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In: Consumption, population, and sustainability: perspectives from science and religion, edited by Audrey R. Chapman, Rodney L. Petersen, and Barbara Smith-Moran. Washington, D.C., Island Press, 2000. 207-17.One way of assessing consumption is to consider whether a consumption choice or pattern may be beneficial or detrimental to a person's own well-being, which is apart from its effect on institutions, other people and the world. What role should goods and services play if our lives are to go well? What kinds of consumption are good for us? In seeking to answer these questions, the author begins by assessing the notions of materialism and antimaterialism. He states that getting clear on how these rival norms go wrong will help establish a more adequate consumption norm and a better conception of “well-being” In a subsequent exploration of the concept of well-being, it is noted that to be and to do well, is to function and to be capable of functioning in certain humanly good ways. This conception provides the basis for a general consumption norm. It is cited that one consumption pattern or choice is better than another if it does better in protecting and promoting a person's well-being. Such a consumption norm has sufficient content to rule out the one-sidedness of materialism and antimaterialism, and to permit "balancing acts", depending on a person's specific abilities, opportunities, and choices. Thus, wise consumption requires knowledge of ones' self and ones' society as well as choice in the light of that knowledge.
Cresskill, New Jersey, Hampton Press, 1995. xv, 171 p. (Quantitative Methods in Communication)Innovations, such as ideas, products, or opinions, spread or diffuse through society at a rate and specificity which can be understood by analyzing the pattern of communication (the social network) which exists between individuals in a social system. Analysis of such network models of diffusion reveals tipping points in the process that are studied through threshold models, which focus on individuals, and critical mass models, which describe social systems. Together, these models provide a comprehensive picture of how social systems determine social change. This book opens with an introduction which reviews the theory of diffusion of innovations, network analysis, and the three diffusion datasets used as examples. The concept of "contagion," or the specific process of innovation diffusion (also known as the "diffusion effect"), is defined. Chapter 2 provides a framework for understanding threshold and critical mass models by describing prior research on their effects. Chapter 3 describes relational diffusion network models, which maintain that individuals adopt innovations based on their direct relations with others in their social system. Structural diffusion network models, presented in chapter 4, hold that individuals adopt innovations based on their position in their social system, regardless of their direct ties to others. Chapter 5 covers threshold models of diffusion and introduces the notion that individuals may be innovative with respect to their personal network as well as to the social system. Chapter 6 deals with critical mass models of diffusion and points out that competing definitions of critical mass and a lack of clarity in critical mass research has hindered the theoretical development of these models. This chapter tests alternative models and shows how centralness and radiality of personal networks contribute to the critical mass. Chapter 7 develops a network threshold model which can be conceptualized in both relational and structural terms and which allows individual innovativeness to be measured relative to an individual's personal network or relative to a whole social system. This model can be used to predict diffusion, identify opinion leaders, understand the two-step flow model of opinion formulation, and determine the critical mass. Chapter 8 discusses other possible methods which are useful for understanding network models. The final chapter discusses applications, contrasts network thresholds with the classic diffusion model, and concludes that network characteristics are associated with adoption behavior at both the individual and the system level of analysis. The shortcomings of the modeling systems presented in this book and the limitations of the research are discussed, and indications for future research are given.
JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS. 1994 Feb; 7(1):49-62.A model of capital accumulation is built in relation with fertility and consumption. Avoiding [the imposition of] a direct analytical relationship between these three variables, the author studies the set of possible evolutions under the constraints imposed by the inertia of habit change. The conflict between the necessity to avoid impoverishment, the desire to increase consumption when possible and the reproduction intensity delineate the set of viable solutions and the set of attitudes leading to capital extinction. This qualitative view of change of behaviors provides an alternative explanation to historical fertility fluctuations outside the usual Easterlin framework. The geographical focus is on Western developed countries, with particular reference to Sweden. (EXCERPT)
Lancet. 1992 May 30; 339(8805):1347-8.Human history is 1 of increasing numbers, increasing consumption, and increasingly invasive and disruptive technologies. Mankind has already weathered 2 major crises. The 1st which arose because of the rising human population, was a shortage of natural food. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors overcame this food crisis by developing agricultural systems. The 2nd, a fuel crisis brought about by dwindling wood supplies, was solved by use of fossil fuels in the industrial revolution. We are now on the threshold of a 3rd turning point--an environmental crisis of waste and wasting rather than a resource shortage--which will lead either to our destruction or to a 3rd revolution. Paul Harrison believes that this revolution is in all our hands and is not merely the responsibility of the politicians. Central to the challenge for all of us is a change in values, from the notion that human beings are masters of the earth by right to the concept that we are stewards of the planet with which we have been entrusted. Harrison's assertion may sound overused and cliched but he is earnest in his belief that the environmental crisis will be the most serious that man has had to deal with and therefore must be tackled while there is still time. Governments certainly can act, for example, to improve education and healthcare for women with better choices and access to contraception, which has been shown to reduce the number of children. But we can also contribute individually by, for instance, turning lights off when leaving a room, choosing a fuel-efficient car, exerting consumer pressure to refuse unnecessary packaging, choosing recycled products when possible, and so on. Status ought to be determined by how little we damage the earth and not according to affluence and excess consumption. If we can take on board an altruistic ethic towards future generations and other species. Our children and grandchildren will not be able to ask "were you 1 of those who helped to destroy my future?". (full text) (1 reference cited in original document)
Life cycle savings and consumption constraints: theory, empirical evidence, and fiscal implications.
JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS. 1991; 4(3):233-55.Recent tests of both the pure and the extended life cycle hypothesis have generated inconclusive results on the life cycle behavior of the elderly. We extend the life cycle model by introducing a constraint on the physical consumption opportunities of the elderly which, if binding, imposes a consumption trajectory declining in age. This explains much of the received evidence on the elderly's consumption and savings behavior, in particular declining consumption, and increasing savings and wealth with increasing age. Our analysis of [Federal Republic of Germany] data gives additional support to our theory. We finally draw the implications of the theory on the incidence of consumption and income (wealth) taxes, and on the recent (inconclusive) tests of intergenerational altruism. (EXCERPT)
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University, Migration and Development Program, 1989 Apr. , 21 p. (Migration and Development Program Discussion Paper No. 43)If children confer new insurance benefits or old insurance benefits better, the demand for children may rise. Although it might be costlier to prepare children for providing new or better benefits, it might also be costlier to induce them to engage in this activity when the number of children is small. Hence, the possibility exists that the demand for children and consequently the level of fertility will rise. If, as tends to be the case in environments characterized by spatially covariant risks such as rural India, the insurance benefits are provided by daughters who, through their marriage, to locationally distant and dispersed households, facilitate income sharing and consumption smoothing, then more daughters (and more children), not less, would be required to create a spatially diversified, income-pooling family that can mitigate the hazards of agricultural production and reduce income variability. (author's)
[Unpublished] 1989. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Baltimore, Maryland, March 30 - April 1, 1989. 30 p.The relationship of population to the Industrial Revolution is such that population density and economic development in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe were causes of each other. Industrialized society allowed larger numbers of people to survive than did agrarian society. Greater agricultural yields produced by fewer people permitted more people for both non-agricultural activities and for creating demand for more products. The population in Europe during this period increased exponentially because of a plummeting death rate, higher marriage rates and birth rates, and increased life expectancy. The precise causes of these trends are still unclear, but changes in climate and rodent disease vectors and improved nutrition, transportation, and public health are cited. Contrary to accepted demographic theory, this increase in population density lead to the 1st permanent increase in living standards for the bulk of the population to above subsistence levels. Thus more people, wealthy and poor, were enabled to live. The Industrial Revolution was both a cause and a consequence of an exodus from farming. More consumers demanded better food, and thus created a demand for agricultural technology. Similar demand relationships appeared for energy development, physical and social capital, infrastructure, and social and political organization. Population density lead to better organized markets. Why an industrial revolution did not occur in China or India was probably due to serfdom and social immobility. Demographic change was an indispensable element woven into the fabric of the Industrial Revolution.
TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY. 1987; 9(3-4):261-73.Technology as a factor influencing fertility is discussed. The author argues that "technological change affects the demand for children, and hence for fertility regulation, both by directly altering the expected benefits and costs of children to parents and by influencing the cultural and social structural underpinnings of that economic calculus. Routes of that influence include the demand for education generated by competition for modern sector employment, the consumerist values and lifestyles conveyed by communications media, and the erosion of community and kin pressures on individual behavior in a more mobile and more commercialized society. Such forces for behavioral change, it is argued, are more powerful factors in fertility decline than either the 'social technology' of contraceptive service delivery (family planning programs) or improvements in the technology of contraception itself." (EXCERPT)
BMJ. British Medical Journal. 1988 Oct 1; 297(6651):824-6.To estimate the excess mortality due to alcohol [consumption] in England and Wales death rates specific to alcohol consumption that had been derived from five longitudinal studies were applied to the current population divided into categories of alcohol consumption....This resulted in an estimate of 28,000 deaths each year in England and Wales as the excess mortality among people aged 15-74 associated with alcohol consumption. (EXCERPT)
In: Tobacco: a major international health hazard. Proceedings of an international meeting organized by the IARC and co-sponsored by the All-Union Cancer Research Centre of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, USSR, held in Moscow, 4-6 June 1985, [edited by] D.G. Zaridze, R. Peto. Lyon, France, International Agency for Research on Cancer, 1986. 125-33. (IARC Scientific Publications No. 74)In most developing countries, tobacco consumption has been relatively low in the past. It has been increasing in recent years as developed countries have exported more cigarettes to developing countries, and as developing countries have cultivated more tobacco themselves to produce cheaper tobacco, at the sacrifice of food production. Tobacco sales are an important source of revenue for governments in the developing countries as in the developed countries. The spread of smoking to developing countries and the increase in tobacco consumption have had several adverse effects: an increase in lung cancer and other smoking-related diseases; an increase in economic burdens resulting from imports of cigarettes from developed countries and increased medical costs for smoking-related diseases; and decreases in production and import of foods. There are many obstacles and constraints to smoking control in the developing countries, but smoking control is badly needed to prevent lung cancer and other smoking-related diseases, to alleviate economic burdens, and to increase the production and import of foods. (author's)
JOURNAL OF MEDICAL EDUCATION. 1975 Sep; 50(9):839-48.The importance of consumer perceptions of health care services in relation to behavioral outcome was assessed in 903 household interviews in rural Illinois. The interview scale was designed to measure evaluation of health care in the area, beliefs about physician behavior, reasons for postponing doctor visits, and general attitudes toward health care services. The 18 factor scores that measured consumer perceptions were found to explain a significant amount of the variance in terms of the behavioral outcomes of number of physician visits during the preceding year, whether or not the respondent scheduled a medical check-up when not sick during the prior year, whether annual dental visits were made, and whether there had been a change in physician as a result of patient dissatisfaction. Covariates such as health status or ability to pay less significant than perceptual measures. Of particular significance were measures of patient perceptions regarding the conduct of physicians and other health care providers in relation to their patients, especially continuity and humaneness of care. Quality of care factors that emerged as significant were thoroughness, preventive measures, surgical conservatism, female health care, use of medication, information giving, and use of the health care system. These findings indicate that the perceptions of consumers of health care should be given greater emphasis in the planning and evaluation of health care systems. The authors are currently involved in further refinement and validation of rating scales that emphasize the consumer viewpoint.
[Business demographics: a new market for demographers?] Business demographics: een nieuwe markt voor demografen?
