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Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1989. , iii, 139 p. (Order No. 8923677)A population of low-income urban squatter households in Amman, Jordan, many of whom are migrants, is used to investigate the degree to which fertility has been affected by exposure to the influence of an urban environment. The data are provided by 2 surveys, carried out in 1981 and 1985, before and after a substantial upgrading program was carried out. The program included the provision of physical and social infrastructure (paved roads, piped water and sewerage, electricity, community centers, and women's training centers, etc.). Since the program also provided the opportunity for households to purchase the land on which they had settled, it represented altogether a substantial change in living conditions and choices for the study population. The surveys thus allowed the investigation of the effects of land ownership on fertility; the factors involved were those such as ethnic background, presence of extended family members in the household, as well as urban exposure. The aspects of fertility which were investigated were: cumulative fertility--analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on cross-sectoral data; contraceptive use--examined using logit and probit analysis as well as OLS, on a subsample of the study population; and current fertility--investigated using Poisson regression to analyze the number of children born between the 2 surveys and the open interval at the time of the 2nd survey to analyze OLS regression. The various analyses do not support a hypothesis of urban exposure per se as being negatively associated with fertility. Apart from the expected findings regarding the biological variables included (age, marital status), and the pervasive negative effect of women's education, the variables tested tend to influence fertility in a direction contrary to expectation. "Higher status" variables such as land ownership, skilled occupation of household head, and income, tend to operate in the direction of allowing larger numbers of children. Contraceptive use levels are higher than would be expected on the basis of observed fertility levels, but are much lower than the potential need for birth spacing, given the relatively large proportion of the women surveyed who did not desire a pregnancy. What emerges, essentially, is that those households studied still either have a large desired family size, due possibly to cultural factors not seen in the analysis (those that would affect the entire population) or that their altered perceptions concerning number of children have not yet been translated into lower fertility. The main policy implications for this population are: changes in dwelling ownership, household head's job status, and household income are unlikely to, on their own, have a strong negative impact on fertility in the shortterm. There is considerable scope, however, for reducing fertility among the older age groups. In view of the likelihood of a decline in breastfeeding popularity, the potential demand for birth spacing, and the positive correlation between contraceptive use and income in the study population, reductions in cost and increased availability of contraceptive methods as part of a healthcare program would likely be beneficial. (author's modified)
Austin, Texas, University of Texas, Texas Population Research Center, 1990. 19,  p. (Texas Population Research Center Paper No. 12.02)This paper offers a new perspective on the fertility decline in Brazil, and argues that a number of government policies have had substantial unintended and unanticipated effects on the rapid changes in reproductive behavior that have taken place since 1960. The four policy areas we focus on are consumer credit, telecommunications, social security, and health care....We address the question of how Brazilian development yielded values and norms consistent with controlled fertility. We claim to have identified significant institutional changes that had a direct and immediate bearing on the way people thought about sex and reproduction, and that facilitated the massive adoption of modern contraception. Our approach to the role of the state differs from that of most Brazilians in that we focus on the unintended effects of real policies rather than the intended effects of a non-policy....[Data are from] the 1980 Northeastern Brazil Survey of Maternal Child Health/Family Planning.... This paper was originally presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America (see Population Index, Vol. 56, No. 3, Fall 1990, p. 400).
In: Demographic change and economic development, edited by Alois Wenig and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany, Springer-Verlag, 1989. 152-65. (Studies in Contemporary Economics)The focus of this study concerns a family consisting of 2 altruistic agents, the parent and the child. The model is cast within a 2-period framework where, in the 1st period, the parent decides on the allocation of his resources between consumption and investment in the human capital of his child, and, in the 2nd period, the child has to decide how much of his (acquired through the parent's transfer) wealth to give away for the support of his parent. The 1st result establishes that the outcome of the game of transfer is inefficient; the possible means of attaining efficiency are investigated. Finally, the impact of uncertainty regarding a child's preferences on the game equilibrium are analyzed.
PAKISTAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1988 Autumn; 27(3):229-76.A subjective equilibrium model was constructed, integrating economic and demographic behavior of agricultural households, using data from a special Philippine survey. The data were collected in 1978-1979 from 590 households in Misamis Oriental, northern Mindanao Island, sponsored by FAO/UNFPA. Households were categorized into large and small farms, and owner and tenant-operated farms. The utility maximization hypothesis was tested and could not be rejected for any socioeconomic groups. The major difference was the input of child labor. The utility maximization model also revealed demands for leisure and commodities consistent with higher valuation of children in tenant and small households compared to owner and large households. The analysis of household equilibrium with demographic characteristics suggests important policy implications: that improved endowments at the bottom could trickle up to result in higher production and lower population growth.
