perceptions depending on cultural context has become common in economic theories of fertility. The only fertility model elaborated in demography is that of the demographic transition, which has been criticized for being more descriptive than explanatory. In sociology a series of variables have been related to fertility, with only partial success. Some of the hypotheses were studied by means of large surveys, a program culmintting in the World Fertility Survey. Fertility differentials by income and rural or urban residence have been the only 2 generalizable findings to date. Finally, the analytical model of Davis and Blake listed the intermediate variables through which social factors were related to fertility. Sociological explanations are increasing in importance for nonsociologists, especially economists and demographers, and family structure in particular has assumed strategic importance. A scarcity of empirical work on fertility in Spain has hampered testing of fertility theories there. Hypotheses bearing on the determinants of fertility decisions should be tested in Spain, with preconscious-factors such as imitation, pressure exerted by the family and social circle, and affective relations as well as structural factors examined.