BEVOLKING EN GEZIN. 1987 Dec; (2):43-67.The author discusses the value of business demographics for marketing and management in the private business sector. The demographic factors that are most pertinent to business planning are identified and include changes in age structure, compositions of the labor force and households, and mobility. (SUMMARY IN ENG) (ANNOTATION)
Chicago, Illinois, Economics Research Center, 1987. 37 p. (Discussion Paper Series No. 87-14.)Valuation formulas for age-specific mortality risks are derived from life-cycle allocation theory under uncertainty and related to empirical estimates of the value of life. A change in an age-specific mortality risk affects all subsequent survivor functions and reallocates consumption and labor supply over the entire life cycle. The value of eliminating a risk to life at a specific age is the expected present value of consumer surplus from that age forward. Approximate numerical extrapolations from cross-section estimates imply that values decrease rapidly in current age and in the distance between current age and age at risk. (author's)
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1986; 12 Suppl:139-54.Mean family size in the industrial nations is less than the 2.1 children per couple needed for the population to remain constant over the long run. The countries of Western Europe have a mean family size of about 1.61 children per couple, with West Germany as low as 1.42, Japan at 1.71, Europe as a whole at 1.9, and the US at 1.85. The decline of births is related to 1) contraception, for the 1st time controlled by women; 2) women's employment outside the home; and 3) the democratization of decision making within couples. Work opportunities for women lower the birth rate, but they do so by freeing women from the dictatorship of men. The activity of child rearing is compared with other uncompensated activities that occupy people's leisure on the one hand, and with paid work in the other hand. Clerical work, women's current alternative to the 19th century factory, has agreeable social elements combined with tolerable and limited duties. Staying home with children can be lonely 7 days a week; it lacks crisp challenges and interpersonal relations. If parents do not spend their money and time producing children, they can apply both money and time to the purchase and use of dazzling array of other goods. Children are no longer investments in the traditional sense because 1) children are in large part no longer formed by parents but by television, schools, and peer groups; and 2) parents rely on their own savings and the state to provide for their old age. A feature of earlier high fertility was the inculcation of differentiated gender roles starting long before marriage. Women has few choices beyond raising children. The spread of high-fertility cultures did not need to be planned by anyone; sheer aithmetic worked at 2nd remove to make male dominance universal. This article argues that under modern conditions there will be few children.
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1986; 12 Suppl:69-76.The economic approach to fertility emphasizes the effects of parents' income and the cost of rearing children. With a few exceptions, this approach has neglected the analytical links between decisions by different generations of the same family. This article develops the implications of altruism toward children, where utility of parents depends on their own consumption, their fertility, and the utility of each of their children. Altruism toward children implies that the welfare of all generations of a family is linked through a dynastic utility function that depends on the consumption, fertility, and number of descendants in all generations. The head of a dynastic family acts as if he maximizes dynastic utility subject to a dynastic budget constraint, which involves the wealth inherited by the head, interest rates, the cost of rearing children in all generations, and the earnings of all descendants. The authors neglect uncertainty, marriage, the spacing of births, and capital-market restraints over life cycles and across generations. Nevertheless, even a highly simplified model of altruism toward children and the behavior of dynastic families appears to us to capture important important aspects of the dynamic behavior of fertility and consumption. If so, a new approach would be warranted to the analysis of trends and long-term fluctuations in fertility, population growth, and consumption.