Chicago, Illinois, National Opinion Research Center, Economics Research Center, 1988. 30,  p. (Discussion Paper No. 88-8.)Altruistic parents make choices of family size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. The authors apply this framework to a closed economy, where the determination of interest rates and wage rates is simultaneous with the determination of population growth and the accumulation of capital. Thus, the literature on optimal economic growth to allow for optimizing choices of fertility and intergenerational transfers is extended. The authors use the model to assess the effects of child-rearing costs, the tax system, the conditions of technology and preferences, and shocks to the initial levels of population and the capital stock. (author's)
TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY. 1987; 9(3-4):261-73.Technology as a factor influencing fertility is discussed. The author argues that "technological change affects the demand for children, and hence for fertility regulation, both by directly altering the expected benefits and costs of children to parents and by influencing the cultural and social structural underpinnings of that economic calculus. Routes of that influence include the demand for education generated by competition for modern sector employment, the consumerist values and lifestyles conveyed by communications media, and the erosion of community and kin pressures on individual behavior in a more mobile and more commercialized society. Such forces for behavioral change, it is argued, are more powerful factors in fertility decline than either the 'social technology' of contraceptive service delivery (family planning programs) or improvements in the technology of contraception itself." (EXCERPT)
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. 1988 Feb; 103(1):1-25.An economic analysis of the linkages in fertility rates and capital accumulation across generations is developed, considering the determination of fertility and capital accumulation in each generation when wage rates and interest rates are parameters to each family and to open economies. The model is based on the assumption that parents are altruistic toward their children. The utility of parents depends on their own consumption and on the utility of each child and the number of children. By relating the utility of children to their own consumption and to the utility of their children, a dynastic utility function was obtained that depends on the consumption and number of descendants in all generations. The term "reformulation" was used because of the emphasis on dynastic utility model of altruism toward children and deriving the budget constraint and utility function of a dynastic family, the model was applied to the Great Depression and World War II. The 1st-order conditions to maximize utility imply that fertility in any generation depends positively on the real interest rate and the degree of altruism and negatively on the rate of growth in per capita consumption from 1 generation to the next. Consumption of each descendant depends positively on the net cost of rearing a desdendant. Applying the model, it is shown that the analysis is consistent with baby busts during the Depression and the war and with a baby boom after the war. The effects on fertility of child mortality, subsidies to (or taxes on) children, and social security and other transfer payments to adults were considered. The demand for surviving children rises during the transition to low child mortality, but demand for survivors return to its prior level once mortality stabilizes at a low level. Fertility falls in response to declines in international real interest rates and increases in an economy's rate of technological progress. Extending the analysis to include life-cycle variations in consumption, earnings, and utility, fertility emerges as a function of expenditures on the subsistence and human capital of children but not of expenditures that simply raise the consumption of children. The path of aggregate consumption in demographic steady states does not depend on interest rates, time preference, or other determinants of life-cycle variations in consumption.
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1986; 12 Suppl:139-54.Mean family size in the industrial nations is less than the 2.1 children per couple needed for the population to remain constant over the long run. The countries of Western Europe have a mean family size of about 1.61 children per couple, with West Germany as low as 1.42, Japan at 1.71, Europe as a whole at 1.9, and the US at 1.85. The decline of births is related to 1) contraception, for the 1st time controlled by women; 2) women's employment outside the home; and 3) the democratization of decision making within couples. Work opportunities for women lower the birth rate, but they do so by freeing women from the dictatorship of men. The activity of child rearing is compared with other uncompensated activities that occupy people's leisure on the one hand, and with paid work in the other hand. Clerical work, women's current alternative to the 19th century factory, has agreeable social elements combined with tolerable and limited duties. Staying home with children can be lonely 7 days a week; it lacks crisp challenges and interpersonal relations. If parents do not spend their money and time producing children, they can apply both money and time to the purchase and use of dazzling array of other goods. Children are no longer investments in the traditional sense because 1) children are in large part no longer formed by parents but by television, schools, and peer groups; and 2) parents rely on their own savings and the state to provide for their old age. A feature of earlier high fertility was the inculcation of differentiated gender roles starting long before marriage. Women has few choices beyond raising children. The spread of high-fertility cultures did not need to be planned by anyone; sheer aithmetic worked at 2nd remove to make male dominance universal. This article argues that under modern conditions there will be few children.