In: Return migration and regional economic problems, edited by Russell King. London, England, Croom Helm, 1986. 152-70.This paper looks at the adjustment made by return migrants to resettling in small communities in western Ireland. Although some theories suggest that the psychic costs of return migration may be low due to prior experience with the destination, the cases described here present a different picture. Some migrants pick up quickly where they left off; others become unhappy and disillusioned. While returnees are often better off financially than their neighbors, they are often bitter and disappointed about life in their homeland. The sample included 606 return migrants from County Cork in the south to County Donegal in the north. 51% of the migrants were men, and 49% were women. The average length of stay abroad was 17 years. The greatest readjustment problem for returnees is dealing with the slow pace of life in Ireland and coping with widespread inefficiency. The 2nd most important problem involves reestablishing relationships with local people; returnees felt that local people were narrow-minded and nosey. Many returnees had forgotten the severity of Irish winters. 1/10 of the returnees found the economic situation very unfavorable. A moderate relationship was found between readjustment and both housing and job satisfaction. The variable most strongly related to adjustment was a satisfactory social life. Developing friendships and gaining local acceptance are very important; conformity may be the key factor in gaining local acceptance. Migrants, on the whole, do not learn skills abroad that they are able to use at home. Purchasing a home remains returnees' highest priority, although many also use savings to set up a small business. Returnees may affect their communities most by example; young people may see them as more worldly and well-to-do than nonmigrants and be encouraged to follow their example.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL. 1984; 36(3):519-36.The processes of acculturation and the social integration of immigrants are as complex as the societies involved in the international movements of people. Sociocultural adaptation may occur without undue conflict where the receiving society is experiencing economic growth and relative affluence, but gives rise to problems where unemployment is high or there is competition for other scarce resources, such as housing, education, or welfare. Immigrant adaptation is influenced by 1) pre-migration conditions; 2) the transitional experience in moving from 1 country to another; and 3) migrant characteristics and conditions in the receiving country, including government policies and economic factors. Other important determinants include 1) age of arrival in the new country; 2) the immigrants' education and qualifications; 3) their degree of exposure to the mass media, including ethnic newspapers, radio, and television; and 4) the types of social networks entered into in the receiving country. The motives and intentions of the migrants themselves are an important pre-migration factor. A distinction exists between voluntary and involuntary migration. Immigration generally involves some desocialization; this is not only easier for children, it is also assisted by the schools. Education, more than any other single factor, may explain subsequent sociocultural adaptation. Most contemporary forms of recreation, sport, entertainment, and popular culture are independent of language, nationality, or cultural boundaries. Soccer, football, and cricket unite spectators and participants alike, whatever their ethnic origin. Music and movies serve much the same purpose. Refrigeration and rapid transportation have made formerly exotic foods available to all and have changed the life styles and consumer habits of peoples throughout the more affluent countries. After age on arrival and education, length of residence in the new country is the single most important determinant of adaptation. Recent global economic crises have aggravated the problems of adaptation facing immigrants and their children, increasing hostility toward them by those who feel threatened by "foreigners."
[Unpublished] 1985 Mar. 55 p.This study presents new analysis and evidence on the link between population growth and national saving. Analysis was based on the variable rate-of-growth effect model (Mason, 1981; Fry and Mason, 1982), which distinguishes 2 population growth effects: the rate of growth effect and the dependency effect. The paper's 1st section reviews previous research on the saving population growth link, including applications of the variable rate-of-growth effect model. Its 2nd part presents an extension of the variable rate-of-growth effect model by linking factors determining the number of children reared to the budget shares devoted to childbearing and, in turn, to the national saving rate. Part 3 presents estimates from international cross-section data covering the 1960-80 period. The final section uses the neoclassical growth model to show circumstances under which the rate of growth effect dominates the dependency effect reversing the relationship between population growth and saving. Available evidence from the international cross-section supports the proposition that a higher dependency ratio leads to lower saving, particularly among countries with moderate to high rates of income growth. At the mean rate of growth observed over the last 2 decades for the 70 countries analyzed, a decline from a high to a low childbearing regime generated an increase in the net national saving rate of about 5% -- nearly a 50% increase. The results reported also addressed the magnitude and validity of the equivalent adult consumer unit. Aggregate consumption data imply an equivalent adult consumer unit of about 1/3. The analysis implies that simulation models that are based on equivalent adult consumer unit can provide useful insights about the relationship between population growth and aggregate consumption and saving rates. The analysis fails to fully resolve the issue of the relative importance of the rate of growth and dependency effects. It is based on the neoclassical growth model for which the equilibrium rate of growth of national income increases point for point with an increase in the rate of growth of population. Given the long periods required to adjust from one equilibrium to another, the steady-state results of the neoclassical model may have limited relevance to the design and evaluation of development and population policy. Although the model proposed clearly delineates the link between children, household saving, and national saving, the role ascribed to children is limited. Only that children require household resources for their support is acknowledged.
Research in Population Economics. 1984; 5:29-50.A model of life cycle fertility is developed using the language and framework of optimal control theory. The chief characteristic of children that distinguishes them from other consumer durables is, in the language of the optimal growth theory, the "irreversibility of investment." As the good does not depreciate in the ordinary sense, the stock must be monotonically nondecreasing over time. The optimal profile of fertility is, for this reason, characterized by the same type of "bang-bang" behavior found in many optimal growth problems. Yet, the fertility decision is complicated considerably by several other factors. Chief among these is the intrinsic relation to the labor-supply decision, for having children implies inevitable constraints on the mother's or father's time. Thus, optimal labor-supply decisions also must be considered. The model is developed in stages, proceeding from very simple to the more complex models. 1 section introduces the impact of fertility on the future demands for home time. It is shown that optimal fertility profiles follow turnpike paths similar to those in the growth-theory literature. A subsequent section introduces labor-supply and human-captial considerations. As the models become more complex, solutions become harder to derive and are often only outlined. The analysis provides some theoretical basis for expecting certain shapes of the life-cycle profiles of fertility, labor supply, and wages. Fertility profiles may be of 2 shapes--one beginning at a high rate, falling to a lower rate, then to zero; and one beginning at zero, rising to a moderate rate, then falling back down to zero. Labor supply profiles can be of a number of different shapes, but the impact of childbearing is to lower hours worked during the early childrearing period. As the children mature, hours worked rise (or at least fall more slowly) as home time responsibilities lessen, although the level to which they rise will probably be lower than before the 1st birth. Log-wage profiles rise during the period before the 1st birth, then either fall or rise more slowly during the early years of childbearing, and then rise again as the children mature. These shapes have been inferred from a control-theory model that is quite complex and which could use considerably more delineation than has been achieved here. Closed-form solutions to the model have not been obtained, nor have any formal comparative dynamics been performed. As the model stands it is too complex to be empirically implemented. Such implementation would be desirable.
Family decisionmaking over the life cycle: some implications for estimating the effects of income maintenance programs.
Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 1973 Nov. 62 p. ([Rand Report] R-1121-EDA/OEO Grant No. OER 388-G-71-11 Grant No. 90088-D-72-01)The standard 1 period labor supply model that economists have used is in some ways an inadequate tool to evaluate a Family Assistance Plan (FAP). The main difficulty is that an FAP will have important interperiod life or cycle effects. In the standard model, which contains just 1 time period, interperiod effects are ignored. The 1 period model is appropriate only when the proposal being investigated does not alter the incentives to substitute economic activity between item periods. But an FAP will typically change an individual's wages by different percentage amounts at different points in his life cycle, providing him with incentives to alter the timing of his market participation. Observing the change in labor supplied in only 1 period can give a misleading indication of the total effect of an FAP. For the purpose of studying an FAP, a complete model of labor supply must incorporate its effects on the timing of market responses. Recent contributions have permitted inclusion of the timing aspects in an economic model of choice. By extending the original 1 period model to a lifetime context, it was possible to place in sharp focus the previously neglected influence of cyclincal, seasonal, and life cycle movements in wage rates and other variables. The pure life cycle model is deprived here without reference to its implications for an FAP. The timing of market participation is shown to depend on the life cycle wage pattern of men and women, the rate of interest and the rate of time preference, and any age related changes in the productivity of nonmarket uses of time. A comparison of the predictions of the pure life cycle and pure 1 period models attempts to clarify circumstances under which the life cycle model should be used and those under which the single period model is appropriate. The theoretical model is then used to predict and analyze the expected labor supply effects of an FAP. The effects of an FAP partly reflect life cycle considerations and partly the more standard 1 period model. The appropriate model to use, a marriage of the 2 pure special cases, shows that it is essential to identify those periods in the family life cycle when the family is eligible for benefits and those in which it is not. The use of the 1 period model has probably led researchers to underestimate the magnitude of the labor market withdrawals in those years in which the family is eligible for benefits. Human capital investments are included in the model. This generalization leads to a number of predictions concerning which groups in society are most likely to have the largest labor supply reactions to an FAP. Economic theory in fact suggests that young married women and those individuals in older families will exhibit larger reductions in market work than other groups in society. An empirical simulation of the predicted effects on an FAP on the hours behavior of men and women is included. Results show a much larger effect of an FAP on work behavior of married women than on work behavior of male heads of households. (author's modified)