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1986; 12 Suppl:69-76.The economic approach to fertility emphasizes the effects of parents' income and the cost of rearing children. With a few exceptions, this approach has neglected the analytical links between decisions by different generations of the same family. This article develops the implications of altruism toward children, where utility of parents depends on their own consumption, their fertility, and the utility of each of their children. Altruism toward children implies that the welfare of all generations of a family is linked through a dynastic utility function that depends on the consumption, fertility, and number of descendants in all generations. The head of a dynastic family acts as if he maximizes dynastic utility subject to a dynastic budget constraint, which involves the wealth inherited by the head, interest rates, the cost of rearing children in all generations, and the earnings of all descendants. The authors neglect uncertainty, marriage, the spacing of births, and capital-market restraints over life cycles and across generations. Nevertheless, even a highly simplified model of altruism toward children and the behavior of dynastic families appears to us to capture important important aspects of the dynamic behavior of fertility and consumption. If so, a new approach would be warranted to the analysis of trends and long-term fluctuations in fertility, population growth, and consumption.
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS. 1985 Aug; 18(2-3):243-52.That the introduction of a means for transferring present to future consumption other than children in a developing country will reduce the rate of population growth is shown to depend crucially on the assumption that parents do not care about the numbers or the welfare of the children they have. When parents do care, the conclusion no longer unambiguously follows because the new means for providing for parents' old age leads to a positive income effect. (EXCERPT)
Population and Development Review. 1984 Mar; 10(1):41-54.Intergenerational exchanges may have powerful effects on the long run growth of the economy in terms of both physical and human wealth accumulation per capita and of population growth. This discussion explores the choice structure underlying the relations between generations with particular attention directed to the interaction of intergenerational wealth flows and parental control of the activities of offspring. Key to the analysis is the treatment of families as collections of individuals with potentially strong interdependence of utilities but with distinct preferences and economic constraints. Parental control of offspring is an economic outcome, subject to shifts in market opportunities and the volume and form of intergenerational wealth flows. This view of the family process opens up a wide range of problems to economic analysis, including age of independence of offspring, extent of child labor, and pension value of offspring. In addition, it recasts family decisions in such areas as schooling, marriage, and fertility in a potentially useful way. The 1st section discusses a formal model of family control and intergenerational consumption shares as a function of initial resource endowments and levels of altruism. A simple economy in which income is the only economic good is considered. The discussion then describes a more general model of the family allocation process, which allows exchange as well as gift relationships among family members. A 2nd good, labeled child services, is introduced. It assumes that the younger generation holds property rights in this service flow. If the younger generation controls income as well as child services, a gift or altruism process will occur. If the older generation controls income, an exchange process within an altruistic framework will occur. A bargaining model of this family exchange is elaborated, and implications for household structure are derived. Recognition that intergenerational transfers involve a complex mixture of gifts and exchanges, induced by altruism and self-interest, suggests that a variety of economic and family models may be recast. Macroeconomic models based on unidirectional intergenerational concepts may be usefully reconsidered in a broader framework. The models discussed also point the way to a more complete analysis of the system of family, government, and market.
[Obstacles in merging the population and production programs in Rwanda] Les obstacles lies au programme de population et de production au Rwanda
Famille, Sante, Developpement/Imbonezamulyango. 1985 Aug; (3):44-9.One of the problems currently observed in Rwanda is that the most densely populated prefectures do not show better agricultural production. Agricultural technology having reached a logistical plateau, and secondary and tertiary industries for the absorption of the surplus labor force being absent, there is considerable population pressure. It is naive to believe that the now densely populated lands will be induced through radical improvement of exploitation technology to be productive to the point of maintaining more than 9,000,000 people, the projected population of Rwanda for the year 2000. 13.6% of the population is now unemployed, and most agricultural workers produce little surplus. There would be hope for producing a national agricultural surplus by the year 2000, saleable abroad and having as a result the slow establishment of an industrial sector, only if the efforts of a family planning program plateaued the population at 8,000,000. A chart outlines the comulative economic effects of children on a single family, showing considerable financial strain of only 4 children. Bold steps to counter pronatalist attitudes might include elimination of tax benefits for large families, elimination of an identity card with spaces for 12 births and replacing it with one providing for differentials in consumer prices for numbers of children, bonuses for older marriages, and minimum wealth provisions for marriages.