Population and Environment. 1983 Winter; 6(4):255-93.Because the earth's natural resources are finite and are growing increasingly more difficult to exploit, energy and resource conversation will soon become essential to our way of life. Psychologists and other social scientists can help in that transition, and recently they have begun to do relevant research in several areas; environmental pollution, recycling and solid wastes, reducing litter, and energy usage and conservation. Research approaches that have been used include studies of environmental and energy attitudes, behavioral research, social interaction studies, community conservation programs, and largescale consumer research. More work is especially needed on the topics of transportation energy use, industrial and commercial energy conservation, and community action campaigns. Research efforts should increasingly utilize measures of actual behavior and actual energy usage, longterm longitudinal approaches, realistic field settings, and cost effective procedures. In addition to doing research, psychologists can contribute to the advent of societal conservation through program evaluation studies, proposals for innovation, dissemination of validated scientific knowledge, and the offering of policy advice. (author's modified)
In: Goldscheider C, ed. Urban migrants in developing nations: patterns and problems of adjustment. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983. 47-90.Discussion focuses on the adjustments of migrants to Seoul, Korea, analyzing the variety of ways migrants differ from lifetime residents and how recent and longterm migrants differ from each other. The socioeconomic characteristics of movers and nonmovers include: father's occupation, age, sex, education, and marital status. Move related variables apply only to migrants and include: farm or nonfarm background, rural or urban origins of the last move, previous exposure to urban areas, age sex marital status at the time of the move, and whether the move was alone or with family. Adjustment was analyzed in terms of labor force and occupational patterns, employment in modern and large industries, income, consumption patterns, housing, social and personal situation, organizational and friendship networks, and traditionalism and personal satisfaction. Recent migrants to Seoul have approximately the same levels of employment as longterm migrants, 89.6 versus 90.6%. Among recent migrants there are more persons in school than unemployed; among longterm migrants there are considerably fewer enrolled in school, with most unemployed. Lifetime urban residents have fewer persons employed, less than 80% of the total, with both higher school enrollment and higher unemployment. The different age compositions of these migrant residence categories account in part for the observed differences. Only 37% of recent migrants are employed in modern industries compared to over 50% of lifetime urban residents. Longterm inmigrants resemble most closely the lifetime urban residents, with 48% in modern enterprises. Over 57% of those with prior urban exposure are employed in modern industries. Income differences have an important role in the adjustment of migrants in the urban setting as a consequence of employment patterns and as a condition for obtaining consumer objects. There are significant differences in the personal income of migrants compared to lifetime urban residents. When the control variables of age, education, and father's occupation are introduced these effects are statistically reduced. Overall, recent migrants show ownership of considerably fewer objects than both lifetime urban residents and longterm migrants. Both migrant groups are relatively disadvantaged in the quality of their housing compared to the lifetime urban residents, but the disadvantage is very slight. Of all the dimensions of social and personal adjustment considered, membership in formal or informal organizations is most clearly related to potential migrant marginality in the urban structure. The differential shown is very pronounced and the standard of lifetime urban residents is approached only by educationally motivated migrants and those with some prior urban exposure, yet the pattern of social participation varies more by sociodemographic characteristics than by migrant recency. No evidence exists in support of the hypothesis that migrants to the cities compare unfavorably with the lifetime urban residents in their traditional attitudes. Age and education account for most of the observed differences in traditional attitudes.
The adjustment of migrants in large cities of less developed countries: some comparative observations.
In: Goldscheider C, ed. Urban migrants in developing nations: patterns and problems of adjustment. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983. 233-53.Results of 4 case studies of Indonesia, South Korea, Iran, and Colombia may be compared along 3 broad dimensions of migrant adjustment to urban places: labor force, including employment and occupational patterns; housing, consumption, and income; and social and psychological elements of adjustment. Occupational changes and the economic mobility of migrants have important consequences for other forms of urban modern adjustments. Better jobs, higher incomes, quality housing, and increased consumer consumption are directly linked. These, in turn, are connected to social and social-psychological adjustments as well as to educational increases for the children of migrants. Occupational changes thus become the pivot around which migration and modernization revolve. Whatever the specific pattern, the relationships between migration and occupation are intertwined in complex ways with the economic development and social modernization of less developed countries. Comparative findings on occupational prestige lead to 3 conclusions: migrants are not particularly disadvantaged in terms of job prestige relative to comparable lifetime urban residents; occupational differences between migrants and natives reflect the background disadvantages of migrants, rather than the impact of migration per se; and over time, migrants attain the occupational levels that are consistent with their skills, education, and experience. These findings, almost without exception, emerge from all 4 case studies. In Korea and Iran, some elements of urban housing and neighborhoods quality are unrelated to migrant status. In Seoul, migrants and natives live in the same quality neighborhoods, consistent with their income and educational levels. Neither recency of migration nor migrant status was specifically associated with neighborhood quality. Parallel findings were reported for migrants to Tehran. 2 other measures of housing showed significant differences between migrants and lifetime urban residents: number of rooms per person and home ownership. Clearly migration status has a significant effect on some aspects of housing quality in Seoul and Tehran. Migrants to Surabaya are no worse off in terms of housing than those born in city. All migrants seem to improve their housing over time, yet 2 subgroups of migrants are particularly disadvantaged: migrants of farm background and the low income self employed. Regarding personal adjustment, defined in terms of traditionalism and satisfaction indexes, the case studies for Korea, Indonesia, and Colombia show little variation among migrant groups or between migrants and lifetime urban residents. The comparative examination of these studies suggests several interrelated, yet independent, dimensions of adjustment. Migrants adjust in some ways and not in other, while some migrants adjust better than others. Adjustment varies with the social, economic, political, and cultural context of urban places and changes over time. The overwhelming impression gained from these studies is that migration is positive for the migrants.
[Causal hypotheses on fertility: the preponderant role of the family unit] Hipotesis causales sobre fecundidad: el papel preponderante de la unidad familiar.
Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 1983 Jan-Mar; (21):83-101.This article reviews fertility theories proposed by economists, sociologists, and demographers over the past few decades and assesses their suitability to the Spanish case. In the early 1960s the foundations for the so-called new home economics were laid by Becker and others of the Chicago school of microeconomics. Becker held that once contraception became available to all population groups, childbearing decisions would be made in the same way as those for any other consumer good. Becker concluded that income is a direct function of the number of children and their quality. In 1962 Friedmann, within the same model, argued that children like automobiles or any other good-were associated with benefits as well as costs. Judith Blake in 1968 criticized both positions, pointing out that the rich have not had more children in any developed society and that the acquisition of children is not under the same cost constraints as that of other goods. Modifications of the theory by Becker gave greater importance to sociological variables. Leibenstein proposed an explanatory model which related fertility change to economic development through an examination of costs and benefits at different stages. Easterlin used the theory of Kuznets cycles to argue that the size of a cohort is related negatively to its fertility, with the fundamental variable being the labor market. He later proposed a more elaborate model that synthesized economic and sociological arguments and introduced new variables with emphasis on endogenous preferences and ferility. Use of sociological concepts such as "tastes", "desires", and "behavior", and of the term "relative" to suggest subjective perceptions depending on cultural context has become common in economic theories of fertility. The only fertility model elaborated in demography is that of the demographic transition, which has been criticized for being more descriptive than explanatory. In sociology a series of variables have been related to fertility, with only partial success. Some of the hypotheses were studied by means of large surveys, a program culmintting in the World Fertility Survey. Fertility differentials by income and rural or urban residence have been the only 2 generalizable findings to date. Finally, the analytical model of Davis and Blake listed the intermediate variables through which social factors were related to fertility. Sociological explanations are increasing in importance for nonsociologists, especially economists and demographers, and family structure in particular has assumed strategic importance. A scarcity of empirical work on fertility in Spain has hampered testing of fertility theories there. Hypotheses bearing on the determinants of fertility decisions should be tested in Spain, with preconscious-factors such as imitation, pressure exerted by the family and social circle, and affective relations as well as structural factors examined.