In: Luz y sombra de la vida: mortalidad y fecundidad en Bolivia [Light and dark of life: mortality and fertility in Bolivia], by Carlos Carafa, Gerardo Gonzalez, Valeria Ramirez, Rene Pereira, and Hugo Torrez La Paz, Bolivia, Proyecto Politicas de Poblacion, 1983. 1-42.Bolivia's population policy must be framed within 3 contexts: an economic and family structure which conditions production and reproduction; as part of Latin America, which is characterized by dependent development, structural heterogeneity, and social differentiation; and as a particlar socioeconomic structure with specific population dynamics. As a peripheral country subordinate to the developed capitalist nations, Bolivia has undergone a process of social differentiation. Mining, which has shaped the economy and society, is declining. Agriculture dominates in terms of jobs, but peasant farms cannot compete with agribusiness. A weak manufacturing sector and increasing urbanization have created vast underemployment and a swollen tertiary sector. Urban-rural disparities have widened. Only 2% of all rural health care needs are met; water and sewerage services are similarly deficient. As the main investor and largest employer, the government can guide development, but its policies have favored agroindustrial interests at the expense of the small farmer. These realities suggest the following working hypotheses: 1) the size, structure and growth of the population determines both the supply of labor and the demand for goods and services. 2) Bolivia's unbalanced occupational structure heightens class differences and disparities in life chances; reproductive patterns reflect the population's social and material circumstances. 3) Outmigration is the peasantry's response to the crisis of the rural areas; migratory movement follow economic activity. 4) Mortality and fertility differentials reflect socioeconomic and cultural differences; rural families see children as assets; 5) The costs fo bearing and raising children do not affect reproductive decisions among the peasantry. 6) Early marriages, low use of contraceptives, low education all interact to raise the fertility of peasant women; these factors are weaker among salaried workers. 7) Urbanization unleashes a number of changes which depress fertility; traditional values are eclipsed by the costs of childbearing. 8) Mortality risks are higher in the rural areas and affect all subgrups; urban areas exhibit greater variation. 9) Disparities in death and fertility rates suggest that different subgroups are at different stages of the demographic transition. Bolivia as a whole is in the 1st stage of this process.
An economic-demographic model of the agricultural household: the case of Northern Mindanao, the Philippines.
Stanford, Calif., Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1982. viii, 134 p. (Working paper, no. 8204)Add to my documents.
Consumption, family size, schooling and labour supply decisions: estimates of a linear expenditure system for Bangladesh.
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, Program for Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population, McMaster University, 1983. 48 p. (QSEP research report, no. 77)Add to my documents.
[Causal hypotheses on fertility: the preponderant role of the family unit] Hipotesis causales sobre fecundidad: el papel preponderante de la unidad familiar.
Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 1983 Jan-Mar; (21):83-101.This article reviews fertility theories proposed by economists, sociologists, and demographers over the past few decades and assesses their suitability to the Spanish case. In the early 1960s the foundations for the so-called new home economics were laid by Becker and others of the Chicago school of microeconomics. Becker held that once contraception became available to all population groups, childbearing decisions would be made in the same way as those for any other consumer good. Becker concluded that income is a direct function of the number of children and their quality. In 1962 Friedmann, within the same model, argued that children like automobiles or any other good-were associated with benefits as well as costs. Judith Blake in 1968 criticized both positions, pointing out that the rich have not had more children in any developed society and that the acquisition of children is not under the same cost constraints as that of other goods. Modifications of the theory by Becker gave greater importance to sociological variables. Leibenstein proposed an explanatory model which related fertility change to economic development through an examination of costs and benefits at different stages. Easterlin used the theory of Kuznets cycles to argue that the size of a cohort is related negatively to its fertility, with the fundamental variable being the labor market. He later proposed a more elaborate model that synthesized economic and sociological arguments and introduced new variables with emphasis on endogenous preferences and ferility. Use of sociological concepts such as "tastes", "desires", and "behavior", and of the term "relative" to suggest subjective perceptions depending on cultural context has become common in economic theories of fertility. The only fertility model elaborated in demography is that of the demographic transition, which has been criticized for being more descriptive than explanatory. In sociology a series of variables have been related to fertility, with only partial success. Some of the hypotheses were studied by means of large surveys, a program culmintting in the World Fertility Survey. Fertility differentials by income and rural or urban residence have been the only 2 generalizable findings to date. Finally, the analytical model of Davis and Blake listed the intermediate variables through which social factors were related to fertility. Sociological explanations are increasing in importance for nonsociologists, especially economists and demographers, and family structure in particular has assumed strategic importance. A scarcity of empirical work on fertility in Spain has hampered testing of fertility theories there. Hypotheses bearing on the determinants of fertility decisions should be tested in Spain, with preconscious-factors such as imitation, pressure exerted by the family and social circle, and affective relations as well as structural factors examined.